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This paper seeks to extend the median voter model of the "size of government" (Meltzer and Richards) by incorporating legislative institutions. I take three of the leading models of Congressional policy making and analyze their respective predictions about the size of the tax and transfer system. The models are the distributive/committee model (Shepsle and Weingast), the partisan model (Cox and McCubbins, Aldrich and Rohde) and the informational model (Krehbiel). After making these models comparable and applying them to redistribution policy formation, it becomes clear why Meltzer and Richard's model of redistribution policy has failed to stand up to empirical tests. In their model, the policy outcome is the national median voter's ideal point. However, in reality this median voter in the United States only gets to vote for his or her member of Congress, and that member's location in the ideological distribution of Congress may or may not be the median. Further, the median member of Congress may not be the actor whose ideal point becomes the policy outcome. The predictions of each of the models are then tested using two different empirical approaches. The first is a time series approach using data on redistribution at the national level. The second test uses a cross section of data from state legislatures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of complexity science and agent based models has been growing within social science, in general, and specifically within political science. The tools of complexity have been used to examine a wide range of social science issues; collective action, elections, political economy, macroeconomics, and international relations. As of yet, though, there has been very little application of the tools of complexity science to issues associated with American political institutions. This project seeks to begin that process by taking a complex adaptive systems approach to the United States Congress. Traditionally formal models of Congress have used a game theoretic approach. However we believe that there are analytical gains to be made by using the agent based approach. Systems that have dynamics, heterogeneous agents, non-linear interactions, adaptation, positive and negative feedback, and externalities are prime candidates for an application of the complex adaptive systems approach. We make the argument in this paper that each of these properties is an important (and often core) attribute of the congressional policy making system. In order to illustrate the analytical leverage of the complex systems approach we first build a set of models that replicate the most prominent models of congressional policy making. To these we add a model using the complex adaptive systems approach. We are then able to simulate a simple public goods allocation problem in each model and view the various policy outcomes. The core feature of our model is that it allows the pivotal agent to arise endogenously. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An agent based model of presidential primaries, viewing them as a complex adaptive system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We test several claims about the relationship between unanimity rule and Pareto optimality. Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Mueller (2003), and other scholars argue that unanimity rule is more capable of producing Pareto optimal outcomes than other voting rules, such as majority rule, because unanimity rule passes an alternative only if it makes everyone better off. Majority rule can pass alternatives that make some individuals worse off. Dougherty and Edward (2008), in contrast, claim that majority rule is at least as likely to select Pareto optimal outcomes as unanimity rule in finite games if proposals are random, sincere, or strategic. We test the two sets of conjectures in a two dimensional framework using laboratory experiments. Our results suggest: 1) majority rule enters the Pareto set more quickly than unanimity rule, 2) majority rule leaves the Pareto set at the same rate as unanimity rule, and 3) majority rule is more likely to select a Pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule in the final round of play. Our results also suggest that proposers do not behave observationally-rational in the final round and complete information does not affect the primary result. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]