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In this article, I respond to critics of Plato and the Mythic Tradition in Political Thought. First, I defend my choice to carve up the concept of myth into deep myths and literary myths. I address concerns that the effective focus of my book on literary myths risks jettisoning the political stakes of myth, and that it may not solve the definitional problems the move seeks to mitigate. Second, I answer my critics' invitation to elaborate on the relationship between myth and critical reason. In particular, I attempt to resolve the tension they perceive between my definition of myth, as a medium that is distinctively opaque to criticism, and my argument that it can complement critical thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction presents an overview of Plato and the Mythic Tradition in Political Thought and its central arguments. I situate the contributions of the book within theoretical work on political myth, both traditional and more recent, and also within scholarship on the philosophical function of Plato's myths. Whereas political theorists have long conceived of myth in pathological terms, Plato and the Mythic Tradition joins a growing body of work envisioning a more constructive role for myth in politics and philosophy. This was a task that preoccupied Plato and some of his most significant modern readers. Recovering their common project, moreover, helps us tell a different story about Plato's philosophical myths and their reception in modern political thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a visualist theory of design that contrasts with the instrumental rationalism that dominates the philosophy of design. My critique of rationalism is based on two omnipresent and paradigmatic phenomena in design: the variety of forms for one single function and the variety of uses of one form. Instrumental rationalism defines design as a coherent line that runs from a rational goal to the proper means and proper use of an object. Therefore, this philosophy values design according to its efficiency. However, the diverse aesthetic forms of design objects and the creative ways that users engage with them. do not follow the instrumental rational plan, but rather aesthetic motivations and design's visual affordance. I argue that the variety of forms of design objects and emergent uses are often more substantial than rationality in the constitution of design. Claiming that these encounters are innate to our essence and ontology as visual beings, I offer a visualist anti-rationalist theory of design and human nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Teacher education reforms worldwide have reinforced a narrative that 'high-quality' teaching and teachers are the most significant contributors to raising education achievement, reducing societal inequities, and boosting economic development. Consequently, countries have put substantial efforts into regulating initial teacher education (ITE) to ensure graduates are 'ready' to deliver 'high-quality' practice tackling education and societal issues. This paper problematises the widespread narrative of ITE by critiquing the construction of 'ready to teach' graduates in a leading New Zealand ITE regulatory policy. I argue that teaching and assessing 'readiness' via ITE has reinforced 'linearity' and 'technical rationalism' in defining what it is to be a teacher. It has also reflected humanist-colonial discourses that placed solely human agency, capacity, and achievement at the centre of global progress. I propose making a qualitative shift in conceptualising ITE and moving away from defining 'quality' and 'achievement' through a set of 'special properties essential to the human knowing subject'. Recognising that the knowing subject is never the teacher alone, but is a living constellation of human, nonhuman, and more-than-human elements with distributed agency is vital for inviting alternative teacher becomings that societies need to change the status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultivating rational thinking, rather than solely adhering to the text of Islam, can be a different crucial approach to Islamic pedagogy. We can find some of these differences in the post-Prophetic period when influential figures shaped differing interpretations of Islamic thought. This paper examines two major Islamic theological perspectives regarding the role of rational, logic, and interpretation in understanding sacred texts. The Ahl al-Hadith and Ash’ari school emphasises strict adherence to textual sources, often rejecting interpretative approaches, in contrast to the Ahl al-Ra’y and Mu’tazila schools, which give precedence to reason and interpretation. These divergent views have significantly influenced contemporary Islamic education, leading to notable differences in the method of curricula of Islamic studies. This paper explores how these perspectives shape the content of Grades 1 to 6 of Islamic studies textbooks in Iran and Saudi Arabia, focusing on their impact on developing logic, reasoning, and interpretive skills among students at this crucial stage of intellectual growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay is concerned with a passage from §24 of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia, in which Hegel characterises the concepts or ‘thoughts’ developed in the discipline of metaphysics by saying that they ‘used to count as expressing the essentialities of things’. I begin by drawing attention to Hegel’s use of the past tense in this passage and suggest that it looks problematic for conceptual realist interpreters of Hegel’s idealism, who want, roughly, to attribute to him the view that thoughts or ‘thought-determinations’ express the essentialities of things. I then develop this challenge with help from Robert Pippin, who takes Hegel, in this passage, to be rejecting the metaphysical projects of pre-Kantian European rationalism. If Pippin is right, then in this passage Hegel is in fact distancing himself from the view that conceptual realist accounts attribute to him. In the final part of the article, I re-examine some of Hegel’s remarks concerning the history of European metaphysics and offer an alternative, better explanation of Hegel’s use of the past tense in the passage in question, one which neutralises the objection to conceptual realist accounts of Hegel’s idealism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In history a decade is an eyeblink. In a Journal devoted to classical liberalism and complexity, it is an appropriate time to reflect on core principles and enduring themes. We should reflect, as Hayek continually noted, on purging oversimplifications and well-meaning political attempts to "improve" upon the actual, which is to say the original, liberal theory of social organization. That theory coalesced primarily in writings of the Scottish moralists of the 18th century, such as David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith. We must constantly re-emphasize that, unlike other political views, liberalism as a political position is based upon negative prohibitions to actions, not prescriptions of particular actions that must be performed. We need to go "back to the future" to understand that it is actual liberalism, rather than socialism (as contemporary progressivists constantly but falsely claim) which has never actually been practiced. The progressivist perversion of liberalism, found today in cultural Marxism and "market" socialism, requiring conscious, directed central planning and defined control structures, has in fact been attempted in the past, and, because of its internal structural limitations (detailed beautifully a century ago by Mises (1981), and eighty years ago by Popper (2011, 2013), can never be achieved. Inevitably backwards oriented to tribal existence, progressivist alternatives overstate the positive effects that can be achieved by deliberate intervention into complex social phenomena. In following such "alternatives," unforeseen negative consequences stifle spontaneous organization, exacerbating problems they were supposed to cure, inevitably creating additional new ones. Liberalism, as a spontaneously evolving series of institutions and constraints on behavior, simply gradually abandons what does not succeed in favor of alternatives that in fact still work. That is the sense in which it is internally empirically driven, and retains the testability of actual scientific fields. This is why there are no final or "certain" solutions, only compromises. Progressivism is not internally driven, and (exactly like conservatism) has to respond in "catch up" fashion to changes that are external to its stated programs. The political "theory" framework formulation of evolutionary liberalism is found primarily in the later work of Hayek (especially 1979, 1983, and 1989). In that framework, liberalism has not failed and is not in need of reformulation or supplementation, but rather has not yet overcome powerful emotional resistance and good sounding ideas from primitivism and tribalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ling Ma’s post-apocalyptic novel Severance (2018), like many examples of the genre, has generally been interpreted as a progressive work. This essay contends, however, that it expresses a conservative disposition as English philosopher Michael Oakeshott defined it, with clear preferences for the familiar over the unknown and a disdain for utopias. A close reading of Severance through the lens of Oakeshott’s philosophy reveals that change is shown as negative, since both the world after a deadly pandemic strikes and pre-2010 New York are portrayed as diminished by disruption – and as devoid of a sense of adventure that might otherwise turn disruption interesting. Furthermore, the novel warns of ideology and teleology: the apocalypse remains unexplained and is not used to communicate criticism or lessons, while the progressive and totalitarian characters that aim to impose a grand vision on the rest are ridiculed, and the personal and the private appear as tantamount. Finally, laissez-faire capitalism and the neo-liberal state are criticized not so much for their inherent exploitation, but for forcing a lifestyle onto people that is without alternative, that they did not choose, that (through the hegemony of work) leads to a profanation of life, and that causes an erosion of tradition.

The article "THE DEBATE ABOUT THE WAYS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD" presents an analysis of the ways that aim to prove the existence of God, highlighting the importance of Saint Thomas Aquinas in perennial philosophy. The positions of various thinkers throughout history are discussed, from the Church Fathers to nominalism and Cartesian rationalism. The importance of metaphysics and transcendental causality in Thomistic ways is emphasized, which seek to demonstrate the existence of God through participation and conservation of being in all things. [Extracted from the article]

This article discusses explanations behind theory choice, that is, ultimately, what leads people to accept a certain claim as valid. There has been a recent debate as to how closure was achieved in the continental-drift discussion. The controversy had found its usual explanation under rationalist terms: Wegener's 1912 continental-drift theory was accepted 50 years later only after the plate tectonic theory had provided more evidence or a more in-depth problem-solving capacity. Nevertheless, a re-examination of the controversy under constructivist terms argued that closure was achieved by a change in the style of thought. This analysis prompted some authors to react calling to a 'defence of rationalism' and insisting on explaining that the continental-drift theory was only accepted because of epistemic reasons. As the debate impacts on the way to explain scientific controversies, in this article I analyze rationalist and constructivist approaches with respect to ways to explain the social acceptance or rejection of a theory. The analytical perspectives will be contextualized within a broader theoretical discussion in philosophy and social sciences about the role of different factors that condition knowledge, which will also include an empirical approximation in the analysis of GMO and continental-drift controversies. Ultimately, the debate with rationalism is situated in a broader context about the ways of explaining the social acceptance of a theory, arguing that the problem with the rationalism that confuses a purely logical explanation with a sociological one is that it tends to judge rather than understand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Contemporary Educational Studies / Sodobna Pedagogika is the property of Association of Slovenian Educationalists and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper considers the formulation of the moral requirement against hypocrisy, paying particular attention to the logical scope of 'requires' in that formulation. The paper argues (i) that we should prefer a wide-scope formulation to a narrow-scope formulation, and (ii) this result has some advantages for our normative theorizing about hypocrisy—in particular, it allows us to resist several of Daniela Dover's (2019) recent arguments against the anti-hypocrisy requirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I reevaluate Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori contra a Kantian pure modal rationalism according to which modal cognition is a priori. I argue that Kripke's critique of Kant suggests an impure but nevertheless ambitious modal rationalism according to which the basis of modal cognition remains a priori. I then argue that Kripke's critique of pure modal rationalism does not go deep enough. More specifically, I argue that certain conditional modal judgments, which Kripke regards as a priori, are, in fact, a posteriori. An example is the conditional modal judgment that if gold is a metal, then it is necessary that gold is a metal (if gold exists). However, Chalmers has developed a general frontloading strategy for turning a posteriori conditionals into a priori ones. So, I consider whether the frontloading strategy may be applied in a development of a modest modal rationalist account of the necessary a posteriori. Although the frontloading strategy is attractive for the modal rationalist, I argue for a twofold conclusion. First, I conclude that a posteriori conditionals constitute a serious and unanswered challenge to modal rationalists. Second, I conclude that the frontloading strategy does not by itself provide a response to this challenge and that substantiating the strategy is problematic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Educational Studies (1673-1298) is the property of Journal of Educational Studies Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a set‐theoretic approach that enables accounting for causal complexity, incorporating features of qualitative and quantitative methods. Pioneered in sociology, it is increasingly used in comparative research to explain social phenomena in various disciplines. Despite its growing adoption, and because of its eclectic nature, some methodological themes have proven elusive. Its philosophy of science is one such issue. Philosophical pragmatism, which focuses on action, rather than the mind as rationalism or things as empiricism, is proposed to fill this void. Moving beyond the positivist‐interpretivist dichotomy, this paper argues that pragmatism's philosophical wagers support QCA's assumptions and practice. Moreover, pragmatism's implications in terms of practical consequences, provisionality of insights, plurality of method, and public participation provide fertile soil on which QCA‐based inquiry can sow, producing pragmatic comparative research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Part Five of Spinoza's Ethics includes a notoriously challenging set of propositions about human perfection. Part of the difficulty in interpreting these elements of the work arises from neglecting important philosophical background for the relevant propositions, namely, medieval Jewish rationalism and Maimonides in particular. Spinoza was well acquainted with Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexted as well as his halakhic or legal writings. For both Spinoza and Maimonides (who, in turn, is a good Aristotelian on this matter), human perfection is essentially a cognitive matter, albeit one with an affective component, whereby the highest good for a human being consists in the superb and joyful intellectual condition that is the knowledge and love of God. My goal in this essay, then, is to see whether any light can be thrown on Spinoza's views on this topic by considering them through a Maimonidean lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Italy’s long and stratified history offers abundant heritage resources, with Rome serving as a showcase for the architectural embodiment of political and ideological changes over time. Among these periods, the Fascist regime under Benito Mussolini initiated extensive urban and architectural renewal projects, notably exemplified by the Foro Italico, a monumental sports complex that is still actively used. The present contribution retraces the elements constituting Fascist architectural heritage in Italy and explores how Italian people comprehend and interpret the dissonant heritage site of the Foro Italico. Departing from previous approaches, this research employs a conservation perspective, exploring, among others, architectural and socio-cultural values associated with the complex. By analysing the motives underlying its unceasing use, this study seeks to understand why citizens continue to create new experiences and memories at the site despite its contentious ideological symbolism, without undergoing modern damnatio memoriae or de-commemoration processes, thus contributing to ongoing debates on heritage management and the politics of memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Taking inspiration from Hume, I advance a conception of the part of morality concerned with right and wrong, rooted in the actual moral rules established and followed within our society. Elsewhere, I have argued this approach provides a way of thinking about how we are genuinely “bound in a moral way” to keep our moral obligations that it is both ethically attractive and psychologically realistic. Here, I focus on some implications for our evaluation and criticism of actions, which some may initially find peculiar. Sometimes we should judge of an action that it was (unqualifiedly) right, and the result of flawless reasoning by the agent; and yet, we may also have cause to regard that same action as, in other respects, deeply morally deficient. Using Nomy Arpaly's conception of “responsiveness to right‐making moral reasons” as a foil, I argue that this unorthodox implication leads to more subtle and helpful evaluations of actions—especially actions undertaken in the context of wicked social institutions. The conception also encourages us to take a more conflicted, less confident, attitude toward many of our own righteous and rational actions—and perhaps even toward our capacity for living together by moral rules itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores Jonathan Swift's portrayal of reason and its relationship with faith in Gulliver's Travels, with particular focus on Gulliver's loss of faith and his submission to the autonomy of reason. Topics discussed include Swift's critique of Cartesian rationalism, the connection between reason and faith in Gulliver's transformation, and the competing interpretations of Swift's view on reason.

This paper focuses on school choice within the public school system in Queensland, Australia. While school choice has typically been framed as a logic of economic rationalism (for middle-class families), in this paper we use Ahmed's concept of the cultural politics of emotion to describe a more complex dimension of choice through gendered community. We argue that mothers become responsibilized for school choice, and in the process become emotionally invested in school choosing. In managing their soft bodily desires and hard cognitive rationalities, they are responding to the emotional histories that stick to schools. The problem we frame through our empirical case is that there is a clash of cultures between the type of school mothers desire, and the reality of what schools are, and could ever be. This is the double-bind or 'cruel optimism' of mothering school-aged children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When it comes to invasive manipulation of animals on the biological level, reactions of disgust are common and often influential on people's moral judgments. As a case in point, the Belgian Blue, a breed of hyper-enhanced cattle which will serve as a case study for the present article, has historically been met with revulsion. Traditionally, in bio- and animal ethics, this 'yuck factor,' has been denied any productive role in proper moral justification, since rationalism is still a dominant paradigm in those disciplines. This is not surprising since rationalism offers the fulfilment of certain expectations we have of morality, like universality, intersubjective communicability, and objectivity. Increasingly, however, the preconceptions of rationalism have been brought into question, both through empirical as well as philosophical insights. In this paper, we will explore a way in which researchers who are, accordingly, critical of rationalism, and who wish to take seriously the role disgust plays in the formation of moral judgments when it comes to biological manipulation of animals, can do so without abandoning those virtues of rationalism which make it such an appealing position. We will do so by offering what we call a 'tempered' kind of rationalism, that is, one which conceives of rationality in the terms of Mary Midgley, not as distinct from, but as a possible function of, well-ordered emotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In The Birth of Tragedy , Nietzsche contrasts the rationalism and optimism of Socrates with the tragic outlook of the "Dionysian Greeks." Most scholars read him as taking the side of the Dionysian Greeks against Socrates. I argue that Nietzsche presents the Dionysian as an essentially religious perspective, characterized by a proto-Christian need for redemption or "metaphysical solace" he implicitly disavows. Nietzsche himself occupies a perspective which incorporates elements of the Dionysian and the Socratic and gestures towards a higher synthesis, which like Socratic philosophy is reflective and contemplative, delighting in the pursuit and enjoyment of knowledge, but like Dionysian wisdom acknowledges the limits of rationalism. This new philosophy is neither tragic nor optimistic but playful and comic or, perhaps, tragicomic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, every fact has an explanation. An important challenge to this principle is that it risks being a counterexample to itself. What explains why everything needs to be explained? My first goal is to distinguish two broad kinds of answers to this question, which I call "Humean Rationalism" and "Non-Humean Rationalism". My second goal will be to defend the prospects of Humean Rationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the reevaluation of the "Middle Ages" in light of modern rationalism and medieval philosophy. Topics discussed include the modern critique of medieval rationalism; the contrast between medieval and modern thought regarding reason and authority; the role of priest Aquinas and rabbi Maimonides in bridging ancient and modern thought; and the integration of natural reason with divine authority in Christian philosophy.

According to the most widely accepted view, Imāmism and Muʿtazilism were originally poles apart. Subsequently, proselytes physically transported Muʿtazilī theology to Imāmī circles where it was adopted by the Banū Nawbakht among others. The basic problem with this explanation is that intellectual developments remain disconnected from wider social and political realities, which obscures the illocutionary force of texts and distorts their significance. Therefore, the first part of this article examines the background to the Imāmī turn toward rationalism. To understand the assimilation of Muʿtazilism as a creative historical process, intellectual developments are placed in the context of three sociopolitical factors: the crisis of the Occultation, Buwayhid patronage, and the religious topography of Baghdad. The second part of the article compares two texts that represent the evolution of Imāmī theology in this period: Ibn Bābawayh's Iʿtiqādāt al-imāmiyya and al-Mufīd's Taṣḥīḥ iʿtiqādāt al-imāmiyya. When historicised properly, a detailed comparison of these creeds suggests a more nuanced understanding of the Imāmī turn toward rationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic Revolution is the property of University of Tehran and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The pragma-dialectical research program begins with a philosophical estate, in which a conception of reasonableness is offered that must serve as ground for the theoretical estate. Pragma-dialectics has produced many important insights in the theoretical estate, including the ideal model and the rules for critical discussions. However, here I will argue that the conception of reasonableness that the pragma-dialecticians adopt in the philosophical estate, based on anti-dogmatism, assumption of fallibilism and willingness to engage in critical discussion, is too narrow to support the whole system of pragma-dialectical rules. What the philosophical estate requires is a broad and rich conception of excellent performance in argumentative practice, which then the rules of the critical discussion are intended to capture systematically in the theoretical estate. In my view, a virtue approach to argumentation is the ideal framework for such a philosophical ground. Virtues such as intellectual empathy, intellectual honesty, faith in reason, or recognition of reliable authority, point towards aspects of a philosophical conception of excellent arguing that are absent in the pragma-dialectical view of reasonableness. Finally, I will argue that what pragma-dialecticians call "second-order conditions" for a critical discussion are better understood as minimal argumentative virtue, a basic degree of virtue that arguers are required to possess in order to be prepared to participate in a fruitful critical discussion. The possession of such a basic degree of argumentative virtue is, I believe, what we mean when we characterise someone as reasonable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Environmental & Social Management Journal / Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental is the property of Environmental & Social Management Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article offers an examination of the doctrine of the virgin birth in Christianity within the framework of intra-confessional discussion. Paying attention to the emphasis of the doctrine of the virgin birth in the modern Protestant tradition, the question of the place and significance of the doctrine of the virgin birth in the church tradition (Orthodox and Catholic) is introduced into the problem field of the study. Separately, the question of the possibility of the new birth in an age of “the waning of faith” is raised. The interdisciplinary approach in the study allows us to identify a number of important provisions that determine the difference and commonality in the interpretations of the two traditions: the authority of holy theological exegesis, the significance and place of the oral tradition in modern Protestant communities, the primary and secondary in the understanding of the hierophanic, the rational and mystical in the spiritual experience of the believing Christian. The works of such scholars and researchers as: M. Weber, D. Melton, M. Eliade, M. Foucault, L. Harrison, D. Bogolepov, S. Horuzhiy, I. Yablokov. An important place in the study of the issue is occupied by the holy theological heritage - the works of John Chrysostom and Simeon the New Theologian. As methods of research were used: the method of comparative religious studies, hermeneutic-textual analysis, socio-historical and cultural approaches. In the course of the work, a number of important conclusions have been drawn about the understanding and place of the doctrine of the virgin birth in Christian doctrine. The most important of which are: the significance of explicitness and understanding of the virgin birth in Protestantism; the complexity and implicitness of the Church's exegesis of the virgin birth, expressed in two main vectors of understanding of this question. These articles can be used in the research activities of philosophers-religionists on the history of Christianity. The practical value of the study lies in the possibility of incorporating the results into classes in philosophy, religious studies and theology, as well as directly in missionary activities.

Abstrak. Pendidikan Kristen yang terlalu menekankan aspek rasio dari natur manusia terpengaruh oleh rasionalisme yang mereduksi konsep imago Dei. Di dalam tulisan ini, saya menyajikan studi biblis dan ekstrabiblis tentang gambar dan rupa Allah. Visi citra Allah yang diciptakan untuk menyembah Allah dan mewakili pemerintahan-Nya di bait semesta merupakan kemuridan yang menjadi tujuan dari pendidikan Kristen. Konsep imago Dei di bait semesta ini diperbandingkan juga dengan model homo liturgicus yang diajukan oleh James K. A. Smith. Hasil kajian ini menunjukkan bahwa pendidikan Kristen tidak berhenti pada hanya mengomunikasikan bahan ajar Kristiani, melainkan pembentukan orang-orang yang hasratnya diarahkan kepada Kerajaan Allah. Abstract. Christian education which places too much emphasis on the rational aspect of human nature is influenced by rationalism which reduces the concept of the imago Dei. In this article, I present a biblical and extrabiblical study of the image and likeness of God. The vision of the image of God created to worship God and represent His reign in the universal temple is the discipleship that is the goal of Christian education. The concept of the imago Dei in this cosmic temple is also compared with the homo liturgicus model proposed by James K. A. Smith. The results of this study show that Christian education does not stop at only communicating Christian teaching materials, but rather forms people whose desires are directed towards the Kingdom of God.

The article focuses on the personal and historical reflections of the author, Damjana Mraović-O'Hare, as she connects her experiences during the Yugoslav Wars with themes of authoritarianism and societal collapse in Paul Lynch's Prophet Song. Topics include the erosion of rationalism and intellectual discourse in times of political upheaval, the parallels between fictional and real-world totalitarianism, and the disillusionment with international institutions' failure to prevent conflict.

The aim of the 17th century philosophers, in general, was to show that, by taking as an example the success of the human mind embodied in science, definitive knowledge could be achieved in philosophy, just as in science. To this end, firstly, they described in detail the method to be followed in order to obtain the knowledge. In science, the efforts of scientists such as Kepler, Galileo, and Newton to explain the universe based on mathematics led mathematics to stand out as a way of thinking. In this period, while mathematical research methods enabled the examination of physical phenomena, philosophy, on the other hand, was seen as a model to reach exact knowledge. Rationalist philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz all agree that people should use their own minds, not authorities, and moving from this idea, mathematics is the method that will lead us to the truth. This paper aims to show how these three great philosophers applied mathematics to their own philosophies, based on their differences and similarities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the significance of André Breton's "Manifesto of Surrealism," exploring its historical context and impact one hundred years after its publication. It discusses how Breton distinguished surrealism from Cartesian rationalism and advocated for a synthesis of dreams and rational thought to create a "surreality" that enriches contemporary life.

In his book The Culmination, Pippin leaves no doubt that he still thinks that German Idealism has achieved a level of understanding and radicality that makes its proponents the best conversational partners to develop an understanding of what philosophy is about. It is the question of the very possibility of understanding that comes to be at the center of their writings and informs every page. Yet this radicality is now seen in a different light. It is now conceived as a culmination, not of an understanding that comes to itself but of a misunderstanding that informs, unavoidably, Western philosophical tradition as a whole. The resources for the idea that there is something fundamentally wrong in the conception of what it is to be a being that is able to know anything at all Pippin finds most vividly and forcefully articulated in Heidegger. I will argue that there is something profoundly true about Pippin's idea that, at the bottom of any knowledge we have of ourselves and the world, there is something that Heidegger calls Stimmung, which is essentially non‐discursive. However, I will argue that to defend the latter thought, one has to read Heidegger's notion of Stimmung in a more radical way than Pippin seems to be willing to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the auto/biographies of high-caste middle-class Punjabi Khatri men, and those of cognate castes like Arora and Baniya, written in the first half of the twentieth century: men who were born in the second half of the nineteenth century or early twentieth century. While the discourse on caste under the colonial regime exploded, there was also an embarrassment about caste, or re-thinking its place in society among the upper-caste groups who invested in ideas of progress, improvement and scientism. It is argued that caste was referenced in the memoirs, life stories and self-reflexive writing when these men spoke of their familial backgrounds and admired the deep religiosity and devotionalism of their fathers even though some paternal practices were incongruent with the reformism of the sons. Caste is also in play when one traces the advantages of literacy, education, professional accomplishments, mobility, and reformist activities of men who came to have an important presence in public life. A number of these men had similar life trajectories, indicative of how some aspects of colonial educational and administrative structures could be utilized by them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hargrove's ontological argument for Aesthetic Foundation of Wilderness Preservation was the extension of the thinking paradigm from human beings to moral consideration and aesthetic appreciation of wilderness. The thinking paradigm was based on the framework of traditional Western philosophy, which includes metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In this article, I will examine Hargrove's ontological argument by making a little comparison with the perspective of a Chinese philosophical framework. This paper will be divided into three parts. In the part I, I will summarize Hargrove's ontological argument for natural beauty and environmental preservation. In part II, I will examine the metaphysical framework in Hargrove's ontological argument. I argue it is the extension of Plato's metaphysics of the ultimate reality to wilderness. In Part III, I will examine the ethical and aesthetic framework in his ontological argument. I point out Hargrove's ethical framework comes from ethical rationalism and his aesthetic framework is the legacy of Plato's aesthetics. By comparison, Chinese metaphysics stresses the process and Chinese ethics stresses care. The two different directions promote the aesthetic appreciation of agricultural land rather than wilderness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The irrationalist and vitalist options in the philosophy of the early twentieth century find in María Zambrano a liminal proposal. The author proposes a double movement: archaizing in order to renew the model of a philosophy saturated with formulas and without experiential content. To do so, she reads Plato, the father of Greek rationalism, through her acute hermeneutics to demonstrate that the birth of philosophy is methodologically congruent with mystical experience. Both philosophy and mysticism are models of liberation of the soul in search of truth, understood as transcendent reality. Both start from the multiplicity of being to coincide in the unity of the permanent. Both are also sources of knowledge for the common man who can approach the divine by means of his decision and will. Thus, in her main texts we find the arguments to recover the lost spirituality and to move into the experience of the sacred through the articulation of poetic reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) is the property of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, I discuss the relationship between Karl Popper's conception of critical rationalism and William Bartley's conception of pancritical rationalism. Both Popper and Bartley tended to identify rationality with openness to criticism, but they are usually considered to be disagreeing about whether rationality is limited or comprehensive and whether or not it applies to moral attitudes. These traditional interpretations are found wanting, and I make the case that there is—and was—no genuine, substantial conflict between Popper's critical and Bartley's pancritical rationalism. The apparent disagreement between Popper and Bartley about critical versus pancritical rationalism is nothing but a tangle of several factors, including the misconstrual of Popper's critical rationalism by Bartley, Popper's disagreement with Bartley's criticism of critical rationalism, Popper's disagreement with Bartley's claim that his formulation is superior to Popper's formulation of critical rationalism in The Open Society and Its Enemies , and the clash of Bartley's ambitions with Popper's rather cold attitude toward his cherished ideas. New (so far unpublished and not discussed) archival material—Popper's interview and two letters to Leslie Graves dated 1992—is invoked to provide crucial evidence for this interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers a response to commentaries made on his book "Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation." He mentions his two concerns when the book was published that kept him awake at night. He discusses the worries introduced by Davide Fassio for his defense of the Erotetic view of normative reasons. He also discusses the intriguing points made by Eva Schmidt in her comment.

The comment starts with a brief exposition of the Eroteric View put forth by Artūrs Logins. I then provide one friendly comment on the exact form of the normative question which is central to the view, and suggest that in addition to the question, 'Why ought S to φ ?', Logins should take the question, 'Why is S permitted to φ?' as definitive of normative reasons. In a more critical comment, I reflect on how normative explanatory reasons and normative reasoning reasons relate, calling into question Logins's claim that the two kinds of reasons are fundamentally distinct. First, I argue that being a normative explanatory reason near enough guarantees being a normative reasoning reason; second, I argue that normative explanatory reasons as well as normative reasoning reasons can be weighed, and that they can be weighed against each other. But this causes trouble for the Eroteric View. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of the book "Normative Reasons: Between Reasons and Explanation" by Artūrs Logins, which seeks to reconcile views about the nature of reasons that seem to be in opposition. Topics discussed include the reconciling projects in the book, factor that makes something normative reason for Logins, and desiderata/constraints that Logins articulated for a theory of normative reasons.

In Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation (2022), Arturs Logins provides a novel reductivist account of normative reasons, what he calls the Erotetic View of Reasons. In this paper, I provide three challenges to this view. The first two concern the extensional adequacy of the Erotetic View. The view may fail to count as normative reasons all and only considerations that are such. In particular, the view seems to both overgenerate and undergenerate reasons. My third concern is that the view may fail to capture the essential, practice-independent nature of reasons, as well as reasons' constitutive and grounding role with respect to other normative properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Sharia & Law is the property of United Arab Emirates University, College of Law, Sharia & Law Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores Spain's positioning in the shifting currents of the later Enlightenment through the polemic works of lawyer and satirist Juan Pablo Forner. Forner's attempts to prove the existence of an autochthonous tradition of Spanish pragmatism and empiricism form an index of the penetration of intra‐Enlightenment debates into Spanish thought in the late eighteenth century. Forner, profoundly aware of tensions between Cartesian rationalism and Lockean sentimental empiricism across Europe, intervenes on the side of empiricism, insisting that Cartesianism is nothing but a guise of Scholastic hyperrationalism. The article disputes scholarly perceptions of Forner as a Christian reactionary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]