Search

We tested three hypotheses derived from intergroup emotions theory: that group-based emotions, emotions felt as a member of a group, (1) are influenced by group norms, (2) especially for highly identified group members, and (3) are relatively more positive for highly identified members. Hypothesis 4 tested the prediction that these self-categorization, normative influence, and identification processes hold across memberships in exemplars of intimacy, task, and social category groups, which differ from one another in structural and functional characteristics. Two studies using three different samples found strong consistent support for Hypotheses 1 and 3, and only partial support for Hypothesis 2 (high identification increased the power of group norms on group-based emotions about only negative events). These findings held across multiple exemplars of the three group types, regardless of whether group-based emotions were targeted or untargeted, and regardless of whether emotion norms were empirically derived or based on group members' perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advancing knowledge in many areas of psychology and neuroscience, underlined by dazzling images of brain scans, appear to many professionals and to the public to show that people are on the way to explaining cognition purely in terms of processes within the individual's head. Yet while such cognitive individualism still dominates the popular Western vision of cognition, modern scholarship rejects such a personalized view of the mind. Few students of cognition today still envision a solitary thinker whose thoughts arise solely from his or her own personal experience and idiosyncratic outlook on the world. The rise of the modern study of the mind coincides with the decline of the Romantic vision of the individual thinker and a growing interest in the nonpersonal foundations of cognition. In this article, the authors describe in depth two broad approaches that help people transcend individualism and to arrive at a more satisfactory understanding of cognition.

Research on person perception typically emphasizes cognitive processes of information selection and interpretation within the individual perceiver and the nature of the resulting mental representations. The authors focus instead on the ways person perception processes create, and are influenced by, the patterns of impressions that are socially constructed, transmitted, and filtered through social networks. As the socially situated cognition perspective (E. R. Smith & G. R. Semin, 2004) suggests, it is necessary to supplement consideration of intra-individual cognitive processes with an examination of the social context. The authors describe a theoretical model of processes of distributed social cognition that takes account of 3 levels: the individual perceiver, the interacting dyad, and the social network in which they are embedded. The authors' model assumes that perceivers elicit or create as well as interpret impression-relevant information in dyadic interaction and that perceivers obtain information from 3rd-party sources who are linked to perceivers and targets in social networks. The authors also present results of a multiagent simulation of a subset of these processes. Implications of the theoretical model are discussed, for the possibility of correcting biases in person perception and for the nature of underlying mental representations of persons. (Contains 4 tables and 3 footnotes.)

An exemplar-based model of social judgment is presented in which specific past experiences and more abstract schematic knowledge influence judgments and perceptions of people and groups. Computer simulations illustrate the way the model accounts for social influences on exemplar access and use and on the content of social judgments. (SLD)

Male and female subjects asked to evaluate six candidates for a management training program responded more favorably toward female and Black subjects, in a manner suggesting a "reverse discrimination" effect in their final decisions. (DM)

People's emotions toward their ingroups and salient outgroups often change over time as a result of changing circumstances or intentional self-regulation. To investigate such dynamics, two studies assessed participants' perceived past, present, and ideal levels of group-based emotions toward ingroups and outgroups, for several different types of groups. Consistent with predictions, participants ideally wanted to feel more positive and less negative emotions toward the ingroup compared to their present levels. However, contrary to predictions, ideal emotions toward competitive outgroups were more positive than negative. Several effects over time suggested the successful regulation of emotion: Ideal levels of positive ingroup emotion predicted group-related behavioral intentions as well as emotions reported at a later time, over and above present levels. This work puts group-based emotions in a subjective temporal context and opens new directions for theory-driven investigation and new possibilities for interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do people treat robot teammates compared to human opponents? Past research indicates that people favor, and behave more morally toward, ingroup than outgroup members. People also perceive that they have more moral responsibilities toward humans than nonhumans. This paper presents a 2×2×3 experimental study that placed participants (N = 102) into competing teams of humans and robots. We examined how people morally behave toward and perceive players depending on players' Group Membership (ingroup, outgroup), Agent Type (human, robot), and participant group Team Composition (humans as minority, equal, or majority within the ingroup compared to robots). Results indicated that participants favored the ingroup over the outgroup and humans over robots – to the extent that they favored ingroup robots over outgroup humans. Interestingly, people differentiated more between ingroup than outgroup humans and robots. These effects generalized across Team Composition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like early work on human intergroup interaction, previous research on people's willingness to interact with robots has focused mainly on effects of anxiety. However, existing findings suggest that other negative emotions as well as some positive emotions also have effects. This article systematically examines the roles of positive and negative emotions in predicting willingness to interact with robots, using an integrative analysis of data across five studies that use diverse interaction conditions and several types of robots. We hypothesize and find that positive emotions account for more variance than negative emotions. Practically, the findings suggest new strategies for interventions, aimed at increasing positive emotions to increase willingness to engage in intergroup interaction. No existing work has examined whether positive emotions are stronger predictors than negative emotions for willingness for human intergroup interaction, an important topic for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysis shows that whether the mother worked was the major background influence on dependent variables. Father's occupation had no significant independent effect. Identification with the mother and beliefs in individual achievement strongly influenced dependent variables. The choice of career pattern was a central one in girls' attitudinal structures. (Author)

Group-based emotions are experienced as a result of group categorization and group identification. We first review the transformative idea that emotion can occur as a group-level phenomenon driven by group-level processes. We then briefly review the impact of this idea on research about intragroup processes and intergroup relations in the decades since 1998. We conclude by raising some questions whose answers would further extend the reach and predictive power of group-based emotions in both intragroup and intergroup contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emotions are increasingly being recognised as important aspects of prejudice and intergroup behaviour. Specifically, emotional mediators play a key role in the process by which intergroup contact reduces prejudice towards outgroups. However, which particular emotions are most important for prejudice reduction, as well as the consistency and generality of emotion–prejudice relations across different in-group–out-group relations, remain uncertain. To address these issues, in Study 1 we examined six distinct positive and negative emotions as mediators of the contact–prejudice relations using representative samples of U.S. White, Black, and Asian American respondents (N = 639). Admiration and anger (but not other emotions) were significant mediators of the effects of previous contact on prejudice, consistently across different perceiver and target ethnic groups. Study 2 examined the same relations with student participants and gay men as the out-group. Admiration and disgust mediated the effect of past contact on attitude. The findings confirm that not only negative emotions (anger or disgust, based on the specific types of threat perceived to be posed by an out-group), but also positive, status- and esteem-related emotions (admiration) mediate effects of contact on prejudice, robustly across several different respondent and target groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People from honor cultures show heightened emotional responses to insults to their social image. The current research investigates whether people from honor cultures also show heightened protection of social identities. We find that honor concerns may be embedded in some social identities but not others, and that those identities associated with honor concerns are defended more than identities not associated with honor. Three experiments investigated participants’ emotional responses to insults to their ethnic or student identity. Results showed that compared with dignity culture (British) participants, participants from an honor culture (Arab) reported stronger anger responses both across and within cultures when their Arab identity, an identity explicitly linked to honor concerns, was insulted. In contrast, responses did not differ between dignity (American) and honor (Arab) cultures when participants received an insult to their student identity, a non-honor-oriented identity. These findings suggest that overarching cultural values are not applied to all identities, and therefore, that cultural variables influence psychological outcomes differently for different identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a new model of social influence, which can occur spontaneously and in the absence of typically assumed motives. We assume that perceivers routinely construct representations of other people’s experiences and responses (beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and behaviors), when observing others’ responses or simulating the responses of unobserved others. Like representations made accessible by priming, these representations may then influence the process that generates perceivers’ own responses, without intention or awareness, especially when there is a strong social connection to the other. We describe evidence for the basic properties and important moderators of this process, which distinguish it from other mechanisms such as informational, normative, or social identity influence. The model offers new perspectives on the role of others’ values in producing cultural differences, the persistence and power of stereotypes, the adaptive reasons for being influenced by others’ responses, and the impact of others’ views about the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]