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Management incentives for engaging and excelling in corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance is an important theme as business sustainability gains momentum. We examine the role of tournament incentives, which are created by competition among non-CEO (chief executive officer) senior executives (vice presidents [VPs]) for promotion to the CEO position, in firms' CSR performance. Using a sample of U.S. Standard & Poor (S&P) 1500 firms from 1993 to 2014, we find that tournament incentives proxied by pay gaps between CEOs and VPs are negatively associated with CSR performance, suggesting that competition for promotion could be detrimental for CSR performance. We further show that such association is more pronounced when the perceived probability of promotion increases prior to CEO turnover. This article provides policy, practical, and education implications and contribute to the literature on the integration of CSR into the business culture and strategic management processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internal governance is the process by which vice presidents (VPs) use their influence with the chief executive officer (CEO) to impact the firm's direction and policy. This study examines the effect of internal governance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Based on a large sample of US firms and after controlling for various CEO incentives, corporate governance and other determinants of CSR performance, we find that more effective internal governance is associated with a better CSR performance. These results are robust to alternative internal governance and CSR measures, alternative samples and various approaches that mitigate potential endogeneity problems. Further analysis shows that the effect of internal governance on CSR performance is more pronounced when (a) the CEO is subject to more intensive monitoring, (b) VPs are more powerful, (c) firms experience less short‐term financial performance pressure and (d) they face stronger product market competition. This study advances our understanding of corporate governance's effect on CSR by showing the importance of internal governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how labor-friendly institutional features (i.e., laborism) relate to corporate investment efficiency in labor in a sample of firms from 33 countries over 1996–2012. We consider three dimensions of laborism—the presence of a left-leaning government, rigidity of employee protection laws, and collectivist culture. Our evidence shows that firms operating in stronger laborism countries make less efficient labor investment decisions, which is consistent with higher labor adjustment costs associated with laborism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior studies argue that high‐quality internal information improves forecasting and reduces internal information asymmetry, and hence facilitates firms' decision‐making. Consistent with this argument, we find that internal information quality (IIQ) is positively associated with employment efficiency. Furthermore, we find that better IIQ leads to an improvement in employment efficiency primarily by improving demand forecasts. The baseline finding is robust to using a setting that exploits time‐series shocks to IIQ (i.e., the adoption of SFAS 158) and other sensitivity analyses. Our findings add to prior studies on the role of IIQ in decision‐making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SYNOPSIS: In this study, we investigate whether individual auditors are associated with the comparability of their clients' financial statements, based on a sample of Chinese companies audited by ten large audit firms. We demonstrate that individual auditors have an incremental effect on comparability, beyond the office-level effect. We also find that the style of individual auditors is stronger when they are affiliated with Big 4 audit firms (compared to non-Big 4 large audit firms) and when they are industry experts. In addition, two possible channels of enhanced comparability are identified: (1) clients' accounting flexibility, which provides opportunities for auditors to exert influences; and (2) individual auditors' characteristics, such as age, position, and academic degree, which affect auditors' abilities to exert influence. Our results are robust to alternative comparability and industry expertise measures, to various sampling methods, and to corrections for potential endogeneity problems. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY: This study examines the relation between country-level audit profession development (APD) and bank loan contracting around the world. Using a sample of bank loan data from 35 countries, we find that stronger APD is associated with more favorable loan terms, such as lower loan spreads, fewer covenants, and larger loan amounts. These effects are stronger in countries with a weaker rule of law. We also find that stronger APD attracts significantly more lenders participating in loans and more foreign lenders leading loans. A breakdown of APD into three subcategories, namely, auditor education, auditor independence and liability, and auditor oversight, reveals that all three influence various contracting terms. We also provide evidence that stronger APD is associated with a higher degree of timely loss recognition. Collectively, our findings show that APD improves bank loan contracting terms. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources mentioned in the manuscript. JEL Classification: F34; K20; M41; M42. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether and how auditors respond to audit risks arising from secrecy culture when making audit opinion decisions. Using a sample of international Big N auditors from 33 countries, we find strong and robust evidence that auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions to clients domiciled in countries with a strong secrecy culture. In addition, we find that the association between secrecy culture and auditors' propensity to issue modified audit opinions is less pronounced in countries with strong investor protection than that in countries with weak investor protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of investor protection, firm informational problems (proxied by firm size, firm age, and the number of analysts following), and Big N auditors on firms' cost of debt around the world. Using data from 1994 to 2006 and over 90,000 firm-year observations, we find that the cost of debt is lower when firms are audited by Big N auditors, especially in countries with strong investor protection. Second, we find that firms with more informational problems (i.e., higher information asymmetry problems) benefit more from Big N auditors in terms of lower cost of debt only in countries with stronger investor protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effect of the Asian financial crisis on the relationship between client economic importance and auditor independence. Using data from 1994 to 2001 in six Asian markets (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), we find that auditors are less likely to compromise their independence for important clients after a crisis. The result is consistent with Coffee's (2001) crash-then-law hypothesis and supports the notion that financial crisis triggers public concern over auditors' independence. Furthermore, we find the effect of financial crisis on auditor independence is more pronounced in weaker investor protection regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]