Search

A meeting was held on 14th January 1944 to discuss the possibilities which might exist for increased collaboration between S.O.E. and N.K.V.D. in the Balkans. The following agenda was submitted: A review of S.O.E. aims in each area and an outline of their resources with the object of examining the possibilities of a concerted Balkans plan for all countries concerned. The coordination of all these plans into one directive. The possibility of discussing such a plan with the N.K.V.D. in an endeavor to enlist their cooperation and assistance in a common plan for S.O.E., O.S.S. and N.K.V.D. Our article follows the evolution of these plans during January-August 1944.

Between 1941-1944, S.O.E. (Special Operation Executive)activity in Romania depended heavily on the collaboration with Maniu and P.N.T (National Peasant Party - Partidul National Țărănesc). In order to improve its activity, S.O.E. has taken steps to create a reliable communication channel between S.O.E. residents in Istanbul and Bucharest. The connections between the residence in Istanbul and the S.O.E. network in Romania were made through the connections of Switzerland and Turkey or through the transmitters sent to Istanbul, Ankara and Cairo, or through radio and radio transmissions launched by the parachute. Our study aims to find the connection between the S.O.E. activity in Romania, the Soviet Iasi-Chisinau offensive and the coup d’etat on August 23, 1944.

The memorandum concluded by S.O.E.(Special Operations Executive) and N.K.V.D., (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs-Народный комиссариат внутренних дел) in September 1941, obliged the two intelligence services to collaborate in a wide range of fields. The British wanted to take advantage of “the powerful communist N.K.V.D. during world war II network in Europe to destabilize the German-occupied countries by organizing sabotages and subversive actions. The Russians, on the other hand, did not want to organize sabotage operations in areas far from the front line, but were interested in contacting their Western European information network. The present article presents aspects of the co-operation between the two services in the light of the research we have undertaken in the London archives.

During September-November 1968 there was a crisis situation in the Romanian-Soviet relations, generated by the criticism that the Romanian government formulated for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 23, 1968. This crisis came to the attention of decision-makers in the United Kingdom and Allied bodies within NATO. Both the British Cabinet and the representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance member countries held several meetings in which the issue of Romania and Yugoslavia was discussed in the context of Soviet threats. The Secretary of State of the Foreign Office visited Romania and discussed with Nicolae Ceauşescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Corneliu Mănescu. This article aims to present debates within the NATO and the UK bodies on the political crisis in the Romanian-Soviet relations from the autumn of 1968 and the position adopted by them against a possible Soviet invasion in Romania and Yugoslavia.