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Prior affective and social knowledge about other individuals has been shown to modulate perception of their faces and gaze‐related attentional processes. However, it remains unclear whether emotionally charged knowledge acquired through interactive social learning also modulates face processing and attentional control. Thus, the aim of this study was to test whether affective knowledge induced through social interactions in a naturalistic exchange game can influence early stages of face processing and attentional shifts in a subsequent gaze‐cueing task. As indicated by self‐reported ratings, the game was successful in inducing valenced affective knowledge towards positive and negative players. In the subsequent task, in which the locations of future targets were cued by the gaze of the game players, we observed enhanced early neural activity (larger amplitude of the P1 component) in response to a photograph of the negative player. This indicates that negative affective knowledge about an individual indeed modulates very early stages of the processing of this individual's face. Our study contributes to the existing literature by providing further evidence for the saliency of interactive social exchange paradigms that are used to induce affective knowledge. Moreover, it extends the previous research by presenting a very early modulation of perception by socially learned affective knowledge. Importantly, it also offers increased ecological validity of the findings due to the use of naturalistic social exchange in the study design., This research complements previous evidence that experimentally induced socio‐affective knowledge about other individuals, modulates processing of their faces, and shows that negative (but not positive) affect enhances very early face processing (the P1). Importantly, we provide an effective affect induction tool—an interactive social exchange game—which offers increased social ecological validity in experimental settings.

Social rewards are a broad and heterogeneous set of stimuli including for instance smiling faces, gestures, or praise. They have been widely investigated in cognitive and social neuroscience as well as psychology. Research often contrasts the neural processing of social rewards with non-social ones, with the aim to demonstrate the privileged and unique nature of social rewards or to examine shared neural processing underlying them. However, such comparisons mostly neglect other important dimensions of rewards that are conflated in those types of rewards: primacy, temporal proximity, duration, familiarity, source, tangibility, naturalness, and magnitude. We identify how commonly used rewards in both social and non-social domains may differ in respect to these dimensions and how their interaction calls for careful consideration of alternative interpretations of observed effects. Additionally, we propose potential solutions on how to adapt the multidimensional view to experimental research. Altogether, these methodological considerations aim to inform and improve future experimental designs in research utilizing rewarding stimuli, especially in the social domain.

The present study had three main objectives. First, we aimed to evaluate whether short-duration affective states induced by negative and positive words can lead to increased error-monitoring activity relative to a neutral task condition. Second, we intended to determine whether such an enhancement is limited to words of specific valence or is a general response to arousing material. Third, we wanted to assess whether post-error brain activity is associated with incidental memory for negative and/or positive words. Participants performed an emotional stop-signal task that required response inhibition to negative, positive or neutral nouns while EEG was recorded. Immediately after the completion of the task, they were instructed to recall as many of the presented words as they could in an unexpected free recall test. We observed significantly greater brain activity in the error-positivity (Pe) time window in both negative and positive trials. The error-related negativity amplitudes were comparable in both the neutral and emotional arousing trials, regardless of their valence. Regarding behavior, increased processing of emotional words was reflected in better incidental recall. Importantly, the memory performance for negative words was positively correlated with the Pe amplitude, particularly in the negative condition. The source localization analysis revealed that the subsequent memory recall for negative words was associated with widespread bilateral brain activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and in the medial frontal gyrus, which was registered in the Pe time window during negative trials. The present study has several important conclusions. First, it indicates that the emotional enhancement of error monitoring, as reflected by the Pe amplitude, may be induced by stimuli with symbolic, ontogenetically learned emotional significance. Second, it indicates that the emotion-related enhancement of the Pe occurs across both negative and positive conditions, thus it is preferentially driven by the arousal content of an affective stimuli. Third, our findings suggest that enhanced error monitoring and facilitated recall of negative words may both reflect responsivity to negative events. More speculatively, they can also indicate that post-error activity of the medial prefrontal cortex may selectively support encoding for negative stimuli and contribute to their privileged access to memory.