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According to the principle of energy-conservation principle, effort investment is usually reduced in situations that are perceived as uncontrollable. This is because when success is recognized as impossible, any effortful actions are no longer justified. However, we predicted that individual differences in uncertainty tolerance, i.e., the need for closure (NFC), may moderate effort investment in uncontrollable situations. We tested this prediction in two experimental studies in which we exposed participants with differing levels of NFC to uncontrollable events, and indexed effort through the assessment of systolic blood pressure (SBP) responses. As predicted, in the uncontrollability (vs. controllability) condition, effort investment decreased significantly among low- but not high-NFC participants. Since gaining certainty and achieving closure is not a critical epistemic goal for low-NFC individuals, exerting extra effort to gain certainty is therefore no longer justified. On the other hand, high-NFC participants do not withhold their efforts, as they are highly motivated to obtain certainty. These results may help to account for contradictory findings in effort-investment behaviour and add substantively to the literature concerning motivation toward closure.

One might assume that the desire to help (here described as Want) is the essential driver of helping declarations and/or behaviors. However, even if desire to help (Want) is low, intention to help may still occur if the expectancy regarding the perceived effectiveness of helping is high. We tested these predictions in a set of three experimental studies. In all three, we measured the desire to help (Want) and the Expectancy that the aid would be impactful for the victim; in addition, we manipulated Expectancy in Study 3. In Studies 1 and 3, we measured the participants’ declaration to help while in Study 2, their helping behavior was examined. In all three studies, we used variations of the same story about a victim. The results supported our hypothesis. Thus, the studies help to tease apart the determinants of helping under conditions of lowered desire to do so, an issue of great importance in public policymaking.

Critical reflection on one's own group is beneficial for the group in the long run, yet critics addressing its wrongdoings are usually not welcomed and have to cope with hostility and ostracism from the ingroup. The present research tested whether the personal sense of control and perceived self-efficacy help one to speak out against one's own group and to endure its pressure to conform. The results across two studies (total N = 212) show that perceived self-efficacy (Study 1, correlational), or its experimental equivalent, perceived self-competence (Study 2, experimental), mediated the relationship between the sense of control and critical group reflection. The findings suggest that confidence in one's own abilities, which is the core of perceived self-efficacy and self-competence, is more important than the feelings of being in control and of having influence over reality. Confidence in one's own efficacy drives the individual to defend one's own ideas even when they are at odds with ingroup norms, and it allows one to cope with the adversity that may arise as a consequence of doing so.

According to recent studies, people on both the political right and left show prejudice toward groups whose beliefs are in conflict with their own. This prediction applies to both cultural and economic dimensions of political beliefs. In three studies (N = 499) we demonstrate that people on both the cultural and economic right and left show negative attitudes toward groups on the other side of the given spectrum and that underlying this effect is the perception of value violation. In two out of three studies, we manipulated the extremity of target worldviews to further explore the causal chain between political beliefs, the perception of value violation, and prejudice. Our results showed a high degree of symmetry between the political left and right in their attitudes toward groups with dissimilar beliefs. However, although people on both sides of the political spectrum show prejudice toward each other, people on the cultural and economic right seem to be more sensitive to value violations than people on the left.

The study focuses on the relationship between religious fundamentalism and brain activity, investigating whether religious beliefs, especially in a fundamentalist form, act as a bulwark against uncertainty that mitigates feelings of threat and worthlessness. We hypothesize that this muted response to uncertainty would manifest neurophysiologically, such that under uncertainty (vs. certainty), religious fundamentalism is associated with reduced activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and evinced in the N2 component. Religious fundamentalism was measured on a scale and electroencephalographic neural reactivity in the ACC was recorded as participants completed a Stroop task. We found that greater religious fundamentalism is associated with lower conflict-related anterior cingulate activity (N2 component), suggesting lower sensitivity to cues that might alter a habitual response pattern. This study provides evidence that religious fundamentalism, by providing a sense of coherency and control, may offer relief from distress and uncertainty.

Examining the relationship between brain activity and religious fundamentalism, this study explores whether fundamentalist religious beliefs increase responses to error-related words among participants intolerant to uncertainty (i.e., high in the need for closure) in comparison to those who have a high degree of toleration for uncertainty (i.e., those who are low in the need for closure). We examine a negative-going event-related brain potentials occurring 400 ms after stimulus onset (the N400) due to its well-understood association with the reactions to emotional conflict. Religious fundamentalism and tolerance of uncertainty were measured on self-report measures, and electroencephalographic neural reactivity was recorded as participants were performing an emotional Stroop task. In this task, participants read neutral words and words related to uncertainty, errors, and pondering, while being asked to name the color of the ink with which the word is written. The results confirm that among people who are intolerant of uncertainty (i.e., those high in the need for closure), religious fundamentalism is associated with an increased N400 on error-related words compared with people who tolerate uncertainty well (i.e., those low in the need for closure).

We claim that religious orthodoxy is related to prejudice toward groups that violate important values, i.e., atheists. Moreover, we suggest that expressing prejudice may efficiently reduce the threat posed by this particular group among people who hold high levels, but not low levels, of orthodox belief. We tested these assumptions in an experimental study in which, after being exposed to atheistic worldviews (value-threat manipulation), high and low orthodox participants were allowed (experimental condition) or not (control condition) to express prejudice toward atheists. Threat was operationalized by cardiovascular reactivity, i.e., heart rate (HR); the higher the HR index, the higher the threat. The results found that people who hold high (vs. low) levels of orthodox belief responded with increased HR after the threat manipulation. However, we observed decreased HR after the expression of prejudice toward atheists among highly orthodox participants compared to the control condition. We did not find this effect among people holding low levels of orthodox belief. Thus, we conclude that expressing prejudice toward this particular group may be an efficient strategy to cope with the threat posed by this group for highly orthodox people. The results are discussed in light of previous findings on religious beliefs and the self-regulatory function of prejudice.

Need for Closure (NFC) refers to an individual’s aversion to uncertainty and desire to quickly resolve it. Although numerous studies have demonstrated that this need leads to a reluctance to invest effort in judgments and decision making, we argue that NFC may be associated with less or more effort investment depending on key features of the performance situation and instrumentality of effort for achieving closure. Specifically, we expect that high (vs. low) NFC individuals should exert less effort when both lowand high-effort performance options are available and both afford closure. By contrast, they should exert more effort when task-related uncertainty causes that only effortful means are instrumental for the goal of achieving closure. If only a high-performance option allows the task goal to be attained and instructions how to perform a task are clear and specific, there will be no differences between high and low NFC participants. We tested these hypotheses in an experiment framed in terms of Motivational Intensity Theory. The experiment asked participants to solve cognitive tasks under relevant performance circumstances, indexing effort through assessment of systolic blood pressure (SBP) responses. Results were supportive. They help to account for contradictory findings in the NFC literature and add substantively to the broader literature concerned with determinants and cardiovascular correlates of effort.