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Due to its unpredictability, the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has changed the global business climate and commercial management practices in unprecedented ways. As a direct result of the pandemic, the hospitality and tourism sectors have shut down, and business failure rates have occurred exponentially. The franchise hospitality industry has experienced significant impact and challenged a basic understanding of knowledge management (KM) implementation in the face of the COVID-19 outbreak. A strategic KM implementation practice can not only guide a large-scale operation, but also adjust an organization’s performance and competitiveness. The purpose of this study is to examine the influential criteria of success through effective KM implementation and to predict the probability of successful KM in a post-pandemic era. The conceptual framework for KM applies an analytic hierarchical prediction model reliant upon consistent fuzzy preference relations to assist the franchise hospitality sector’s consciousness of the influential criteria. An empirical case study is used to apply pairwise comparisons used to determine the priority weights and two possible outcomes. The case study will assist franchise organizations to analyze whether or not to implement KM, interdict application, or adopt revised actions. This assistance will enhance the success possibility of KM implementation within such a crisis environment. This study uses a case setting by assessing 15 franchises hospitality experts’ opinions in Taiwan relevant to KM implementation.

In this paper, we first show that if the firm’s production leads to environmental damage and the government does not implement any environmental policy by using a two-stage game model, the “excess-entry” theorem holds. We then show that entry can be socially insufficient in the presence of production externality and policy mix is needed for pollution control in oligopoly industry with endogenous market structure. Hence, the anti-competitive entry regulation policy suggested by the “excess-entry” theorem does not always hold.

We examine in a mixed oligopoly setting how foreign competition and the excess burden of taxation will affect privatization policy in the presence of strategic tax/subsidy policies. We show that in the presence of excess burden of taxation with foreign competitors, output subsidy coupled with import tariff and partial privatization is adopted to improve the social welfare. However, if the excess burden of taxation is relatively large, the government may switch to use production tax coupled with tariff policy and partial privatization to improve the social welfare.

In this paper, we show that the implications of consumer awareness on environmental policy in both mixed and private oligopolies under regulated entry and free entry. The emission taxes are charged when the market imperfection and consumer cognition of pollution are low, while the consumption externality is substantial. However, when the consumers’ cognition of pollution damage is increasing and the consumers are willing to pay (WTP) less for the polluted good, the government should choose a lower emission tax.

In literature, the common wisdom is that entry in an industry with homogeneous products may be socially insufficient instead of excessive in the absence of scale economies. In this paper, we formally introduce endogenous research and development (R&D) and cost asymmetry into both Cournot and Stackelberg competition, and show that entry is socially insufficient in the presence of ex ante asymmetric costs coupled with the spillover effect of R&D.

Past research indicates that a licensor tends to adopt the fixed fee, in order to obtain higher profit rather than secure royalty when he participates in zero production in the market. This study instead finds that the patentee&rsquo, s optimum strategy may vary. In addition to the fixed-fee strategy, royalty or mixed licensing, or fixed fee plus royalty may be potential choices for the patentee as well which is depend on the market scale, incidence of market scale, and magnitude of cost-saving. The patentee may choose to only authorize a type of high market size based on self-interested motives. The technology licensing market is not sustainable.

We examine how the shadow cost of public funds will affect the privatization policy in the presence of strategic tax/subsidy policies in a mixed oligopoly model with foreign ownership. We show that (1) When the dual policies are employed, the privatization policy is partial privatization and the production tax may be used if the shadow of the public fund is relatively large; (2) When the privatization policy is employed, the degree of privatization is decreasing in the shadow cost of public funds if the share of foreign investors in the private firms is relative small; however, when the dual policies are employed, the degree of privatization is increasing in the shadow cost of public funds. Additionally, we show that the influence of foreign ownership on the privatization and subsidization policies are dependent upon the cost structures, ownership types, distribution of firms, and policy pairs.