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International audience; Using a new and original database, our paper contributes to the growth accounting literature by singling out the contribution of robots through two channels: capital deepening and TFP. The contribution of robots to productivity growth through capital deepening and TFP appears to have been significant in Germany and Japan in the sub-period 1975–1995 and in several Eastern European countries in 2005–2019. However, robotization does not appear to be the source of a significant revival in productivity.

Using a new and original database, our paper contributes to the growth accounting literature with three original aspects: first, it covers a long period from the early 60's to 2019, just before the COVID-19 crisis; second, it analyses at the country level a large set of economies (30); finally, it singles out the growth contribution of ICTs but also of robots. The original database used in our analysis covers 30 developed countries and the Euro Area over a long period allowing to develop a growth accounting approach from 1960 to 2019. This database is built at the country level. Our growth accounting approach shows that the main drivers of labor productivity growth over the whole 1960-2019 period appear to be TFP, non-ICT and non-robot capital deepening, and education. The overall contribution of ICT capital is found to be small, although we do not estimate its effect on TFP. The contribution of robots to productivity growth through the two channels (capital deepening and TFP) appears to be significant in Germany and Japan in the sub-period 1975-1995, in France and Italy in 1995-2005, and in several Eastern European countries in 2005-2019. Our findings confirm also the slowdown in TFP in most countries from at least 1995 onwards. This slowdown is mainly explained by a decrease of the contributions of the components 'others' in the capital deepening and the TFP productivity channels.

International audience; ICT components, such as microprocessors, may be embodied in other capital goods not recorded as ICT in National Accounts. We name ‘indirect ICT investment’ the value of embodied ICT components in non-ICT investment. The paper provides estimates of ‘indirect ICT investment’ based on detailed and unpublished Supply-Use tables (SUT) in 12 OECD countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.Our main finding is that ICT investment appears significantly higher when considering its indirect component, the average increase being about 35%. The inclusion of indirect ICT investment, excluding software (for which firms’ expenditures are difficult to measure), changes significantly the relative position of countries with respect to the ICT intensity of their investments. The inclusion of software further increases indirect ICT investment but the increase is smaller (in percentage) than without this inclusion. A final result, but concerning only three countries, it that the diagnosis of a stabilisation, or even a decrease, of ICT investment in percentage of GDP or of total investment, observed from the beginning of the century, is not modified if we take into account the indirect ICT investment.

This chapter provides new estimates of the effects of ICT investments on total labour demand in 19 OECD countries over the early 1990–2012. The findings suggest that ICT investments have no effects on labour demand in the long run. In the short run, however, due to sluggish adjustments in production inputs, a one-off permanent decrease in ICT user cost results in a temporary increase in labour demand followed by a temporary decrease. Our estimates suggest that ICT investments raised labour demand in all countries in the early 1990–2007 but reduced it afterwards. The decrease in labour demand after 2007, however, was smaller than the increase before 2007, thus leading to a positive effect of ICT investment on labour demand over the whole period.