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When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much to trade. We conducted an experiment where traders could decide to trade either in an (efficient) double-auction institution or in a posted-offers one, which should favor sellers. When sellers face decreasing returns to scale (increasing production costs), fast coordination on the double-auction occurs, with the posted-offers institution becoming inactive. In contrast, under constant returns to scale, both institutions remain active and coordination is slower. The reason is that, in a finite-horizon setting, sellers trade off larger efficiency in a market with dwindling profits for biased-up profits in a market with vanishing customers. Hence, our results indicate that efficiency alone might not be sufficient to guarantee coordination on a single market institution if the distribution of the gains from trade is asymmetric. Trading behavior approaches equilibrium predictions (market clearing) within each institution, but switching behavior across institutions is explained by simple rules of thumb, with buyers chasing low prices and sellers considering both prices and trader ratios., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Does hosting a sports team boost the visibility of a city among tourists? I test this proposition by looking at the effect of playing soccer’s UEFA Champions' League on air travel. I compare routes across cities that had their teams randomly drawn into the same group in the first phase of the competition to routes across cities hosting teams randomly allocated to different groups. The average effect of being drawn into the same group is between 5% and 8% more arrivals for the 3 months following the group stage, a period which coincides with a break in the competition. The first appearance of a team in the competition has a larger impact on air travel, providing suggesting evidence of diminishing returns of exposure.

We investigate how the selection process of a leader affects team performance with respect to social learning. We use a lab experiment in which an incentivized guessing task is repeated in a star network with the leader at the center. Leader selection is either based on competence, on self-confidence, or made at random. Teams with random leaders do not underperform compared to rather competent leaders, and they even outperform teams whose leader is selected based on self-confidence. The reason is that random leaders are better able to use the knowledge within the team, i.e., the wisdom of crowds. We can show that it is the declaration of the selection procedure which makes non-random leaders overly influential. The central position in the communication network already makes a leader highly influential. Knowing that the leader is not selected at random pushes team members to weigh the leader’s opinion even more. We set up a horse race between several rational and naive models of social learning to investigate the micro-level mechanisms. We find that overconfidence and conservatism contribute to the fact that too confident leaders mislead their team in finding good estimates.

Assessing whether investments result in the desired non-financial performance is a key concern in the fast growing field of impact investments, including microfinance. The social performance of the...

When investigating the well-being of a society, the living conditions of females are of special importance, not only due to the immediate impact for those directly involved, but also because of the potential intergenerational effects. Studying the dimorphism in the mean height helps to depict variation in the basic biological sex difference due to gender-related factors that potentially determine net nutrition. To expand knowledge of diachronic development in Swiss well-being conditions we investigate changes in the height of adult females born 1770-1930, and compare the series with data on contemporary males from the same sources: We employ a sample of N = 21'028 women and N = 21'329 men from passport-, convict-, maternity hospital-, and voluntary World War II army auxiliary records. The secular height trend is found both in males, from the 1870s/1880s, and in females starting with the 1840s/1850s birth cohorts. During the decades under study, mean height increased from 157 cm to 164 cm in female and 167 cm to 172 cm in male passport applicants, 154 cm to 159 cm in female and 167 cm to 169 cm in male convicts, 159 cm to 163 cm in female auxiliaries, and 155 cm to 159 cm in females giving birth in the maternity hospital of Basel. Because females seem to have started the secular trend in height earlier than their male contemporaries, the height dimorphism decreased during the second half of the 19th century. Differences between socio-economic status (SES) and data sources are found in both females and males: Women with low SES were significantly shorter than those of the other SES groups in all sources (on average 1.40 cm, p-values between 0.00 and 0.03). In men we found individuals of upper SES to be significantly taller (on average 1.96 cm, p-value = 0.00-0.10). Concerning differences between the sources, overall, passport applicants were the tallest for men as well as women; in females the individuals measured at the maternity hospital and in prison were the shortest. The variances across the datasets highlight the importance of considering different sources to depict average living conditions. Noteworthy is the finding that the diverse sources under study all show the same trajectory of increasing mean height over the course of the 19th century. In the long run, the improving net nutritional status of Swiss females may have been one of the contributors behind the general rise in well-being of the country's population from the later 19th century onwards.

This paper discusses why mathematical economists of the early Cold War period favored formal-axiomatic over behavioral choice theories. One reason was that formal-axiomatic theories allowed mathematical economists to improve the conceptual and theoretical foundations of economics and thereby to increase its scientific status. Furthermore, the separation between mathematical economics and other behavioral sciences was not as clear-cut as often argued. While economists did not modify their behavioral assumptions, some acknowledged the empirical shortcomings of their models. The paper reveals the multifaceted nature of rational choice theories reflected in the changing interpretations and roles of the theories in those early years.

In this paper we evaluate the heterogeneous effects of online copyright enforcement. We ask whether the unexpected shutdown of the popular file hosting platform Megaupload had a differential effect on box office revenues of wide-release vs. niche movies. Identification comes from a comparison of movies that were available on Megaupload to those that were not. We show that only movies that premiere in a relatively large number of theaters benefitted from the shutdown of Megaupload. The average effect, however, is negative. We provide suggestive evidence that this result is driven by information externalities. The idea is that online piracy acts as a mechanism to spread information about product characteristics across consumers with different valuations for the product. Our results question the effectiveness of blanket public anti-piracy policy, not only from a consumer perspective, but also from a producer perspective.

There is substantial evidence that women tend to support different policies and political candidates than men. Many studies also document gender differences in a variety of important preference dimensions, such as risk-taking, competition and pro-sociality. However, the degree to which differential voting by men and women is related to these gaps in more basic preferences requires an improved understanding. We conduct an experiment in which individuals in small laboratory "societies" repeatedly vote for redistribution policies and engage in production. We find that women vote for more egalitarian redistribution and that this difference persists with experience and in environments with varying degrees of risk. This gender voting gap is accounted for partly by both gender gaps in preferences and by expectations regarding economic circumstances. However, including both these controls in a regression analysis indicates that the latter is the primary driving force. We also observe policy differences between male- and female-controlled groups, though these are substantially smaller than the mean individual differences-a natural consequence of the aggregation of individual preferences into collective outcomes.The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-021-09741-8.

We examine whether the moment just before the half-time break is a particularly good time to score a goal. Using detailed data from the top five European football leagues between the 2013-2014 and 2017-2018 seasons, we exploit the quasi-random occurrence of goals scored just before and just after the half-time break. In the former situation, the game is exogenously interrupted by a break immediately after the goal, whereas in the latter situation, the game continues without interruption. We show that in the case of a goal being scored just before halftime, the scoring team benefits more from the half-time break than the conceding team.

In European club football, decision makers often rely on recent match outcomes when evaluating team performance, even though short-term results are heavily influenced by randomness. This can lead to systematic misjudgments. In this article, we propose a complementary approach for performance evaluation. We build upon the concept of expected goals based on quantified scoring chances and develop a chart that visualizes situations in which a team’s true performance likely deviates from the performance indicated by match outcomes. This should prevent clubs from making flawed decisions when match outcomes are misleading due to the influence of random forces.

We study how the scope of negative externalities from market activity affects the willingness of market actors to exhibit social responsibility. Using the laboratory experimental paradigm introduced by Bartling et al. (Q J Econ 130(1):219–266, 2015), we compare the voluntary internalization of negative social impacts by market actors in cases where the negative externality is diffused among many subjects or is concentrated on a single subject. We (1) replicate earlier results demonstrating substantial degrees of market social responsibility and (2) find that the willingness of market actors to act pro-socially is only slightly affected by whether the impacts are concentrated or diffused.

The house money effect predicts that individuals show increased risk-seeking behavior in the presence of prior windfall gains. Although the effect’s existence is widely accepted, experimental studies that compare individuals’ risk-taking behavior using house money to individuals’ risk-taking behavior using their own money produce contradictory results. This experimental field study analyzes the gambling behavior of 917 casino customers who face real losses. We find that customers who received free play at the entrance showed not higher but significantly lower levels of risk-taking behavior during their casino visit, expressed through lower average wagers. This study thus provides field evidence against the house money effect. Moreover, as a result of lower levels of risk seeking, endowed customers yield better economic results in the form of smaller own-money losses when leaving the casino.

Building on critical literature on corporate sustainability, we add a perspective thus far only scarcely addressed: the toxicity of financial practices and products generating systemic risk. We start with illustrative examples setting the stage for defining toxic assets and practices as revealed after the onset of the financial crisis precipitated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. To illustrate corporate toxicity we use the ‘Global 100 Index’ from ‘Corporate Knights’ to show which (mostly financial) scandals or bailout cases were detected at corporations awarded a position in this prestigious sustainability rating. Next, we present examples of toxic products (Naked Credit Default Swaps and structured products) and practices (securitization and ratings). Based on the examples we derive the concept of ‘financial toxicity’ adopted from pharmacology as a meta-criterion, which, as we argue, should be added to the ESG (environment, society, governance) universe as well as to corporate social responsib...

We analyze the best price clauses (BPCs) of online travel agents (OTAs) using meta-search price data of nearly 30,000 hotels in different countries. We find that BPCs influence the pricing and availability of hotel rooms across online sales channels. In particular, hotels publish their offers more often at Booking.com when the OTA does not use the narrow BPC, and also tend to promote the direct online channel more actively. Moreover, the abolition of Booking.com’s narrow BPC is associated with the direct channel of chain hotels having the strictly lowest price more often.

We show that the optimal asset allocation for an investor depends crucially on the decision theory with which the investor is modeled. For the same market data and the same client data different theories lead to different portfolios. The market data we consider is standard asset allocation data. The client data is determined by a standard risk profiling question and the theories we apply are mean–variance analysis, expected utility analysis and cumulative prospect theory. For testing the robustness of our results, we carry out the comparisons for alternative data sets and also for variants of the risk profiling question.

It has been argued persistently that economic models frequently suffer from poor empirical performance because they rely upon empirically inadequate behavioral foundations, i.e. theories of rationa...

Voluntary contribution games are a classic social dilemma in which the individually dominant strategies result in a poor performance of the population. However, the negative zero-contribution predictions from these types of social dilemma situations give way to more positive (near-)efficient ones when assortativity, instead of random mixing, governs the matching process in the population. Under assortative matching, agents contribute more than what would otherwise be strategically rational in order to be matched with others doing likewise. An open question has been the robustness of such predictions when heterogeneity in budgets amongst individuals is allowed. Here, we show analytically that the consequences of permitting heterogeneity depend crucially on the exact nature of the underlying public-good provision efficacy, but generally are rather devastating. Using computational methods, we quantify the loss resulting from heterogeneity vis-a-vis the homogeneous case as a function of (i) the public-good provision efficacy and (ii) the population inequality., Computational Economics, 52 (3), ISSN:0927-7099, ISSN:1572-9974

Increasing financial disparity and spiralling wages in European football have triggered a debate about the introduction of salary caps. This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports leagues and studies the welfare effect of salary caps. It shows that salary caps will increase competitive balance and decrease overall salary payments within the league. The resulting effect on social welfare is counter-intuitive and depends on the preference of fans for aggregate talent and for competitive balance. A salary cap that binds only for large market clubs will increase social welfare if fans prefer aggregate talent despite the fact that the salary cap will result in lower aggregate talent. If fans prefer competitive balance, on the other hand, any binding salary cap will reduce social welfare.

Amtliche Statistiken sind offentliche Guter, welche von einem regulierten und unabhangigen Staatsmonopol und nach Normen, die allgemein als objektiv akzeptiert werden, geliefert werden. In demokratischen Gesellschaften sind sie als Referenz in der offentlichen Diskussion wichtig; zuverlassige, genaue, zeitnahe und international vergleichbare statistische Informationen zu verschiedenen Themen werden als wesentlich erachtet. Dieses Monopol, das im 19. Jahrhundert eine lange Zeit benotigte, um zusammen mit der Grundung der Nationalstaaten zu entstehen und sich zu konsolidieren, scheint nun bedroht zu sein, und zwar einerseits durch die Verfugbarkeit von „freien“ grosen Datenquellen und andererseits durch die anhaltende Skepsis der offentlichen Meinung uber Informationen, die von Staatsburokratien zur Verfugung gestellt werden. „Big Data“ und „postfaktisch“ sind mithin die beiden Stichworte, die es erforderlich machen, erneut bekannte Fragen zu stellen, namlich erstens, was amtlichen Statistik in unserer Gesellschaft fur eine Aufgabe und Position haben soll, zweitens, wie die Qualitat der Informationen unter neuen Gegebenheiten gesichert und drittens, wie das Vertrauen in diese Statistiken dauerhaft hergestellt werden kann.

We analyze the first representative series of individual measurements of the height of Swiss conscripts for the years 1875-1950. We find that average height followed a general upward time trend, but the economic downturn in the 1880s slowed down the increase in rural average-heights while the economic crisis subsequent to World War I had only a minor effect. Moreover, social-class affiliation was the most important determinant of differences in the biological standard of living, with class and regional disparities remaining constant, for the most part, during the observation period. Lower-class individuals' ability to overcome economic stress was limited, with the result that their biological standard of living, as reflected in the cyclicality of deviations from average height, was likely to be affected by cycles in economic activity.

We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre-play messages. In a laboratory experiment, we modify communication by making the sending of messages optional and costly. Even small costs dramatically reduce message use, but efficient coordination of actions occurs with similar frequency to that observed under costless communication. Our results can be accounted for by Govindan and Wilson's formalization of forward induction (GW-FI), which selects, among the pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes, the one in which efficiency is achieved without communication. Consistent with the introspective character of GW-FI, the fraction of players who achieve efficient coordination by forgoing the use of reasonably costly optional messages is substantial from the first period, is remarkably stable at that level, and is not significantly affected by learning.

There are two regularities we have learned from experimental studies of choice under risk. The first is that the majority of people weigh objective probabilities non-linearly. The second regularity, although less commonly acknowledged, is that there is a large amount of heterogeneity in how people distort probabilities. Despite of this, little effort has been made to identify the source of heterogeneity. In this paper, we explore the possibility that the probability distortions are linked to the personality profile of the decision maker. Using four widely utilized personality tests, we classify participants into three distinct personality types and find that these types have different risk characteristics. Particularly, the trait of motivation plays a role in explaining the attraction of gambling, while the trait of impulsiveness affects the discriminability of non-extreme probabilities. Our results suggest heterogeneity in probability distortions may be explained by personality profiles, which can be elicited though standard questionnaires.

This article examines how firms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where risk averse firms decide on their hedging strategies before their product market strategies. We find that hedging modifies the pricing and production strategies of firms. This strategic effect is channelled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e., the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders' risk aversion. It has opposite effects depending on the nature of product market competition: hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, if firms can decide not to commit on their hedging position, this can never be an equilibriumoutcome: committing is always a best response to non committing. In the Hotelling model, committing is a dominant strategy for all firms.

This article uses bookmaker betting volume data to test the influence of bettor sentiment on bookmaker pricing in the over/under 2.5 goals betting market. In an average match, more than 80% of the volume wagered is concentrated on the over bet as cheering for a high score is more attractive than betting against it. We do not find that this volume imbalance is associated with systematic biases in bettor returns. High price transparency seems to prevent bookmakers from systematically distorting their odds in order to exploit bettor sentiment.

Distortions under the value-added tax (VAT) arise partly from the exemption of specific services and sectors. This paper develops an analytical model that is applicable to any sector characterized by asymmetric VAT exemptions of services and activities. We analyze the effects of such asymmetric tax regimes on market shares, optimal prices, tax receipts, and social welfare. The analytical model shows how asymmetric VAT exemptions distort competition by strengthening the competitive position of non-rated firms. The net effect of such tax exemptions depends on the fraction of VAT-rated inputs versus the fraction of non-rated customers. We further elucidate main competitive impacts of VAT policies, while showing their consequences on overall welfare by presenting simulation results based on a calibrated quantitative model of a selected sector. Our paper provides guidance on how to resolve the policy trade-off between a level playing field in the market, consumer surplus, and government tax revenue.

In the December 2002 issue of the American Economic Review, Mark Duggan and Steven D. Levitt published an article on corruption in professional sumo. In the present article, the authors update the study of Duggan and Levitt to take into account changes since January 2000. The authors find strong statistical evidence that corruption is reduced after January 2000 but reappears in the period from 2003 to 2006. In addition, they can show that the nonlinearity in the incentive structure disappears from 2000 to 2003 and reappears after 2003. These results confirm the findings of Duggan and Levitt, who suggest that the structure of promotion in rankings gives incentives to the sumo wrestlers to rig matches.

This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weighted sum of profits and wins (utility maximization). The model analyzes how more win-oriented behavior of certain clubs affects talent investments, competitive balance, and club profits. Moreover, in contrast to traditional models, the authors show that revenue sharing does not always reduce investment incentives due to the dulling effect. The authors identify a new effect of revenue sharing called the ‘‘sharpening effect.’’ In the presence of the sharpening effect (dulling effect), revenue sharing enhances (reduces) investment incentives and improves (deteriorates) competitive balance in the league.

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in Experimental Economics 2013, 16(1), 52-87. Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an environment where both demand reduction and preemptive bidding are supported as equilibrium phenomena of the ascending auction. In a series of experiments, we compare its performance to that of the discriminatory auction. Strategic demand reduction is quite prevalent in the ascending auction even when entry by the newcomer imposes a (large) negative externality on incumbents. As a result, the ascending auction performs worse than the discriminatory auction both in terms of revenue and efficiency, while the two auction formats offer similar chances for newcomers to enter the market.

Standard economic theory suggests that more choice is usually better. We address this claim and investigate whether people can cope with the increasing number of television programs and watch the amount of TV they find optimal for themselves or whether they are prone to over-consumption. We find that heavy TV viewers do not benefit but instead report lower life satisfaction with access to more TV channels. This finding suggests that an identifiable group of individuals experiences a self-control problem when it comes to TV viewing.