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Not all politics is local. Not even local politics is necessarily local. The reemergence of local politics is not comparable to the nationalization of politics but is rather an element making multilevel policies more or less interconnected. This global review (not including North America) suggests that the rise of local politics is explained by three set of processes—( a) democratization, including protest, ( b) economic globalization, urbanization, and the deepening of territorial inequalities, and ( c) decentralization or deconcentration and the rise of local governance and policies. The rise of local politics is not a revival of the past but an element of the politics of scale taking. All over the world, local politics is increasingly about policies, governance, and political choice.

The last 20 years have been characterized by very different dynamics: massive reduction of milk and, to a lesser extent, dairy consumption; fewer positive attitudes towards milk; no reclaims for affordable, public dairy production; the development of a large conversation about the presumed risks associated with the intake of lactose; and semantic battles on non-dairy ‘milk’ alternatives. These new attitudes haven’t been systematically studied. We explore here the links between milk/dairy consumption, health concerns, and trust in medical expertise. Through an online survey of highly educated youth in Italy (N=378) we have investigated: milk and dairy consumption; attitudes towards items carried out by vegan movements; attitudes towards medical expertise and trust in counseling by general practitioners. Results show that anti-speciesist and vegan movements are very little known among consumers. Data display very limited impact of the ideas and concepts of anti-milk movements within our sample. The results highlight that milk consumption shrinking is due to health concern and an unfavorable perception of dangerous consequences in lactose intake, and additionally to a general distrust towards medical expertise and evidence-based arguments. Indeed, we observe a tendency to self-diagnose intolerance/allergies, questioning the role of physicians and medical knowledge in advising for dietary choices among highly educated youth. The analysis of the patterns of consumption and motives clearly shows that health considerations, not politics, are behind the Italian youth’s dairy restrictions. Healthy consumerism emerges as a concept fitting better than political consumerism for interpreting our results.; Les vingt dernières années ont été traversées par différentes dynamiques : la réduction massive de la consommation de lait et, dans une moindre mesure, de produits laitiers ; des attitudes de plus en plus négatives à l’égard du lait ; aucune revendication pour une production abordable et publique du lait ; le développement d’une vaste discussion à propos des risques qui seraient associés à la consommation de lactose ; et des batailles sémantiques autour des alternatives que constituent les « laits » non laitiers. Ces nouvelles attitudes n’ont pas été systématiquement étudiées. Nous explorons ici les liens entre la consommation de lait et de produits laitiers, les préoccupations en matière de santé et la confiance dans l’expertise médicale. À partir d’un sondage en ligne auprès des populations jeunes et éduquées en Italie (N=378), nous avons analysé : la consommation de lait et de produits laitiers, les attitudes envers les arguments portés par les mouvements végans, les attitudes envers l’expertise médicale et la confiance dans les conseils dispensés par les médecins. Les résultats ont mis en évidence que les mouvements antispécistes et végans sont assez peu connus des consommateurs. Les données ont montré que les idées et les concepts des mouvements anti-lait avaient un impact limité sur notre échantillon. Les résultats soulignent que la réduction de la consommation de lait est due à des préoccupations en matière de santé et à une perception défavorable des apports en lactose et, additionnellement, à une méfiance générale envers l’expertise médicale et les arguments fondés sur des preuves. En effet, nous observons une tendance à l’auto-diagnostic pour les intolérances et les allergies, une tendance chez les populations jeunes et éduquées qui mettent en doute le rôle des médecins et du savoir médical dans l’accompagnement diététique. L’analyse des schémas de consommation et de motivation montre clairement que des considérations liées à la santé, et non à des opinions politiques, sont derrière les restrictions des jeunes italiens en matière de produits laitiers. Un consumérisme orienté vers la recherche d’une meilleure santé a émergé, un concept qui fonctionne mieux que celui de consumérisme politique pour interpréter nos résultats.

Contemporary political economy is predicated on widely shared ideas and assumptions, some explicit but many implicit, about the past. Our aim in this Special Issue is to draw attention to, and to assess critically, these historical assumptions. In doing so, we hope to contribute to a political economy that is more attentive to the analytic assumptions on which it is premised, more aware of the potential oversights, biases, and omissions they contain, and more reflexive about the potential costs of these blind spots. This is an Introduction to one of two Special Issues that are being published simultaneously by New Political Economy and Review of International Political Economy reflecting on blind spots in international political economy. Together, these Special Issues seek to identify the key blind spots in the field and to make sense of how many scholars missed or misconstrued important dynamics that define contemporary capitalism and the other systems and sources of social inequality that characterise our present. This particular Special Issue pursues this goal by looking backwards, to the history of political economy and at the ways in which we have come to tell that history, in order to understand how we got to the present moment.

Identifying and explaining change in the structure of central state bureaucracies and the determinants of survival of individual public organizations are two closely related areas of research in public administration. We aim to bridge the gap between these two main strands of studies of organizational change by presenting a novel approach to collecting event history data for public organizations. We have developed this framework as part of the Structure and Organisation of Governments Project, which aims to map entire central state bureaucracies in three Western European countries. Our approach is flexible enough to describe macro-trends in public sector organization populations and to explain these trends by analysing the event histories of the organizations they comprise. In addition to presenting our framework and how we applied it to create this data set, we also present some initial cross-national comparisons of the distribution of the event types recorded, highlighting initial findings and promising avenues for further research. Points for practitioners We present here a novel approach for representing the structural changes that organizations and sub-departments experience over time that can apply to any hierarchical organization (public or private). Applying the approach illuminates the historical development of organizations and their parts, and allows cross-national comparisons of events and trends across organizations. Our comparison of ministerial organizations in France, Germany and the Netherlands from 1980 to 2013 shows that trends in the size of bureaucracies mask considerable structural changes within.

Contemporary West European shantytowns have essentially been studied with qualitative methods. Questions related to their ethnic structure, homophily and interaction with local institutions have not been analysed through large samples and survey data. Based on the example of Romanian and Bulgarian Roma living in shantytowns in the Parisian metropolitan area, we analyse the ‘historical’ region of origin (autochthony), networks between individuals and households having lived together in a shantytown, as well as some of their attitudes, skills, and behaviour (i.e. expectations as to local welfare, French proficiency, children’s schooling). We used a database of slum-dwellers in Paris collected by social workers (N = 12,019). The paper looks at how autochthonies combine with socialisation in shantytowns and with territorial institutional effects of local policies. Evidence shows that while there are limited differences in the socio-professional backgrounds of slum-dwellers, there are several differences in attitudes, behaviour and skills. Moreover, social network analysis shows that these differences are only weakly related to the households’ region of origin (autochthony), while they are more correlated to emergent structural clusters of co-habitation connections, where individuals socialise in acting together to build and manage a shantytown. Moreover, local policies at the city level play a role in shaping shantytown dwellers expectations and skills for integration.

Published 16 November 2021. Under embargo until 16 November 2022 The content of this document represents only the views of the TRANSNATIONAL team and is its sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains. The project leading to this application has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 885026)”. This research note reports on the 1999–2019 Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES), which contains measures of national party positioning on European integration, ideology, and several European Union (EU) and non-EU policies for six waves of the survey, from 1999 to 2019. The trend file provides party position measures for all 28 EU countries and 1196 party-year observations. In this article, we analyze the evolving party positions on European integration from 1999 to 2019, with a particular focus on how EU positions are related to economic left right and the Green/Alternative/Libertarian-Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist dimension (GAL-TAN). The dataset is publicly available on the CHES website

First Published December 8, 2021 The role of the symbolic is often overlooked in the public policy literature. Yet, it is a key component of public action, particularly in crisis management. During the Covid-19 pandemic, all democratic states needed to carry out cognitive and emotional work to persuade their citizens to show solidarity and comply with heavy restrictions. The near-simultaneous occurrence of the pandemic’s first wave (March–May 2020) allows us to compare the patterns of symbolic crisis management across four European countries (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom). Our analysis finds significant variation in governments’ usage of the symbolic. We analyse leaders’ performances (wordcraft and stagecraft) as they try to reassure citizens, unite the nation, and legitimise themselves and their decisions. Our article shows not only that national leaders pay great attention to the symbolic in the management of crises, but also that their performances differ systematically in line with their personas and distinct national political cultures.

We offer a series of reflective insights about the state and direction of studies related to the politics of regulation. Notably we argue that the field is characterized by persisting divisions between Americanists and Europeanists. Largely focused on the actions taken by political principals, the former regularly report a substantial politicization of regulatory behavior. Reflecting on recent developments in US politics however, we show that political influence could be overestimated in the United States. Symmetrically, this same influence could be underestimated by Europeanists, who for now have largely focused on regulators and agencies. This is notably suggested by a discussion of recent development in European politics, as revealed by contributions systematically measuring agency politicization in Western European democracies. On this basis, we identify some promising research questions and agendas for future studies on the politics of regulation.

Le marche du risque sante en France connait depuis une trentaine d’annees un vaste mouvement d’europeanisation. Dans les annees 1990, une premiere serie de directives remanie les relations entre les acteurs (mutuelles, institutions de prevoyance et societes d’assurance). En 2016, l’entree en vigueur de la directive Solvabilite II s’accompagne de nouvelles exigences reglementaires. Pourtant, et pendant la meme periode, une serie de mesures adoptees a l’echelon national a renforce la presence de l’Etat dans ses activites. Il en ressort une situation paradoxale : d’un cote, les principaux assureurs sante en France sont certainement plus europeanises qu’auparavant mais, d’un autre cote, les politiques nationales pesent de facon croissante sur leurs activites.

The strengthening of the populist radical right poses an important challenge for European integration. This article explores whether democratic backsliding among member states has acted as a catalyst for broader PRR cooperation at the EU level. Studying the co-sponsorship and contents of parliamentary questions and roll-call vote cohesion of PRR representatives in the European Parliament from 2009 to 2019, we examine the extent and substance of their joint polity-based contestation of European integration. Our findings indicate that overall levels of PRR cooperation remain low and concentrated within European party groups, suggesting that ideological divergences between PRR actors and their institutional fragmentation within the EP still hamper their formal cooperation at the European level. These insights feed into debates on the potential and limitations of transnational cooperation of PRR actors., Journal of European Public Policy, 30 (1), ISSN:1350-1763, ISSN:1466-4429

What explains far-right mobilisation in the protest arena? After decades of growing electoral support and policy influence, the far right is experiencing an increase in grassroots mobilisation. Scholars of social movements and political parties have devoted little attention to the determinants of far-right protest mobilisation in Europe. In this article, we bridge previous research on the far right and social movements to advance hypotheses on the drivers of far-right protest mobilisation based on grievances, opportunities and resource mobilisation models. We use an original dataset combining novel data on 4,845 far-right protest events in 11 East and West European countries (2008–2018), with existing measures accounting for the (political, economic and cultural) context of mobilisation. We find that classical approaches to collective action can be fruitfully applied to the study of the far right. Cultural grievances, notably concerns about immigration, as well as the availability of institutional access points in contexts characterised by divided government increase far-right protest mobilisation. But far-right protest mobilisation also rests on the organisational resources available to nativist collective actors, that is, the network in which they are embedded, their visibility in the media and elected officials. These findings have important implications to understand far-right success in advanced democracies. They show that far-right mobilisation in the protest arena not only rests on favourable circumstances, but also on whether far-right actors can profit from them. More broadly, the study links party politics and social movement research to grasp the far right's modes of political contestation, locating research on this phenomenon at the intersection of political sociology and comparative politics. What explains far-right mobilisation in the protest arena? After decades of growing electoral support and policy influence, the far right is experiencing an increase in grassroots mobilisation. Scholars of social movements and political parties have devoted little attention to the determinants of far-right protest mobilisation in Europe. In this article, we bridge previous research on the far right and social movements to advance hypotheses on the drivers of far-right protest mobilisation based on grievances, opportunities and resource mobilisation models. We use an original dataset combining novel data on 4,845 far-right protest events in 11 East and West European countries (2008–2018), with existing measures accounting for the (political, economic and cultural) context of mobilisation. We find that classical approaches to collective action can be fruitfully applied to the study of the far right. Cultural grievances, notably concerns about immigration, as well as the availability of institutional access points in contexts characterised by divided government increase far-right protest mobilisation. But far-right protest mobilisation also rests on the organisational resources available to nativist collective actors, that is, the network in which they are embedded, their visibility in the media and elected officials. These findings have important implications to understand far-right success in advanced democracies. They show that far-right mobilisation in the protest arena not only rests on favourable circumstances, but also on whether far-right actors can profit from them. More broadly, the study links party politics and social movement research to grasp the far right's modes of political contestation, locating research on this phenomenon at the intersection of political sociology and comparative politics.

Independent regulatory agency has become the standard institutional choice in Western Europe. Little is known, however, about the involvement of legislators in their design and in their monitoring. In this paper, we analyse ex-ante and ex-post legislative involvement for 48 regulatory agencies enacted in France. We show that legislators debate and design more substantially agencies for which the government bill has already granted them more powers to appoint members to their board, or to be appointed as board members themselves. Once enacted, agencies that allow greater participation by legislators in their decision-making are subject to greater scrutiny, and this even after controlling for routine oversight activities. Regulatory domains matter, though only for ex-post legislative oversight. These results suggest that legislative involvement is selective and driven by strategic considerations. More fundamentally, they imply that legislative involvement could be more important in regulatory agency activities than usually assumed.

The striking economic agglomerations emerging in affluent democracies are generating, reproducing, and expanding inequalities. A major mechanism for this is housing, which is both a repository for wealth and, under these conditions, a magnifier of wealth. Access to urban areas – the site of educational, labor, and marriage market advantages – is contingent upon access to housing. We use comparative analysis of cases in Europe (London and Paris) and the United States (New York and San Francisco) to consider the capacities of different societies to limit or ameliorate these new sources of diverging opportunity. These seemingly local issues remain shaped by distinct national political contexts, which vary dramatically in their capacity to support local affordable housing and reduce the collective action problems confronting major metropolitan areas.

Many parties have updated their recruitment strategies and offer softer routes for joining their ranks. In some parties, registered sympathizers are given virtually the same rights as traditional members with substantially lower costs. This begs the question, why would somebody take the further step of joining such parties as full members rather than sympathizers? This article analyzes this question by using membership surveys from three left-wing Spanish parties. As such, it explores the usefulness of the general incentives model (GIM) for explaining the decisions of these two groups of affiliates. We find that full members and sympathizers differ in the motives they have to join the party and in their evaluations of the diverse types of incentives included in the GIM. Candidate selection incentives seem particularly important for sympathizers, whereas selective outcome incentives, selective process benefits, collective outcome benefits and altruistic motivations play a more significant role for members.

This article examines public contestation of Europe by the far right in France. It investigates whether far-right mobilization on the EU has changed over time, and how it diverges in the party and non-party sectors. Specifically, we follow a politicization approach and address mobilization in terms of three interrelated dimensions: intensity, issue focus, and action repertoire. This allows comparing collective action in the electoral and protest arenas, thus assessing how the far right politicizes Europe in public debates. The study relies on a mixed quantitative and qualitative analysis of the content of the press releases posted by far-right parties and movements on their official websites, scraped automatically from 2012 to 2019. The results show that European integration is increasingly at the core of far-right politics in France, but its politicization unfolds in different ways in the protest and electoral arenas. As political conflict over the EU expands, far-right parties and non-party actors are challenged to differentiate their respective profiles. These findings complement existing research on the linkages between protest and elections, and suggest that the rooting of the far right in society is reconfiguring the structure of political conflict in Europe.

International audience; Four institutional features such as confidence vote, electoral system, candidate nomination, and decree power can affect the degree of party discipline in France. Other than four institutional factors, this chapter also asserts that three contextual factors such as the popular support for the president, the ideological cohesiveness of the majority, and the majority micromanagement can affect the president’s ability to steer the legislative agenda. In France, the majority of presidents have experienced defections of partisan members who have different preferences or stances in conflict with theirs.; Cette contribution étudie les logiques du soutien de la majorité parlementaire aux projets législatifs impulsés par le président de la République en France. Ce soutien est important mais tend néanmoins à décroitre au fils des décennies. Il se fonde tant sur des logiques structurelles, de règles constitutionnelles et électorales, que sur des facteurs contextuels dont la qualité du management du groupe majoritaire par l’exécutif.

This article addresses the question of whether populist parties behave differently from other political parties in parliament. Building on the attention-based perspective of the study of policy agendas, we map issue emphasis in parliamentary questions in Italy over more than two decades (1996–2019). The paper is innovative as it compares populist and non-populist parties in government and in opposition. Using data from theItalian Policy Agendas ProjectandThe PopuList, we find mixed evidence. Specifically, we show that populist parties behave differently from other parties only when they are in opposition (signalling that they are different from ‘elite’ ones) but not when in government (signalling that they are ‘competent’ policymakers). While the results are exploratory and drawn from the Italian context, this study contributes to deflate the myth of populists' exceptionalism, at least in terms of their behaviour in parliament. As such, it holds broader implications for the scholarly understanding of party government and the so-called ‘normalization’ of populism in contemporary democracies.

The last decade has seen the development of the so-called ‘monster bills’ in France, that is too say remarkably long laws, putting together heterogeneous elements. Among the notorious examples of them, we investigate the ‘Grenelle laws’ aiming at protecting the environment field (2009) and the ‘Macron Law’ aiming at liberalizing the economy (2015). The development of these laws is interpreted as resulting from two factors: a. the willingness of the executive power to send a diversity of messages to a diversity of audiences through visible legislation, b. pressures from bureaucracies of state departments cyclically willing to promote their reforms in a context of limited access to the legislatures’ agenda. The paper presents this process as well as it consequences for the functioning of the parliament in terms of work-overload, lobbying and MPs influence. The paper supports the view that the inner-logic of rationalization within the State paradoxically lead to de-rationalize the legislative procedure, i.e. a greater complexity and legal as well as political uncertainty in the passing of such bills.

This article analyses the political construction and politicisation of UK–EU relations by British parliamentarians in Westminster and in the European Parliament (EP) between May 2015 and May 2017. Using computer-assisted content analysis techniques and qualitative analysis of sampled speeches, we investigate how parties used frames and emotions in order to mobilise voters. Results indicate that the ‘Leave’ campaign succeeded in triggering sentiments of distrust and anger against the establishment and mobilizing voters while, economic arguments used by ‘remainers’ failed to convince citizens from deprived areas of the benefits of EU membership. Intra-party divisions were stronger among Westminster members than in the EP, but the visibility of the ‘Leave’ discourse in the EP was disproportionately higher to the number of pro-Brexit parliamentarians. Polarisation and values-based arguments are observed in the EP early in the campaign, suggesting that the process initiated at the European level and then migrated to the national level.

This research note introduces two novel indexes designed to measure legislative activity (ParlAct) and use of digital devices to maintain legislative functions (ParlTech) during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic. It will also present a novel comprehensive dataset on the functioning of legislatures during a critical period of the pandemic, providing scores for 152 domestic legislatures on both the ParlAct and ParlTech indexes. It will be argued that both indexes could also serve as templates for future research on legislative activity during other pandemics, crises and contingencies.

In recent decades, accelerating processes of globalization and an increase in economic inequality in most of the world's countries have raised the question of the emergence of a new bourgeoisie integrated at the global level, sometimes described as a global super-bourgeoisie. This group would be distinguished by its unequaled level of wealth and global interconnectedness, its transnational ubiquity and concentration in the planet's major global cities, its specific culture, consumption habits, sites of sociability and shared references, and even by class consciousness and capacity to act collectively. This article successively discusses how the social sciences have examined these various dimensions of the question and begun to provide systematic empirical answers.

Data de publicació electrònica: 06-10-2021 After a decade-long search, countries finally agreed on a new climate treaty in 2015. The Paris Agreement has attracted attention both for overcoming years of gridlock and for its novel features. Here, we build on accounts explaining why states reached agreement, arguing that a deeper understanding requires a focus on institutional design. Ultimately, it was this agreement, with its specific provisions, that proved acceptable to states rather than other possible outcomes. Our account is multi-causal and draws methodological inspiration from the public policy and causes of war literatures. Specifically, we distinguish between background, intermediate, and proximate conditions and identify how they relate to one another, jointly producing the ultimate outcome we observe. Our analysis focuses especially on the role of scientific knowledge, non-state actor mobilization, institutional legacies, bargaining, and coalition-building in the final push for agreement. This case-based approach helps to understand the origins of Paris, but also offers a unique, historically grounded way to examine questions of institutional design. We are grateful for the research funding received from the Institute of Asian Research and the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at UBC, the Environmental Governance Lab (EGL) at the University of Toronto, and the Research Support Scheme at Cardiff University.

This paper aims to put contemporary political socialisation research in perspective. It offers a rapid overview of the crisis of the subfield after the 1970s and then shifts attention to post-crisis studies. Beginning with child political socialisation, it raises four issues: the use of theoretical frameworks derived from child psychology; the need to reconnect political socialisation to the sociology of family; the benefits of renewing methods for understanding the world of child politics; and a new account of social inequality in the process of political socialisation. It then explores lifelong political socialisation and how it has developed around four research dynamics: the study of civic and political socialisation of school-age adolescents and young adults; the generational renewal; the socialising effects of political mobilisation; and the processes and agents of the secondary political socialisation of adults. The final section raises the major question of what is political in political socialisation.

Whether presented as ethnic ‘solidarity’ or ‘segregation’, the idea that migrants’ social world is dominated by tightly-knit, homogeneous, and supportive networks of kin and co-ethnics is common in scholarly and public discourse around migration, particularly for minorities with a history of marginalisation, segregation, and stigmatisation. We test this idea using results from the first survey of personal networks in one of the most stigmatised immigrant minorities in the Western world: Roma migrants in Europe. Analysing data on 119 Romanian Roma migrants in France and their 3,570 social ties, we identify typical structures of personal communities, describe the distribution and association of different dimensions of social support, and estimate multilevel models to identify determinants of support in this population. We find that, even in contexts of strong marginalisation and stigmatisation, the hypotheses of ethnic solidarity, sociodemographic homophily, and network closure are inadequate to explain the way migrants obtain social support. Instead, Romanian Roma in France appear much closer to the model of ‘networked individualism’ and similar to middle classes in Western ethnic majorities, as they strategically maintain diverse and far-flung networks, choose forms of elective belonging in local contexts, and mobilise different social ties for different, specialised types of support.

In what ways, if at all, do past ideologies shape the values of subsequent generations of citizens? Are public attitudes in one period shaped by the discourses and constructions of an earlier generation of political leaders? Using Thatcherism – one variant of the political New Right of the 1980s – as the object of our enquiries, this article explores the extent to which an attitudinal legacy is detectable among the citizens of the UK some 40 years after Margaret Thatcher first became Prime Minister. Our article, drawing on survey data collected in early 2019 (n = 5781), finds that younger generations express and seemingly embrace key tenets of her and her governments’ philosophies. Yet at the same time, they are keen to describe her government’s policies as having ‘gone too far’. Our contribution throws further light on the complex and often covert character of attitudinal legacies. One reading of the data suggests that younger generations do not attribute the broadly Thatcherite values that they hold to Thatcher or Thatcherism since they were socialised politically after such values had become normalised.

The search for a universally acceptable definition of corruption has been a central element of scholarship on corruption over the last decades, without it ever reaching a consensus in academic circles. Moreover, it is far from certain that citizens share the same understanding of what should be labelled as ‘corruption’ across time, space and social groups. This article traces the journey from the classical conception of corruption, centred around the notions of morals and decay, to the modern understanding of the term focussing on individual actions and practices. It provides an overview of the scholarly struggle over meaning-making and shows how the definition of corruption as the ‘abuse of public/entrusted power for private gain’ became dominant, as corruption was constructed as a global problem by international organizations. Lastly, it advocates for bringing back a more constructivist perspective on the study of corruption which takes the ambiguity and political dimensions of corruption seriously. The article suggests new avenues of research to understand corruption in the changing context of the twenty-first century.

After the great financial crisis of 2007–2009, central banks were handed a macroprudential mandate to contain systemic risks, a mandate seen as endangering their independence due to expected distributional conflicts. At the same time, depoliticization through scientific expertise was largely foreclosed, as systemic risk was a largely undefined concept. This paper focuses on how central banks dealt with this conundrum. It examines the scientific debate on systemic risk and macroprudential regulation post-crisis, focusing on the debate’s impact on final regulation. Employing author-topic-modeling on a unique dataset of 2397 published economic papers on the relevant topics, we detect the formation of a new alliance between central bankers and academic economists working jointly on developing systemic risk measures. Centered around a hinge of systemic risk contribution by individual banks, this new alliance expresses itself by incorporating the macroprudential concerns of practitioners into abstract market-based systemic risk measures. These measures develop incrementally, using and repurposing techniques from financial economics pre-crisis to legitimize and justify macroprudential interventions post-crisis. This alliance allows us to account for the incremental change witnessed post-crisis and point to its potential for long-term fundamental change. Introduction The role of economic ideas within pre- and post-crisis financial regulation Shifting alliances of academic and applied economics Dataset and method Analysis of risk modeling and measurement discourse Interaction between academic and applied approaches and their translation into CoVaR, MES and SRISK Discussion and conclusion: the professional origins of systemic risk measures and their usability for systemic risk monitoring References

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En los últimos veinte años, las sociedades de España e Italia han experimentado un cambio demográfico muy notable debido a flujos migratorios de alta intensidad. Desde principios de la década de 1990, la población extranjera se multiplicó por cinco en ambos países y en 2010 alcanzó el 12 y el 6 por ciento, respectivamente, del conjunto poblacional (INE, 2015; ISTAT, 2015). En ambos casos, dicho fenómeno migratorio plantea nuevos desafíos de representación democrática, dado que, en un periodo muy corto de tiempo, ha generado un gran caudal de nuevos residentes con expectativas legítimas de hacer oír su voz en el proceso de toma de decisiones. Sin embargo, el aumento del número de inmigrantes residentes en España e Italia también coincidió con un período en el que la opinión pública empezó a mostrar mayor preocupación por la inmigración, lo que provocó actitudes negativas cada vez más visibles hacia los colectivos inmigrantes en ambos países. Este artículo analiza en qué medida la presión migratoria y el cambio actitudinal hacia los inmigrantes en España e Italia pueden ayudarnos a comprender mejor las estrategias de los partidos a la hora de facilitar el acceso de este colectivo a cargos electos en los parlamentos nacionales. Haciendo uso de una base de datos única que incluye información sobre el perfil sociodemográfico y político de todos los diputados y diputadas en ambos países desde 1990 hasta la actualidad, nuestro estudio contribuye a avanzar en el conocimiento sobre las dinámicas que favorecen y que dificultan la representación política de los inmigrantes en estos dos países del sur de Europa. In the 1990s and the 2000s, Spain and Italy experienced a considerable growth in immigration. In just two decades, the foreign population has multiplied more than fivefold in both countries and by 2010 accounted for 12 and 6 per cent of the total population, respectively (INE, 2015; ISTAT, 2015). This demographic change has put pressure on the democratic representative system of both countries, with large numbers of new residents wishing to have a voice in the direction of collective affairs. Yet, at the same time, public opinion has become increasingly concerned about immigration and immigrants' integration in both countries, with attitudes towards immigrants becoming increasingly negative in both. This article examines how these competing pressures can help us better understand the strategies of political parties in relation to the incorporation of citizens of immigrant origin into elected office in the national parliaments of both countries. Drawing on an original and unique dataset on the socio-demographic characteristics and political profiles of all national MPs elected in Spain and Italy since the beginning of the 1990s, this study aims at examining the dynamics which encourage or hinder the political representation of citizens of immigrant origin in these two Southern European countries. En els últims vint anys, les societats d'Espanya i Itàlia han experimentat un canvi demogràfic molt notable a causa de fluxos migratoris d'alta intensitat. Des de principis de la dècada de 1990, la població estrangera es va multiplicar per cinc en tots dos països i el 2010 va assolir el 12 i el 6 per cent, respectivament, del conjunt poblacional (INE, 2015; ISTAT, 2015). En tots dos casos, aquest fenomen migratori planteja nous desafiaments de representació democràtica, atès que, en un període molt curt de temps, ha generat un gran cabal de nous residents amb expectatives legítimes de fer sentir la seva veu en el procés de presa de decisions. No obstant això, l'augment del nombre d'immigrants residents a Espanya i Itàlia també va coincidir amb un període en el qual l'opinió pública va començar a mostrar major preocupació per la immigració, la qual cosa va provocar actituds negatives cada vegada més visibles cap als col·lectius immigrants en ambdós països. Aquest article analitza en quina mesura la pressió migratòria i el canvi actitudinal cap als immigrants a Espanya i Itàlia poden ajudar-nos a comprendre millor les estratègies dels partits a l'hora de facilitar l'accés d'aquest col·lectiu a càrrecs electes als parlaments nacionals. Fent ús d'una base de dades única que inclou informació sobre el perfil sociodemogràfic i polític de tots els diputats i diputades en tots dos països des de 1990 fins a l'actualitat, el nostre estudi contribueix a avançar en el coneixement sobre les dinàmiques que afavoreixen i que dificulten la representació política dels immigrants en aquests dos països del sud d'Europa.

Volunteer Activism Influence Political Attitudes and Behavior? In this chapter, we propose a reflection on the relationship between volunteering and political participation. We will ask ourselves whether the specific traits that characterize volunteer engagement in various forms, individual or associative networks, interpersonal links, and the cultures that develop through these activities can influence political attitudes and different forms of political participation. In recent years, Italian citizens have scarcely harboured positive feelings toward politics but have rather exhibited indifference and often anger toward parties and representative institutions. Their willingness to participate has not diminished, 14 has rather taken on other forms quite different from the parties themselves (volunteering, associations, movements). These tendencies had already begun manifesting themselves in Italy in the 1980s with the growth of volunteer commitment at a social, individual, or group level. The weight of social volunteering, oriented to the production of public goods, has increased in the last 20 years, while the influence of political parties has been reduced, and the forms of citizens’ participation have been transformed. In general, a considerable amount of research indicates a significant relationship between volunteering and political participation. However, the relationship can take several different forms and meanings depending upon the type of association to which the volunteers are linked and the possible ways of expressing political participation. On the other hand, a hypothesis may also be put forth that volunteering and political commitment are both influenced by the same social conditions of the volunteers as well as by the territorial contexts in which they operate. Based on the survey results of the Istat Aspects of Daily Life (ADL) of 2013, this chapter shows proofs of a socialisation effects of volunteering on political skills and behaviour, reducing inequalities in political participation. Especially, an inclusive group’s style reduces the effects of exclusion from democratic political participation structured by social inequalities. In 2013, associationism was confirmed as a true school of democracy, namely, for the work- ing classes. Finally, we note that political and social participation differ in relation to their distribution on the respondents’ respective territories. The levels of latent and visible political participation can be significantly influenced by the levels of civicness that traditionally differentiate across the Italian regions, as has been noted since the beginning of Putnam’s research in the 1980s. However, in all regional areas, the experience of volunteering and participation in social associations increases political participation. The influence of this experience is much more relevant in the southern regions where a more limited level of civic participation is traditionally reported. In territories where civicism is lower, not only associationism itself play a fundamental role in the production of public goods, but it also serves as a fundamental driver of the socialization to democratic values and practices, even more so than in other parts of the Bel Paese.

This chapter considers the political battles that led to the far-reaching reform of solvency rules governing insurance activities in the EU, between 1994 and 2016. Then we review their main implications for a particular segment of this industry, namely private health insurance. Focusing on the prudential regime laid down in EU law and regulation, we show that the adoption of Solvency II is likely to be a critical shift for the sector. Indeed, and while previous directives were essentially preoccupied with finding common rules to organize competition within the Single Market, Solvency II developed as a more conceptual architecture, with rules, requirements and standards intended to become ingrained in insurers’ daily activities. This shift was essentially legitimized as providing greater transparency and safety to financial investors and policyholders. Yet, we argue from the vantage point of private health insurance that this statement is open to doubt, and that greater financialization of entire segments of the industry could happen instead as a result of the implementation of Solvency II.

Research has paid little attention to date on how the European Union (EU) affects private (usually voluntary) health insurance at domestic level and more broadly, the political economy of the public-private mix in healthcare. Our argument in this Introduction is that EU law and regulation is, essentially, likely to do so through the provisions applicable to the insurance sector as a whole. We then explain why it could potentially be a vehicle for transformative changes of private health insurers, and why, by extension, it could interact with the prior effects of domestic policy choices in healthcare. Ultimately, such interactions could also help change the nature and scope of health coverage. On the basis of these statements, we develop an analytical approach to elucidate, characterize and prove this influence. We then outline the research design and case selection processes and discuss the various methods applied in the nine contributions to this book. After a short summary of their respective findings, we reflect in a concluding section on how they echo wider debates in the literature on the role of private actors in contemporary Welfare States and on EU influence in healthcare.

Electoral systems provide distinctive accountability mechanisms in democratic polities and thereby affect government responsiveness to citizens. In this article, we concentrate on the effects of proportional vis‐à‐vis majoritarian electoral rules. We expect members of parliament to be more responsive under majoritarian rule, because these MPs have a direct mandate from their local constituency, are less dependent on their party, and can be held directly accountable by voters. We exploit Germany's mixed‐member system and test MP’s responsiveness using behavioral data generated within a two‐round field experiment. The experiment observes concrete interactions between voters and representatives. In the experiment, real voters sent emails about a policy issue to their MPs. We show that MPs who were elected via the majoritarian tier are almost twice as likely to respond to a voter request than MPs elected via PR. Our results deliver novel evidence that electoral institutions cause distinct behavioral responses from elected officials. published

This article analyses the nature of policy debates on financial regulation during the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) by considering three elements that shape them: the salience of the debate, the actors that dominate the debate, and the degree of anti-status quo pressure. Theoretically, it contributes to Culpepper’s quiet/noisy politics framework by clarifying its multidimensionality and explicitly introducing the degree of contestation. Empirically, it focuses on two regulatory issues: (1) the restriction of banking and financial activities and (2) the debate on the remuneration of bankers. The data captures political claims during the first 12 months of the GFC and covers 19 established democracies. The findings indicate that policy debates were unevenly politicized across countries and issues, and that structural factors are not enough to account for the observed variation in pressure for reform for all types of actors, thus constituting a puzzle for further research.

International audience; In Belgium, the “public” side of health coverage is delegated and organized around non-profit private health insurers, namely mutual benefit societies, and as such, it is excluded from the perimeter of EU insurance law and regulation. Over the last two decades, and as a result of various governmental attempts to reduce health expenditure, mutual benefit societies nevertheless developed and managed on their own a variety of complementary coverage. This situation was challenged during the 2000s by for-profit insurance companies seeking to penetrate the market. In this context, they used both Insurance and Solvency II directives in their search for supranational support to challenge the position of mutual benefit societies. In turn, the latter responded by working politically to secure their position at the domestic level. As a result of these political struggles, a reform adopted in 2010 reinforced several features of the Belgian public-private mix by safeguarding the position of mutual benefit societies for complementary coverage. But this same reform also opened the supplementary side of health coverage to competition and aligned it with EU provisions, thus marketizing a share of the public-private mix in Belgium—with recent figures suggesting that this new pillar is now expanding.

Despite decades of efforts to harmonize asylum procedures, large unexplained differences in asylum outcomes persist across European Union member states. Unfortunately, relatively little empirical literature has examined the causes of disparities in asylum recognition rates. In this paper, I suggest that domestic politics impact how asylum claims are adjudicated. I analyze origin-specific asylum recognition rates in 27 European Union member states from 2000-2018. The findings show that right-wing parties in government are associated with lower asylum recognition rates. This effect is strongest for far-right parties. When far-right parties gain legislative seats and cabinet positions, there is a substantive reduction in recognized asylum claims.

This article develops a framework to explain ideological diversity within political parties in parliamentary democracies from the positions of individual legislators. First, I review the different theories explaining the variation of ideological diversity within political parties in the field of party politics and legislative studies. Then, I propose to model the relations between legislators, their party and their constituents as a competitive delegation process building on the principal-agent theory. I draw on the literature on the distribution of power within political parties to argue that intra-party ideological diversity can best be explained by vertical bargains taking place between the different territorial layers of political parties.

What is the distinctive contribution of political science to the study of legislative institutions? And what has the study of such entities brought to political research? This paper argues that the answer to these questions is twofold. First, students of legislatures have amply demonstrated that legislative institutions do matter for the daily lives of modern societies – a statement that, as established in a first section, was far from evident in classical studies of political regimes, systems or elites. Second, we argue that legislative studies have actively contributed to our understanding of institutional change and strategic behaviour, arguably two of the most crucial areas of inquiry in political science.

International audience; This comprehensive Handbook takes a multidisciplinary approach to the study of parliaments, offering novel insights into the key aspects of legislatures, legislative institutions and legislative politics. Connecting rich and diverse fields of inquiry, it illuminates how the study of parliaments has shaped a wider understanding surrounding politics and society over the past decades.Through 26 thematic chapters, expert contributors analyse parliamentary institutions from various disciplinary perspectives (history, law, political science, political economy, sociology and anthropology). A wide range of approaches is covered, including the sociological study of members of parliaments, gender studies and the mathematical conceptualisation of legislatures. Exploring the history of parliament, the concepts and theories of parliamentarism, constitutional law, and the linkages between parliaments and the administrative state or with populism, this incisive Handbook provides a panoramic view of this institution. Chapters also map the main trends, patterns of developments and controversies related to parliaments, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of current research and identifying a range of promising avenues for further study.Drawing together international and comparative approaches, the Handbook of Parliamentary Studies will be a critical resource for academics and students of parliamentary politics, political science, political economy, public law and political history. It also provides a vital foundation for researchers of legislative and political institutions.

How transnational are European Parliament (EP) campaigns? Building on research on the European public sphere and the politicisation of the EU, this study investigates to what extent the 2019 EP campaign was transnational and which factors were associated with ‘going transnational’. It conceptualises Twitter linkages of EP candidates as constitutive elements of a transnational campaign arena distinguishing interactions with EP candidates from other countries (horizontal transnationalisation) and interactions with the supranational European party families and lead candidates (vertical transnationalisation). The analysis of tweets sent by EP candidates from all 28 member states reveals that most linkages remain national. Despite this evidence for the second-order logic, there are still relevant variations contingent on EU positions of parties, the adoption of the Spitzenkandidaten system and socialisation in the EP. The findings have implications for debates on the European public sphere and institutional reform proposals such as transnational party lists that might mitigate the EU’s democratic deficit.

The ‘post-functionalist’ view that growing politicisation constrains further integration (‘constraining dissensus’) occupies a prominent place in contemporary European studies. However, in the case of the euro crisis, we observe a rise in contentious politics concomitant with a deepening of EU integration, namely in the areas of economic governance. This paper argues that the intervention of the ‘Troika’ in the struggles over the framing of the southern European crises is a key to this puzzle. The analysis of over 1200 public declarations produced by the three institutions from 2009 to 2016 shows that the Troika actively ‘responded’ to processes of heightened politicisation, reproducing the dominant crisis narrative of the southern European periphery and making the case for the adequacy and inevitability of austerity. The Troika’s success in framing the euro crisis as a result of domestic failure and moral hazard contributed to the legitimation of further integration of European economic governance.

The multiple crises that the EU has faced over the last decade could lead observers to expect an increase in conflicts within its legislative process and, eventually, a shift from a consensual mode to a majoritarian and politicized mode. The dataset The EU Legislative Output 1996–2019 indicates that this has occurred only to a moderate extent. To explore this enduring consensus, we analyse quantitative and qualitative data on law making within the Council of the EU and the European Parliament and proceed to a systematic diachronic comparison. We argue that, as before the crisis, consensus remains a norm and results from cooperation based strategies. Furthermore, new factors, such as the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure, a pro-EU alliance within the European Parliament and the smaller number of legislative proposals, foster consensus.

Taking stock of the numerous crises that have confronted Europe in the last decade, this special issue investigates the relationship between crisis and the politicisation of the process of European integration. It draws attention in so doing to the epistemic construction of crises. In this conceptual overview, we discuss first, how crises are framed and reframed in relation to the constitutive elements of a political community. Second, we explore the extent to which, and how, the emergence of different understandings of crisis and the ensuing frame competition between them contribute to such politicisation. By elucidating the link between the politics of a now seemingly permanent crisis in Europe and the politicisation of European integration, this introduction sets the framework informing all of the articles in this special issue.

Contestation over European integration has been widely studied in the rhetoric of parties, leaders, and movements on the far right in a variety of media. Focusing on Twitter use by far right actors in Western Europe, we apply corpus-aided discourse analysis to explore how imaginative geographies are used to politicize Europe among their digital publics. We find that the idea of a crisis of cultural identity pervades imaginaries of Europe amongst far right digital publics. While Europe is presented as facing a crisis of cultural identity, we find that the far right articulates an aspirational imaginary of Europe, the ‘Europe des Nations’ that rejects liberal-democratic pluralism in the EU and the ‘establishment’. We find that the contestation of Europe in far right digital publics relies on a crisis of cultural identity, representing a translation of Nouvelle Droite imaginaries of Europe into the social media space.

This article starts with a discussion of the analytical issues of the Programmatic Action Framework (PAF); based on the hypothesis that small groups of individuals, sharing a similar analysis of a policy problem sustaining a common policy change program (including orientations, arguments, and instruments) giving them a collective identity, and behaving strategically as a collective actor, can be main drivers of policy change. We then present the methodological implications of the empirical analysis of such programmatic groups and policy change programs. The methodology of the Programmatic Action Framework combines tools coming from the sociology of elites (positional analysis, analysis of professional trajectories, relational analysis) and the sociology of the policy process. It was first applied in empirical researches on health insurance reforms in France and the United States since the 1980s, shedding the light on the key role of specialized policy elites (specialized senior civil servants in France, long‐term insiders in the United States). We conclude by stressing that, because of its systematic and encompassing empirical methodology, the Programmatic Action Framework can be used in a comparative way, in other policy sectors than health care.

Katharina Pistor’s book The code of capital – how the law creates wealth and inequality (Pistor, K. (2019). The code of capital – How the law creates wealth and inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press) is an original and insightful intervention in the quest to understand both the rising inequality of the last 40 years, as well as the inner dynamics of capitalism, a social formation that has ruled in western societies for about 200 years now. Pistor shares many of the convictions of the publications in the journal Accounting, Economics and Law, such as the dangers to democracy inherent in the corporate form (Robé, J. P. (2011). The legal structure of the firm. Accounting, Economics and Law, 1(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/2152-2820.1001; Strasser, K., & Blumberg, P. (2011). Legal form and economic substance of enterprise groups: Implications for legal policy. Accounting, Economics and Law, 1(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/2152-2820.1000), the fact that firms and corporate form need to be distinguished (Y. Biondi, A. Canziani, & T. Kirat (Eds), (2007). The firm as an entity: Implications for economics, accounting and law. New York and London: Routledge) and that shareholders do not own corporations, but just their shares, it is only appropriate to discuss and present it to the wider audience of the journal, pointing to its fundamental insights and potential for follow-up research. The title of the book and its set-up evoke both Luhmann’s system theory with its penchant for binary code as well as Marx’s capital (Marx, K. (1955[1867]). Das Kapital. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, Vol. 1). Combining the coding of social systems and their relentless dynamic in innovating and generating new forms by recursively referring to established elements (Luhmann, N. (1984). Soziale Systeme. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag; Luhmann, N. (1995). Das Recht der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag) with Marx’s focus on the structuring effects capital has on society is making this a very inspiring book, which at the same time evokes many follow-up questions.

A factor that may account for the largely unanticipated victory of Brexit in 2016 is the difference in engagement, mobilization, and, ultimately, turnout between those for whom the question of Brexit was a valence issue (a dry and almost technical question of determining the policies by which uncontroversial shared ends can be achieved) and those for whom it was a positional issue (a question of raw, almost visceral, political preference). The declining appeal of valence politics may reveal a phenomenon that goes beyond Brexit and Britain: a change in the nature and character of contemporary electoral competition that may help to explain the newly resurgent populism characteristic of Western liberal democracies.

The two decades either side of the global financial crisis have seen a remarkable surge and an equally remarkable reaction to global inequalities. This has played some part in fuelling the recent populist backlash against globalisation. In response, many global institutions and some national governments have embraced the concept of inclusive growth – proposing a policy agenda designed to share the benefits of economic growth and development more equitably. This paper argues that the current debate about inclusivity suffers from two major misspecifications that weaken the concept and undermine the prospect of the economic and political goals it stands for being achieved. For inclusivity to be meaningful and sustainable it must be understood in multidimensional terms, but attaching it to orthodox thinking on growth continually draws the debate back to narrow economic considerations. The concept has also been hampered by ‘methodological nationalism’, whereby policies for inclusivity are considered predominantly at the national level without adequate attention being given to the multilateral dimensions of inclusivity in a world of global interdependence. To be coherent and applicable, inclusive growth must be (re)conceived multilaterally and embrace a more multidimensional notion of inclusive development that hinges around a meaningful conception of human wellbeing.

This article is part of the issue “Urban Arrival Spaces: Social Co-Existence in Times of Changing Mobilities and Local Diversity’’ edited by Yvonne Franz (University of Vienna, Austria) and Heike Hanhörster (ILS—Research Institute for Regional and Urban Development, Germany).; The term ‘arrival city’ was notoriously introduced by Saunders (2010) to indicate all places which provide first access to the city. For Saunders, migrants from rural third world villages confront the same challenges in their home country or abroad. The informal neighbourhood in developing countries is thus advocated as a model for cities in western countries. Through an ethnographic approach, the article considers emerging practices of refugees and migrants in the centre of Milan and in a small town on the outskirts of Rome investigating a varied set of reception models. In conclusion, the article revises the model of the arrival neighbourhood while criticizing the underlying assumption of informal development. Instead, it insists on the need for understanding the specific requirements of arrival places for better regulation of the reception of migrants.

Tout processus de reconnaissance est marqué par une lutte de sens : il est, par définition, le lieu de confrontation entre des énoncés, des procédés définitionnels, que ce soit au moment des mobilisations, des demandes, de l’octroi ou de l’obtention d’une reconnaissance. Comment distinguer, au sein des pratiques de reconnaissance, celles qui produisent des effets émancipateurs pour les individus ou les groupes, de celles qui produisent au contraire des effets de concurrence, de minorisation ou de subordination ? Ces ambiguïtés se manifestent à plusieurs niveaux et elles sont analysées par les deux autrices à partir d’un terrain d’enquête conduit entre 2012 et 2017 où se joue particulièrement la reconnaissance d’identités minorisées : une enquête menée auprès des OSIM, Organisations de Solidarité Internationales issues des Migrations, et particulièrement auprès de leur plate-forme nationale, le FORIM, Forum des Organisations Issues des Migrations. Ce cas d’étude permet d’une part de considérer les formulations ambigües de demandes de reconnaissance des associations de migrants, qui sont envisagées par les autrices comme des luttes de visibilité ; d’autre part d’analyser l’ambiguïté des réponses institutionnelles et des modes d’accès à la reconnaissance dans l’espace public démocratique français. Soulignant la permanence d’un idéal républicain universaliste, l’analyse interroge la frontière entre formes « idéologiques » et formes émancipatrices de reconnaissance. Elle démontre qu’un processus de reconnaissance ambigüe, marqué par l’existence de catégorisations et de pratiques associatives essentialisantes, peut permettre des transformations de la représentation politique pertinentes pour le débat démocratique.