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Within the vast seam of scholarship on parliamentary history the evolution and role of select committees in the house of lords, particularly in relation to investigatory or policy‐focused committees, has been almost completely overlooked. They have been 'institutions ignored'. This gap in the existing research base is particularly stark when compared with the very large literature on the history of select committees in the house of commons. This article fills this gap by providing the first detailed historical account of the evolution of investigatory or policy‐focused committees in the house of lords. This account reveals the evolution of a distinctive 'scrutiny style' moulded around the notion of complementarity, a highly specialised approach and an understanding of the merits of self‐restraint. However, during 2018–21 a fundamental review of the investigatory committee system was undertaken within the house of lords which led to significant change in relation to both the structure and ambition of committees. The impact of this reform agenda is likely to ensure that select committees in the Lords are far more visible in the future, within and beyond the Palace of Westminster, than they were in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attitudes to quangos are paradoxical. On the one hand they are perceived to be undemocratic, unaccountable organisations, while on the other they are seen to improve effectiveness, limit political interference and increase public confidence in government. This paradox is reflected in the behaviour of political parties, which generally adopt a harsh line towards quangos in opposition, but come to rely on these bodies in office. Ahead of the 2010 general election it was, however, noticeable that the Conservative party rejected this dynamic by promising to pursue 'a more sophisticated approach'. This article explores the Coalition government's subsequent 'public bodies reform programme', assessing its progress against recommendations contained within the Institute for Government's Read before Burning report of July 2010. It concludes that while the Coalition has addressed long-standing concerns about the day-to-day governance of public bodies, it has failed to resolve a set of broader and strategic (metagovernance) issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While clear lines of accountability are normally considered a sine qua non of any modern democracy, this article argues that too much accountability can be as problematic as too little. Through the application of a number of analytical ‘hooks’ drawn from the accountability studies literature, it argues that if the coalition government’s rhetorical commitment to a shift from a ‘Big State’ to a ‘Big Society’ is implemented, it may well flounder due to its inability to reconcile the centrifugal forces of devolution and localism with the centripetal forces of political accountability and public expectation. Indeed, without a more aggressive, sophisticated and indeed honest approach to accountability, the ‘Big Society’ is unwittingly likely to forge an even ‘Bigger State’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article attempts to make a bold and provocative argument not just about the state of accountability research as a field of inquiry but also about the gap that has apparently emerged between the governors and the governed (and the professional responsibilities of scholars beyond academe in terms of public engagement). It emphasizes that “too much accountability can be as problematic as too little” and asks whether it is possible that the transition from “representative” to “monitory” democracy, which is reflected in an increasingly dense and aggressive “accountability industry” (constitutional watchdogs, audit processes, ethical guardians, investigatory agencies, regulatory boards, freedom of information legislation, quasi-judicial commissions, etc.), has actually contributed to the erosion of public support for politicians, political processes, and political institutions? It therefore seeks to challenge a number of “self-evident truths” and dares to be a little brave, to fly some kites, and risk the inevitable misunderstanding and deliberate criticism that attempting to say something different entails. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Delegated governance refers to the wide range of quasi-autonomous organizations – ‘fringe bodies, quangos and all that’ – to which an increasing proportion of state activity is now delegated. Recent reports by the OECD have emphasized the growing role of these bodies in relation to policy-making, regulation and administration within advanced industrial countries. However, the existence of delegated forms of governance enjoying an arm's length relationship to elected politicians raises fundamental questions regarding the operation and nature of representative democracy. Political devolution to regions within nation states has long been advocated as a potential solution to concerns regarding the control, accountability and patronage in relation to these bodies. This article presents the findings of a research project that examined the degree to which devolution to Scotland since 1998 has impacted upon the structure of delegated governance and the possible policy implications this may have for other European states. The research suggests that although the sphere of delegated governance in Scotland post-devolution has grown it has led to the creation of a new governance framework, which may assuage concerns regarding the ‘democratic deficit’ that is commonly associated with quasi-autonomous public bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]