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https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202916; We show that banker bonuses cannot be understood exclusively as incentive contracts, but also incorporate a significant risk sharing dimension between bank shareholders and bank employees. This contrasts with the conventional view whereby diversified shareholders fully insure risk averse employees. However, financial frictions imply that shareholder value is concave in a bank's cash reserves---making shareholders effectively risk averse. The optimal contract between shareholders and employees then involves some degree of risk sharing. Using extensive payroll data on 1.26 million bank employee years in the Austrian, German, and Swiss banking sectors, we show that the structure of bonus pay within and across banks is compatible with an economically significant risk sharing motive, but difficult to rationalize based on incentive theories of bonus pay only.

How precise should accounting measurements be, if management has discretion to strategically withhold? We examine this question by nesting an optimal persuasion mechanism, which controls what measurements are conducted, within a voluntary disclosure framework a la Dye (85) and Jung and Kwon (1988). In our setting, information has real effects because the firm uses it to make a continuous operating decision, increasing in the market's belief. Absent frictions other than uncertainty about information endowment, we show that imprecision can reduce strategic withholding but always decreases firm value. We then examine plausible environments under which, by contrast, there is an optimal level of imprecision featuring coarseness at the marginal discloser. We offer additional implications in the contexts of enforcement against strategic withholding and financing with collateralized assets.

Political activism positively affects firm innovation. Firms that support more politicians, politicians on Congressional committees with jurisdictional authority over the firms’ industries and politicians who join those committees innovate more. We employ instrumental variables estimation and a natural experiment to show a causal effect of political activism on innovation. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that political activism is valuable because it helps reduce political uncertainty, which, in turn, fosters firm innovation. Also consistent with this hypothesis, we show that politically active firms successfully time future legislation and set their innovation strategies in expectation of future legislative changes.Keywords: political contributions, innovation, investment policy, policy uncertainty

Real and private-value assets—defined here as the sum of real estate, infrastructure, collectibles, and noncorporate business equity—compose an investment class worth an estimated $84 trillion in the U.S. alone. Furthermore, private values can affect pricing in many other financial markets, such as that for sustainable investments. This paper introduces the research on real assets and private values that can be found in this special issue. It also reviews recent advances and highlights new research directions on a number of topics in the real assets space that we believe to be particularly important and exciting.

International audience; Key message: A novel multi-environment competition individual-tree mixed model resulted in better fit, and greater individual narrow- and broad-sense heritabilities than the model without competition, notably for traits showing competition. In multi-environment tests, the proposed model would allow tree breeders to select genotypes with the best performance in both additive direct and competition breeding values, increasing forest productivity. Context: Genetic merit of trees is known to be affected and interact with local competition effects as well as changes across environmental conditions. Recent studies showed that competition genetic effects can affect the genetic variance and bias the tree breeding values, and its covariance with direct breeding values has been variable across traits. Aims: The present paper extends a mixed-model methodology to the problem of accounting for competition in a multi-environment set of forest genetic trials and exploring its impact on genetic variances as well as the multi-environment genetic correlation. Methods: The proposed model is illustrated using data from two full-sib trials of Pinus elliottii var. elliottii × Pinus caribaea var. hondurensis F1. Dispersion parameters and (co)variance of total breeding values were estimated for diameter at breast height, total tree height, and stem straightness at age 10. Results: For traits showing competition effects (diameter at breast height and total tree height), the proposed multi-environment competition model gave better fit than the simpler model. Accounting for competition increased the direct additive variance, reduced the residual variances, and did not change significantly the across-site additive genetic correlation. However, for diameter at breast height, top 5% best genetic rankings showed differences. Conclusion: When traits are strongly affected by inter-tree competition, the use of the proposed model in multi-environment analyses can efficiently identify the phenomenon with general benefits in the fitting of genetic components and open the door to select on the basis of competitiveness.

Under International Financial Reporting Standards, managers can use two approaches to increase the estimated fair value of goodwill in order to justify not recognizing impairment: (1) make overly optimistic valuation assumptions, and (2) increase future cash flow forecasts by inflating current cash flows. Because enforcement constrains the use of optimistic valuation assumptions, we hypothesize that enforcement influences the relative use of these two choices. We test this hypothesis by comparing a sample of 1,958 firms from 36 countries that are likely to delay recognizing goodwill impairment (suspect firms) to a sample of control firms. First, we find that firms in high‐enforcement countries use a higher discount rate to test goodwill for impairment than firms in low‐enforcement countries. We also find a more positive association between discount rate and upward cash flow management for suspect firms than for control firms. This result is consistent with suspect firms substituting optimistic valuation assumptions with inflated current cash flows. Second, we find that, relative to control firms, suspect firms exhibit higher upward cash flow management in high‐enforcement countries than in low‐enforcement countries. Third, we show that suspect firms in high‐enforcement countries are more likely to eventually impair goodwill.

This study examines whether and when credit rating agencies (CRAs) take negative rating actions against issuers committing accounting fraud before the fraud is publicly revealed and the economic impact of such rating actions. Our findings show that these fraud firms experience a greater number of negative rating actions during the four quarters prior to the public fraud revelation, including lower ratings, more rating downgrades, and more negative credit watch additions, compared to firms with similar economic fundamentals and stock performance. Our findings also show that such negative rating actions are not limited to fraud firms in financial distress, suggesting that our effect reflects CRA responses to accounting fraud per se. In addition, we find CRAs take more timely actions when frauds are more severe, when they involve accounts more often scrutinized by CRAs during their credit analysis, and when short sellers target firms. Last, we find that CRAs’ negative rating actions against fraud firms are informative to the market and are associated with shorter fraud duration. Overall, we conclude that CRAs possess private information about accounting fraud prior to the public revelation of this fraud and that they incorporate this information into negative ratings actions, accelerating fraud discovery.

We examine how the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007, which requires additional disclosures regarding clinical trial results, impacts information asymmetry between the disclosing pharmaceutical firm and capital market participants, the general public, academics, and practitioners. We document a reduction in information asymmetry in capital markets. We also document an increase in adverse event and product problem complaint reports filed against the pharmaceutical firms to the FDA and a higher number of drug and medical device recalls for affected firms after the FDAAA enactment. Finally, cross-sectional analyses suggest that the increase in FDA complaint reports and recalls after the FDAAA enactment was more prominent in firms with a higher bid-ask spread decrease. Taken together, our results suggest that the FDAAA has some benefits for both investors and consumers.

We investigate how Activist Short Sellers (AShSs) expose publicly listed firms in an increasingly popular form of “research reports” openly denouncing alleged frauds, flawed business models, accounting irregularities, and wrongdoings. We focus on six AShSs that issued research reports that often led to a strong negative market reaction. Our empirical analysis exploits both qualitative and quantitative methods for a comprehensive dataset of 383 research reports targeting 171 unique firms, and three first-hand interviews with AShSs. Drawing on Aristotle’s rhetoric, we first examine how AShSs use narratives in striving to convince other investors that the target firms are overvalued. Specifically, we search the documents produced by AShSs for stylized narratives related to credibility-based (ethos), emotions-based (pathos), and logic-based (logos) rhetorical strategies. To assess the impact of these strategies, we examine the extent to which the AShSs’ rhetorical strategies resonate in 3,665 press articles. As expected, the press often refers to logos-based arguments. Interestingly, the press also brings up frequently pathos-based and ethos-based statements. Considering the importance of the press in shaping investors’ opinions, our study points to AShSs’ narratives playing a major role in policing financial markets. Theoretically, we show that AShSs, as dissenting market participants, produce narratives that go beyond the language of formal rationality – as they strive to reveal new information and frame it persuasively, in order to destabilize the extent of trustworthiness surrounding target firms.

This paper explores the effects of online customer ratings on debt capacity. Using a large sample of Parisian restaurants, we find a positive and economically significant relation between customer ratings and bank debt. We use the locally exogenous variation in customer ratings resulting from the rounding of scores in regression discontinuity tests to establish causality. Customer ratings affect financial policy through a reduction in cash flow risk and higher resilience to demand shocks. Restaurants with good ratings use their extra debt capacity to invest in tangible assets. Finally, favorable online ratings relax credit constraints mostly for moderately constrained restaurants.

Consistent with salience theories of choice, we find that managers overreact to salient risks. We study how managers respond to the occurrence of a hurricane event when their firms are located in the neighborhood of the disaster area. We find that the sudden shock to the perceived liquidity risk leads managers to increase the amount of corporate cash holdings, even though the real liquidity risk remains unchanged. Such an increase in cash holdings is only temporary. Over time, the perceived risk decreases, and the bias disappears. This bias is costly for shareholders because it leads to higher retained earnings and negatively impacts firm value by reducing the value of cash. We examine alternative explanations for our findings. In particular, we find only weak evidence that the possibility of risk learning or regional spillover effects may influence our results.

This paper investigates the determinants of value and growth investing in a large administrative panel of Swedish residents over the 1999-2007 period. We document strong relationships between a household's portfolio tilt and the household's financial and demographic characteristics. Value investors have higher financial and real estate wealth, lower leverage, lower income risk, lower human capital, and are more likely to be female than the average growth investor. Households actively migrate to value stocks over the life-cycle and, at higher frequencies, dynamically offset the passive variations in the value tilt induced by market movements. We verify that these results are not driven by cohort effects, financial sophistication, biases toward popular or professionally close stocks, or unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. We relate these household-level results to some of the leading explanations of the value premium.

Product categories are more than classification devices that organize markets; when reflecting market actors' purposes, they are also judgment devices. Taking stock of the literature on product categories and drawing on the distinction between the faculties of knowing and judging, we elaborate a framework that accounts for how and why market actors include or exclude normative attributes in a product category definition. Based on a field study of the development of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds in France, we describe the phases and conditions of a judgment framework for category definition for both established and nascent categories. We discuss implications for research on product categories and the workings of markets more broadly.

Real estate—housing in particular—is a less profitable investment in the long run than previously thought. We hand-collect property-level financial data for the institutional real estate portfolios of four large Oxbridge colleges over the period 1901–1983. Gross income yields initially fluctuate around 5%, but then trend downward (upward) for agricultural and residential (commercial) real estate. Long-term real income growth rates are close to zero for all property types. Our findings imply annualized real total returns, net of costs, ranging from approximately 2.3% for residential to 4.5% for agricultural real estate.

Unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities (AFSGL) are included in Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) and directly affect shareholders’ equity but are not included in earnings. We investigate whether unrealized AFSGL help predict future earnings and whether analysts and investors incorporate the information conveyed by unrealized AFSGL in a timely manner. We conduct our investigation on a sample of banks because unrealized AFSGL are material in the banking industry. First, we show that unrealized AFSGL are material and help in predicting next period realized AFSGL and future earnings change. Second, we document that financial analysts are slow to react to unrealized AFSGL and update their forecasts after AFSGL are realized in earnings. Third, we find that investors are also slow to react to unrealized AFSGL and do so only after AFSGL are included (realized) in earnings and after financial analysts update their forecasts. We document an annual difference of 5% in future abnormal returns between banks in the top and bottom quintiles of past unrealized AFSGL. A zero-cost trading strategy that relies on public information about unrealized AFSGL generates a sizeable monthly alpha that ranges between 1.8% and 1.9%.

Stock prices occasionally move in response to unverified rumors. I propose a cheap talk model in which a rumormonger’s incentives to tell the truth depend on the interaction between her investment horizon and the information acquisition decisions of message-receiving investors. The model’s key prediction is that short investment horizons can facilitate credible information sharing between investors, thereby accelerating the information capitalization into market prices. Analyzing a data set of takeover rumors covered by U.S. newspapers, I find suggestive evidence in support of this prediction. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

This is a study of analysts’ use of accounting information for valuation purposes in a venture capital setting. This setting is characterized in terms of the distinctive scouting and coaching work of venture capital funders, and the unproven and incomplete nature of the ventures and entrepreneurs, which seek funding to scale operations, pivot into new markets, internationalize, or undertake some other kind of fundamental change. Based on interviews with entrepreneurs (project-makers) and venture funders (analysts), a four phase model of valuation is proposed. The model illuminates that, in contrast with common assumptions in the existing literature, accounting is mobilized neither to reveal truth nor constitute knowledge about the objects of investment, but to promise and to care. This paper articulates these two concepts in the context of accounting. Promising is shown to be a means not to implement a predesigned business plan and a budgeted set of activities but to commit to a new and unclear future and agree high and sometimes unrealistic expectations. Caring is shown not to be a means to predict a final fate for the organization, but to give and take, interact and sometimes discipline in order to determine what is necessary to preserve and possible to change. Understanding that what is valued is not what exists but what is possible to create helps to resolve puzzles about accounting’s uncertain and ambiguous status and significance in the entrepreneurial economy. It also and more generally illustrates how accounting operates in relation to an unknowable object and future: not as a means to know or reveal but to write and rewrite a daring and ambitious narrative in which the protagonists (here the project-maker and venture) become something else (a manager and an organization).

We provide a new methodology to empirically investigate the respective roles of systematic and idiosyncratic skewness in explaining expected stock returns. Using a large number of predictors, we forecast the cross-sectional ranks of systematic and idiosyncratic skewness which are easier to predict than their actual values. Compared to other measures of ex ante systematic skewness, our forecasts create a significant spread in ex post systematic skewness. A predicted systematic skewness risk factor carries a significant risk premium that ranges from 7% to 12% per year and is robust to the inclusion of downside beta, size, value, momentum, profitability, and investment factors. In contrast to systematic skewness, the role of idiosyncratic skewness in pricing stocks is less robust. Finally, we document how the determinants of systematic and idiosyncratic skewness differ.

© 2020 The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. There is a discrepancy between CAPM-implied and realized returns. Using the CAPM in capital budgeting - as recommended in textbooks - should thus have real effects. For instance, low beta projects should be valued more by CAPM users than by the market. We test this hypothesis using M&A data and show that bids for low-beta private targets entail lower bidder returns. We provide further support by testing several ancillary predictions. Our analyses suggest that using the CAPM when valuing targets leads to valuation errors (relative to the market's view) corresponding on average to 12% to 33% of the deal values.

Both in the United States and in the Euro area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central/federal supervisors. I study how such a system can optimally balance the lower inspection costs of local supervisors with the ability of the central level to internalize cross-border or interstate externalities. The model predicts that centralised supervision endogenously increases market integration and cross-border externalities, further strengthening the need for centralised supervision. This complementarity implies that, for some parameterizations of the model, the economy can be trapped in a local supervision equilibrium with low supervision and integration. In such a case, the forward-looking introduction of a centralized supervisory architecture achieves a superior equilibrium. JEL Classification: D53, G21, G28, G33, G38, L51

We examine the relation between the presence of U.S. government as a major customer and a supplier firm’s loan contract terms, using major corporate customers as a benchmark. We find that firms with major government customers are associated with fewer covenants and a lower likelihood of having performance pricing provisions in their loan contracts. In contrast, we do not find such associations for firms with major corporate customers. Further, we find no evidence that the existence of major government customers is related to the supplier firm’s loan spread, security, or maturity. We conjecture that lenders benefit from the stricter monitoring of the government as a major customer and thus use fewer covenants and performance pricing provisions when lending to firms with major government customers than when lending to those with major corporate customers. We provide evidence consistent with this conjecture.

International audience; We review the extensive literature on systemic risk and connect it to the current regulatory debate. While we take stock of the achievements of this rapidly growing field, we identify a gap between two main approaches. The first one studies different sources of systemic risk in isolation, uses confidential data, and inspires targeted but complex regulatory tools. The second approach uses market data to produce global measures which are not directly connected to any particular theory, but could support a more efficient regulation. Bridging this gap will require encompassing theoretical models and improved data disclosure.

This paper examines how accounting quality affects the degree of debt concentration in corporate capital structures (i.e., a firm’s tendency to predominantly rely on only a few types of debt). Motivated by theoretical and empirical research that supports a strong link between creditors’ coordination costs and debt concentration and the importance of accounting quality in reducing these coordination costs, we hypothesize that firms with low accounting quality have a more concentrated debt structure. Measuring financial reporting quality by the disclosure of material internal control weaknesses over financial reporting (ICWs), we find that ICWs lead to a significantly more concentrated debt structure. We also show that the effect of ICWs on the degree of debt concentration is stronger for more severe ICW disclosures and for firms with a higher credit risk, further reinforcing the importance of financial reporting quality in determining debt concentration.

The purpose of this article is to explore the role of instruments in the transformation of institutional logics and their associated practices at the micro level. Based on an ethnographic study, this article compares two working groups — one responsible for equity and the other for fixed-income investments — in an asset management company attempting to integrate new demands for socially responsible investment (SRI). These two working groups both sought to change their investment processes through the introduction of Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434177 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434177 2 new calculative devices. The equity group was perceived to be more successful than the fixed-income group in introducing SRI because of its greater ability to fabricate calculative devices capable of mediating between financial returns and social responsibility. Elaborating on these findings, the article argues that instruments can effect institutional change when actors come to believe that available instruments are sufficiently flexible and incomplete to act as “mediating instruments” between practice and institutional change.

We test the trade finance channel of exports by controlling for the bank credit channel. Using Turkey’s July 2012 adoption of Basel II as a quasi-natural experiment, we examine whether shocks to trade financing costs affect exports. With data for 16,662 Turkish exporters shipping 2,888 different products to 158 countries, we find that the share of letters-of-credit-based exports decreases (increases) when the associated risk weights for counterparty exposure increase (decrease) after the adoption of Basel II. However, growth of firm-product-country-level exports remains unaffected. Trade financing might have a lesser role in exports than previously suggested by the previous literature. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved.

High frequency arbitrage opportunities sometimes arise when the price of one asset follows, with a lag, changes in the value of another related asset due to information arrival. These opportunities are toxic because they expose liquidity suppliers to the risk of being picked off by arbitrageurs. Hence, more frequent toxic arbitrage opportunities and a faster arbitrageurs' response to these opportunities impair liquidity. We find support for these predictions using high frequency triangular arbitrage opportunities in the FX market. In our sample, a 1% increase in the likelihood that a toxic arbitrage terminates with an arbitrageur's trade (rather than a quote update) raises bid-ask spreads by about 4%.

This paper shows that collateral constraints restrict firm entry and post-entry growth, even in the long-run. We use French administrative data and exploit cross-sectional variation in local house-price appreciation as shocks to the value of collateral available to homeowners. We control for local demand shocks by comparing homeowners to two control groups that live in the same region but do not experience collateral shocks: (i) renters and (ii) homeowners with a mortgage outstanding, who - in France - cannot take out a second mortgage on their house. In both comparisons, we find that an increase in collateral value leads to a higher probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Conditional on entry, entrepreneurs with access to more valuable collateral use more debt, start larger firms, and remain significantly larger even six years after creation.

The position of an internal audit function as a “servant of two masters” (i.e. management and the audit committee) may lead to a conflict of priorities. In this setting, the tone at the top set by the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) plays a critical role in balancing the potentially competing preferences of management and the audit committee. We examine whether the emphasis in the CAE’s communication with internal auditors influences their judgments. We also test whether such influence is more pronounced in an internal audit task where potential for justification created through task complexity and ambiguity is high, as compared to low. We test two hypotheses in a mixed experimental design with the communicated preferences of the CAE to subordinates (cost reduction vs. effectiveness of internal controls) as a between-subjects factor, and levels of opportunity for justification (low, medium, high) manipulated within subjects. Findings suggest that the emphasis in the CAE’s message can bias internal auditors’ judgments, and such influence is more pronounced when the opportunity for justification is high, resulting in the elimination of a significantly greater number of internal controls and the design of less effective processes.

We study a large-scale French reform that provided generous downside insurance for unemployed individuals starting a business. We study whether this reform affects the composition of people who are drawn into entrepreneurship. New firms started in response to the reform are, on average, smaller, but have similar growth expectations and education levels compared to start-ups before the reform. They are also as likely to survive or to hire. In aggregate, the effect of the reform on employment is largely offset by large crowd-out effects. However, because new firms are more productive, the reform has the impact of raising aggregate productivity. These results suggest that the dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities is small in the data, so that the facilitation of entry leads to sizable Schumpeterian dynamics at the firm-level.