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This paper develops and applies the concept of accountability styles for analyzing and comparing accountability practices in different countries. This is relevant as there is considerable scholarship on public sector accountability but only very few comparative studies. Extant studies have shown that national styles of accountability are both marked by convergence as well as the resilience of national differences. The concept of accountability style is adopted to describe and interpret how and why accountability practices differ between administrative systems. It does so by analyzing practices of accountability of public sector agencies in four European democracies with different state traditions: the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. These countries vary with regards to state strength (interventionist propensity) and administrative concentration (high or low centralization). The analysis focuses on the accountability of arms' length agencies which lends itself for comparisons across counties. The paper shows that the national political-administrative context crucially shapes practices of accountability and accountability regimes of agencies. The Norwegian accountability style is characterized as 'centralized and convenient'. The UK-style is equally centralized yet not so convenient as it incurs high accountability-process costs on agencies. Switzerland is marked by limited hierarchical accountability. And the Dutch accountability style is comparatively 'broad and informal'. State strength and administrative concentration explain some of the variance while historical legacies explain additional national variations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role, powers and future of independent European agencies as an aspect of the current debate surrounding European governance. It argues that the design and implementation of independent agencies in the EU should not be seen as a construct of apolitical administrative engineering or integration but should be interpreted as a central component of political debates regarding the future constitutional structure of the EU vis-à-vis member states. In order to demonstrate the validity of this argument, the article reflects upon five themes (growth, co-ordination, accountability, depoliticization and power) which have arisen as central issues in relation to delegated governance at the national level. These themes are analysed in order to assess the main lessons that could usefully be considered during this critical period of constitutional reflection and design for the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]