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While there is a strong presumption in the financial press that oil prices drive the stock market, the empirical evidence on the impact of oil price shocks on stock prices has been mixed. This paper shows that the response of aggregate stock returns may differ greatly depending on whether the increase in the price of crude oil is driven by demand or supply shocks in the crude oil market. The conventional wisdom that higher oil prices necessarily cause lower returns is shown to apply only to oil-market specific demand shocks such as increases in the precautionary demand for crude oil that reflect fears about the availability of future oil supplies. In contrast, positive shocks to the global aggregate demand for industrial commodities are shown to cause both higher real oil prices and higher stock prices. Shocks to the global production of crude oil, while not trivial, are far less important for understanding changes in stock prices than shocks to global aggregate demand and shocks to the precautionary demand for oil. Further insights can be gained from the responses of industry-specific stock returns to demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market. We identify the sectors most sensitive to these shocks and study the opportunities for adjusting one’s portfolio in response to oil market disturbances.

We use time-series methods to estimate a simple aggregate supply and demand model in order to analyse the comparative performance of fixed and flexible exchange rate systems and test competing hypotheses designed to explain shifts between exchange rate regimes. The paper provides a coherent explanation of the causes and consequences of the shift from the Bretton Woods System of pegged exchange rates to the post-Bretton-Woods float. The shift from fixed to floating was associated with a modest increase in the cross-country dispersion of supply shocks, but not with an increase in their average magnitude. There was little change in either the cross-country dispersion or the average magnitude of demand shocks. More important in explaining the collapse of Bretton Woods were factors that heightened the impact of shocks on the external account such as the 1958 removal of controls on current account convertibility and the declining effectiveness of capital controls. These factors obliged governments to respond to supply shocks with changes in demand that stabilized prices and the exchange rate at the expense of increased output volatility.