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Achtereenvolgens wordt ingegaan op: ontwikkelingen in het pachtareaal in de loop van de tijd, eigenschappen van pachtcontracten, waarborgen voor investeringen in grond en gebouwen, effecten van de bundel van eigendomsrechten op het grondgebruik en eigendom, de pacht in het Pachtprijzenbesluit, effecten van de ontwikkelde methodiek voor het berekenen van de pachtprijzen, en verwachte ontwikkelingen in het pachtareaal

Ingegaan wordt op de nieuwe functies die, naast de landbouw, van het landelijk gebied in Nederland en Vlaanderen worden verwacht, en wie belang hebben bij deze nieuwe functies. Ook wordt de noodzaak voor de vorming van nieuwe coalities voor de nieuwe functies besproken, waarbij veranderingen in de institutionele omgeving optreden. Tenslotte komt de rol van overheid en van financiële instellingen ter sprake

Het hoofddoel van China’s landbouw- en plattelandsbeleid is behoud van voedselzekerheid in eigen land en bijdragen aan de voedselzekerheid in de wereld door duurzaam gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en verbetering van de landbouwproductiecapaciteit voor de lange termijn. In veel gebieden in China gaat de landbouwproductiecapaciteit op lange termijn echter achteruit door intensieve landbouw en de daarmee gepaard gaande degradatie van de hulpbronnen land en water. Het systeem van grondeigendom speelt, als fundamentele institutie die het gedrag van grondbezitters aanstuurt, een zeer belangrijke rol bij de landbouwproductie alsook bij het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, en heeft veel belangstelling genoten van onderzoekers in China en andere regio’s in de wereld. Sinds 1998 heeft de Chinese regering een reeks marktgeoriënteerde hervormingen in het grondeigendom ingevoerd die als doel hebben de eigendomszekerheid te verbeteren en de overdraagbaarheid van rurale grond te bevorderen. Relevante wetten behelzen de Wet Grondbeheer (Land Administration Law) uit 1998, de Wet Contracten Rurale Grond (Rural Land Contract Law) uit 2002, de Eigendomswet (Property Law) uit 2007, en de Wet Mediation en Arbitrage bij Geschillen inzake Contracten Rurale Grond (Mediation and Arbitration of Rural Land Contract Disputes Law) uit 2009. Ofschoon deze hervormingen bijgedragen hebben aan een verbeterde formele eigendomszekerheid, is het niet duidelijk in welke mate ze bijdragen aan landbouwproductie en duurzaam gebruik van de grond. In deze studie worden systematisch de relaties onderzocht tussen grondeigendomszekerheid, zoals die wordt beïnvloed door de recente marktgeoriënteerde eigendomshervormingen, en de landbouwproductie in China. Op basis van de bestaande literatuur worden er vier relaties onderzocht, namelijk de relaties tussen eigendomszekerheid en, respectievelijk, grondinvesteringen, marktontwikkelingen betreffende grondpacht, ruraal-urbane migratie, en landbouwproductiviteit en technische efficiëntie. De resultaten van de studie beogen een volledig beeld te verschaffen van de belangrijkste relaties tussen grondeigendomszekerheid, beslissingen op het niveau van huishoudingen, en de landbouwproductiviteit in China. Naar verwachting zullen de verkregen inzichten relevant zijn voor de voortgaande hervormingen van het rurale grondeigendomsysteem en voor gerelateerd landbouw- en plattelandsbeleid in China. Ze zouden tevens van nut kunnen blijken voor andere ontwikkelingslanden met vergelijkbare eigendomsystemen die als doel hebben om huishoudens op het platteland te voorzien van gewaarborgde formele landgebruiksrechten voor de lange termijn.

Het hoofddoel van China’s landbouw- en plattelandsbeleid is behoud van voedselzekerheid in eigen land en bijdragen aan de voedselzekerheid in de wereld door duurzaam gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en verbetering van de landbouwproductiecapaciteit voor de lange termijn. In veel gebieden in China gaat de landbouwproductiecapaciteit op lange termijn echter achteruit door intensieve landbouw en de daarmee gepaard gaande degradatie van de hulpbronnen land en water. Het systeem van grondeigendom speelt, als fundamentele institutie die het gedrag van grondbezitters aanstuurt, een zeer belangrijke rol bij de landbouwproductie alsook bij het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, en heeft veel belangstelling genoten van onderzoekers in China en andere regio’s in de wereld. Sinds 1998 heeft de Chinese regering een reeks marktgeoriënteerde hervormingen in het grondeigendom ingevoerd die als doel hebben de eigendomszekerheid te verbeteren en de overdraagbaarheid van rurale grond te bevorderen. Relevante wetten behelzen de Wet Grondbeheer (Land Administration Law) uit 1998, de Wet Contracten Rurale Grond (Rural Land Contract Law) uit 2002, de Eigendomswet (Property Law) uit 2007, en de Wet Mediation en Arbitrage bij Geschillen inzake Contracten Rurale Grond (Mediation and Arbitration of Rural Land Contract Disputes Law) uit 2009. Ofschoon deze hervormingen bijgedragen hebben aan een verbeterde formele eigendomszekerheid, is het niet duidelijk in welke mate ze bijdragen aan landbouwproductie en duurzaam gebruik van de grond. In deze studie worden systematisch de relaties onderzocht tussen grondeigendomszekerheid, zoals die wordt beïnvloed door de recente marktgeoriënteerde eigendomshervormingen, en de landbouwproductie in China. Op basis van de bestaande literatuur worden er vier relaties onderzocht, namelijk de relaties tussen eigendomszekerheid en, respectievelijk, grondinvesteringen, marktontwikkelingen betreffende grondpacht, ruraal-urbane migratie, en landbouwproductiviteit en technische efficiëntie. De resultaten van de studie beogen een volledig beeld te verschaffen van de belangrijkste relaties tussen grondeigendomszekerheid, beslissingen op het niveau van huishoudingen, en de landbouwproductiviteit in China. Naar verwachting zullen de verkregen inzichten relevant zijn voor de voortgaande hervormingen van het rurale grondeigendomsysteem en voor gerelateerd landbouw- en plattelandsbeleid in China. Ze zouden tevens van nut kunnen blijken voor andere ontwikkelingslanden met vergelijkbare eigendomsystemen die als doel hebben om huishoudens op het platteland te voorzien van gewaarborgde formele landgebruiksrechten voor de lange termijn.

Liquid biofuel from oil crops are broadly promoted globally, among which biofuel from perennial wood species, as well as from bushes and small trees such as jatropha. In China, oil-bearing small trees, which mainly grow on slope land, are applied as so-called bioenergy and oil forests for liquid biofuel production. The national government in China has devised a series of laws and policies to promote bioenergy and oil forest programs. In this study, the focus is on jatropha and camellia programs. Similar as other afforestation programs, bioenergy and oil forest programs may face similar institutional problems in their implementation. In addition, China experienced decentralization in forestry sectors. In investigating the institutional problems China faces in implementing bioenergy and oil forestry programs, this research concentrates on the role of three institutions: property rights, the governance structure and farmer incentives. The general objective of this research is to investigate how these three institutions impact on the implementation of large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs, and whether and how these institutions enable, constrain and condition farmers’ participation in these programs. Both qualitative institutional analyses and quantitative econometric analyses are employed, based on empirical fieldwork in China. The study has led to a number of interesting insights related to each of the three institutional aspects. First, good governance, which includes stakeholder participation, plays a crucial role in the success of large-scale forestry programs. As forestry entails a long-term investment, how to set-up good and sustainable governance architecture is very important, but also challenging. The research shows that large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China are moving from government-organized, centralized, top-down governance architectures to multi-level and multi-actor governance arrangements, which involve market-based mechanisms and private actors such as private companies, NGOs, international agencies, communities and individual farmers. Large bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China can be distinguished as those driven and implemented by the government and those driven and implemented by market arrangements. As such, this structure confirms that new roles and interaction patterns between government and markets are present in contemporary transitional China. Another finding is that jatropha’s failure in China can be attributed to the institutional environment, such as poor implementation and enforcement of monitoring and sanctioning rules. Rules to prevent the withdrawal of a company and executing such rules are crucial to keep companies committed. Finally, convergent “time perspectives” of different actors in forestry institutional arrangements is important in the success of large-scale forestry programs. The second set of results relates to the role of property rights and property rights reform. Since 2003, there is a new trend of devolution in forest tenure in China. Five different forest tenure regimes have been identified in this research: Collective, Collective-Individual, Company, Partnership, and Individual. The study indicates that the devolution process in tenure reform redistributed the user rights to local stakeholders. It also confirms that the de-collectivization process and the tenure reform have resulted in a diversification of management forms. Based on the New Property Rights Theory, it is hypothesized that the five forest tenure regimes differ in terms of residual control and income rights, implying different degrees of tenure security for farm households. The research findings confirm that in general tenure regimes with higher degrees of tenure security trigger higher household investment. Furthermore, the risk of future expropriation negatively affects farmers’ participation in forestry projects. Finally, the study addresses the question of farmer incentives and benefits. For large-scale forestry projects engaging smallholders in forestry is vital for the success of the project, with respect to a balanced socio-economic development in poor rural areas and guaranteed long-term success. Forestry development potentially improves the livelihoods of famers by increasing their income, and poverty alleviation has always been an important objective of bioenergy and oil forestry programs. Although these programs often provide financial support and technical services, some farmers are still not able to join. For instance, the participation rate of farmers in the camellia program was only 37%. Moreover, the participation level varied among counties and villages, because farmers’ participation is still constrained by their capacity in terms of wealth, labour endowment and education. Finally, forestry programs generate different benefit distribution impacts on farm households under different forest project implementation regimes. Results show that five implementation regimes of camellia plantations can be distinguished, i.e. Individual, Partnership, Collective-Individual, Collective, Company, each having their own specifics of project access and benefit distribution among smallholders. Collective-individual, Collective, and Company forest implementation regimes perform better in terms of program access and equal benefit distribution than Individual and Partnership regimes. But also for the former three regimes, village leaders and companies may seize substantial project benefit reducing the benefits to and marginal smallholders.

Liquid biofuel from oil crops are broadly promoted globally, among which biofuel from perennial wood species, as well as from bushes and small trees such as jatropha. In China, oil-bearing small trees, which mainly grow on slope land, are applied as so-called bioenergy and oil forests for liquid biofuel production. The national government in China has devised a series of laws and policies to promote bioenergy and oil forest programs. In this study, the focus is on jatropha and camellia programs. Similar as other afforestation programs, bioenergy and oil forest programs may face similar institutional problems in their implementation. In addition, China experienced decentralization in forestry sectors. In investigating the institutional problems China faces in implementing bioenergy and oil forestry programs, this research concentrates on the role of three institutions: property rights, the governance structure and farmer incentives. The general objective of this research is to investigate how these three institutions impact on the implementation of large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs, and whether and how these institutions enable, constrain and condition farmers’ participation in these programs. Both qualitative institutional analyses and quantitative econometric analyses are employed, based on empirical fieldwork in China. The study has led to a number of interesting insights related to each of the three institutional aspects. First, good governance, which includes stakeholder participation, plays a crucial role in the success of large-scale forestry programs. As forestry entails a long-term investment, how to set-up good and sustainable governance architecture is very important, but also challenging. The research shows that large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China are moving from government-organized, centralized, top-down governance architectures to multi-level and multi-actor governance arrangements, which involve market-based mechanisms and private actors such as private companies, NGOs, international agencies, communities and individual farmers. Large bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China can be distinguished as those driven and implemented by the government and those driven and implemented by market arrangements. As such, this structure confirms that new roles and interaction patterns between government and markets are present in contemporary transitional China. Another finding is that jatropha’s failure in China can be attributed to the institutional environment, such as poor implementation and enforcement of monitoring and sanctioning rules. Rules to prevent the withdrawal of a company and executing such rules are crucial to keep companies committed. Finally, convergent “time perspectives” of different actors in forestry institutional arrangements is important in the success of large-scale forestry programs. The second set of results relates to the role of property rights and property rights reform. Since 2003, there is a new trend of devolution in forest tenure in China. Five different forest tenure regimes have been identified in this research: Collective, Collective-Individual, Company, Partnership, and Individual. The study indicates that the devolution process in tenure reform redistributed the user rights to local stakeholders. It also confirms that the de-collectivization process and the tenure reform have resulted in a diversification of management forms. Based on the New Property Rights Theory, it is hypothesized that the five forest tenure regimes differ in terms of residual control and income rights, implying different degrees of tenure security for farm households. The research findings confirm that in general tenure regimes with higher degrees of tenure security trigger higher household investment. Furthermore, the risk of future expropriation negatively affects farmers’ participation in forestry projects. Finally, the study addresses the question of farmer incentives and benefits. For large-scale forestry projects engaging smallholders in forestry is vital for the success of the project, with respect to a balanced socio-economic development in poor rural areas and guaranteed long-term success. Forestry development potentially improves the livelihoods of famers by increasing their income, and poverty alleviation has always been an important objective of bioenergy and oil forestry programs. Although these programs often provide financial support and technical services, some farmers are still not able to join. For instance, the participation rate of farmers in the camellia program was only 37%. Moreover, the participation level varied among counties and villages, because farmers’ participation is still constrained by their capacity in terms of wealth, labour endowment and education. Finally, forestry programs generate different benefit distribution impacts on farm households under different forest project implementation regimes. Results show that five implementation regimes of camellia plantations can be distinguished, i.e. Individual, Partnership, Collective-Individual, Collective, Company, each having their own specifics of project access and benefit distribution among smallholders. Collective-individual, Collective, and Company forest implementation regimes perform better in terms of program access and equal benefit distribution than Individual and Partnership regimes. But also for the former three regimes, village leaders and companies may seize substantial project benefit reducing the benefits to and marginal smallholders.

This paper serves three purposes. First, it gives a short introduction to the concept of sustainability in relation to land use. Since the Brundtland report it has become clear that sustainability is a dynamic concept that changes when conditions in society change. Moreover, it is easier to assess what is ‘unsustainable’ than what is ‘sustainable’. But that will not suppress the demand for sustainable developments. Second, it elucidates a classification of different concepts developed within New Institutional Economics and applies these concepts to a number of typical problem areas in relation to land ownership and land use. Institutions change slowly and that holds most for informal rules, which are classified by Williamson as ‘social embeddedness’. Land ownership and land use often function partly under informal rules. But formal rules and institutional arrangements are also crucial: together with the informal rules they go here under the name ‘institutional setting’. Because the landowner — or the present user of land — is often not the best user from the perspective of the society, the relationship between ‘owner’ and ‘user’ has raised a lot of attention. Efficient exchange at the land rental market, but also contracts that are adjusted to the characteristics of owners and renters or to the specifics of multifunctional land use contribute to sustainable land use. Third, this paper provides the connection between the different papers of this special issue and shows where they fit into the basic theoretical framework. Most attention goes to ownership (including property rights), the land rental market and contract choice. Different functions of land use, however, are also covered with a clear link to informal rules.

Achtereenvolgens wordt ingegaan op: ontwikkelingen in het pachtareaal in de loop van de tijd, eigenschappen van pachtcontracten, waarborgen voor investeringen in grond en gebouwen, effecten van de bundel van eigendomsrechten op het grondgebruik en eigendom, de pacht in het Pachtprijzenbesluit, effecten van de ontwikkelde methodiek voor het berekenen van de pachtprijzen, en verwachte ontwikkelingen in het pachtareaal

Contracts are mechanisms for carrying out transactions. Leasing land is a voluntary transaction in which property rights — such as user and income rights — are transferred from landowners to tenants. The bundle of property rights transferred within a lease transaction varies with the type of contractual arrangement. Analysis shows that for the landowner the value of the bundle of property rights to land is determined by the type of lease contract. Landowners prefer lease contracts with as little regulation as possible. Lease regulation can be characterized as a ‘handbook’ for concluding lease contracts. However, reducing regulation requires a shift in co-ordination mechanisms from that of the handbook to that of the ‘invisible hand’ (prices) and ‘handshake’ (e.g., mutual adjustment). Making use of the handshake and price as co-ordination mechanisms implies that the importance of trust and reputation will increase for both tenant and landowner. In 2007, the Dutch government introduced two new types of formal lease that rely less on handbook co-ordination. Whether a more liberalized lease system will lead to a change in the area leased not only depends on landowners but also on tenants, because contracts are two-sided mechanisms.

Ingegaan wordt op de nieuwe functies die, naast de landbouw, van het landelijk gebied in Nederland en Vlaanderen worden verwacht, en wie belang hebben bij deze nieuwe functies. Ook wordt de noodzaak voor de vorming van nieuwe coalities voor de nieuwe functies besproken, waarbij veranderingen in de institutionele omgeving optreden. Tenslotte komt de rol van overheid en van financiële instellingen ter sprake

De situatie van pachtboeren en de gangbare regelingen hieromtrent zijn uiteengezet. Geconcludeerd wordt, dat het korte-termijnbeleid dat bedoeld is om pachtboeren te helpen, in feite landeigenaren forceert om hun land te verkopen. Pacht is dus dalend met een percentage van 2% per jaar. Tenzij het beleid verandert zal het pachtsysteem blijven dalen

De situatie van pachtboeren en de gangbare regelingen hieromtrent zijn uiteengezet. Geconcludeerd wordt, dat het korte-termijnbeleid dat bedoeld is om pachtboeren te helpen, in feite landeigenaren forceert om hun land te verkopen. Pacht is dus dalend met een percentage van 2% per jaar. Tenzij het beleid verandert zal het pachtsysteem blijven dalen