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The author examines the strategy and equipment being employed by U.S. forces to jam or confuse Iraqi military communications. Topics include use of unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic jamming equipment, and air warfare strategy.

The author examines the progress of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Topics include air warfare, aerial bombings, use of precision guided munitions, and war damage.

Sensors that conform to the body of an aircraft, multiband radars, algorithms that peel obscuration and interference from sensor images and the long-sought solution to automatic target recognition are expected to propel network-centric warfare, but only after that technologically ugly duckling has been considerably transformed. Network-centric systems are inching into existence as researchers struggle with the basics of open architecture, broadband communication links and the retrieval of data from a mass of geographically distributed sites. However, the aerospace industry's advanced projects shops are already spinning up programs to make network-centric operations better.

This article reports that the U.S. Navy is excited about their competition for the Next-Generation Jammer with the U.S. Air Force as they vie for superiority in airborne electronic attack. Advanced aircraft now have more than double the field of view of electronically scanned antennas. The six-sided active, electronically scanned array can be found in Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet and the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor.

The article focuses on the increasing applications of off-the-shelf network systems and attack tools for the electronic warfare of the enemies of the U.S. China's air defense expenditures are calculated by aerospace officials as only one-tenth of what's invested by the U.S. The Chinese systems are affordable, in part, because of the regular use of stolen U.S. technology, described as Cisco in Chinese, by one specialist. The telecom companies that conduct and exploit the thefts are run by former People's Liberation Army generals.

This article reports that the U.S. Navy's nascent fleet of electric ships can be the technological bridge that moves directed energy from large, earthbound systems to full-scale, highly mobile weapons. Quentin E. Saulter, directed-energy program officer for the Air Warfare and Weapons Department at the Office of Naval Research, commented that new advanced electric-propulsion systems that can generate 30 megawatts or more of electricity are planned for the DD(X) destroyer, CG(X) guided-missile cruiser, littoral combat ship and CV(X) aircraft carrier. Advocates of the technology contend that within a decade, some of these weapons could be among the main armaments on Navy ships. But to make directed energy a tactical weapon, it must be mobile, an ongoing problem for the large and power-hungry directed-energy weapons under development. Electric-kinetic applications include rail guns and free-electron lasers. INSET: INFO ATTACK.

This article reports that reconnaissance specialists of Great Britain have admitted that they don't know exactly what's going to happen when the first two airborne stand-off radar or Astor ground-surveillance aircraft are put in the hands of aircrews later this year. There are, of course, the basics, which involve use of various synthetic aperture radar (SAR) modes--including swath, spot and ground moving target indicator (GMTI) and intelligence fusion--to supply intelligence to a combat brigade headquarters about what's moving and emitting on the battlefield around it. The SAR data can be manipulated further to offer change detection, which allows the system to identify what has left or come on to the battlefield, such as mobile air defense or battlefield ballistic missiles. Using GMTI, Astor also can track where those targets of interest go.

The article reports that aviation company Raytheon plans to market an HPM system that looks like a radar and functions like a weapon to deflect enemy missiles. A series of closely guarded tests, Raytheon researchers have shot down a variety of shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles--the nightmare of airline operators--with pulses of microwave energy at a distance of several miles. The HPM technology is to be the heart of the company's Vigilant Eagle system to protect aircraft from shoulder-fired missiles or man-portable air defense systems during takeoff and landing operations.

The article informs that warfighting for aviators has fundamentally changed. In Iraq and Afghanistan, dropping bombs has given way to gathering intelligence. Moreover, the heartbeat of aerial activity has shifted from the flightline and cockpit to the Combined Air Operations Center here where an increasingly focused group of combined-service and multinational specialists work to analyze, fuse and make sense of the data that pours in. In Iraq, even amidst a proliferation of suicide attacks and improvised bomb blasts, attack missions are now averaging only a fraction of the combat air operations.

This article focuses on how the air war in Iraq has changed from one primarily of bombing to that of intelligence-gathering, surveillance and command. At night, from 31,000 ft. over Iraq, radio chatter records the pulse of military operations. It can offer the pace of a well-written novel by shifting quickly through rapid decision-making, unexpected danger, boredom and fear that escalates into terror. During hot-weather periods, the small JT3D engines can limit the E-8's operational altitude to significantly less than the desired 31,000 ft., which reduces the radar's footprint to less than the surveillance crew would like.

This article reports that the U.S. officials are closely studying what was displayed at the Zhuhai air show. At the top of the items of interest that have already caught the U.S. Defense Department's collective attention is a 7% increase in value in arms agreements during the last year that include spending $1 billion for 24 Sukhoi Su-30 fourth-generation multirole fighters and $500 million for the advanced, long-range, high-altitude Antei-Almaz S-300 PMU2 surface-to-air missile. China has made a recent sale of F-7s to Pakistan, but that was partly because no one else would sell to them during the crisis with India. There have been no international sales of the J-8-II.

Focuses on the air warfare tactics used by the Russian Air Force in conducting air strikes on rebel forces in Chechnia. Criticism of the Russians' use of their aircraft as a flying artillery rather than a precise weapon in pursuit of strategic effects; Estimated percentage of the Russian air force budget being eaten up by the Chechnia air campaign.

Reports that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's gambit of employing a methodical air campaign paid off after 78 days of sustained bombing as Yugoslav military officials agreed to terms for withdrawing their forces from Kosovo. Overall assessment of the air campaign; Ramifications of the emphasis on air power; Terms under the agreement.

The article considers China's armed forces, particularly its air force. China's capabilities in space and information warfare in a conflict with the U.S. are discussed. Two anonymous officers of the U.S. Air Force state that the centralized command structure of China's armed forces would make it difficult for China to engage in prolonged conflict in air or space warfare.

The article reports on the ground strategy of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Gaza Strip. The underground smuggling complex linking Egypt and the Gaza Strip, heavily used by Hamas, will continue to be pounded from the air by Israel and may be swept by ground forces to destroy additional tunnels and storage sites. Israeli officials asserted that they will conduct the attack for up to two weeks.

The article reports that Great Britain's military is assembling a collaborative warfare force for its operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world that parallels the latest technology effort of the U.S. in Iraq. The collaborative warfare is allowing the U.S. military and intelligence agencies to locate, target, and kill key individuals in groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and renegade Shia militias.

The article explores Georgia's relative success against the Russian air force and the failure of Syria's Russian-made air defenses against the Israeli air force. U.S. analysts suggest that the simplicity of the Georgian air defenses, with far less dependence on networking, made it tougher to knock out or blind major parts of the system. The exploitability of Russian-designed and -built defenses was demonstrated in 2007 when the Israeli air force totally shut down Syrian air defenses prior to bombing a suspected nuclear site.

The article reports that U.S. has been conducting network warfare and information operations since the 1992-95 war in Bosnia, but improvements in computer technologies, algorithms and encryption are making enemy networks increasingly tough to penetrate and exploit. To meet the pace of development, BAE Systems' electronic warfare organization has designed, bought and is busy modifying its Field of Dreams facility. At the heart of the capability are the latest network technologies including both wired and wireless gear.

The article reports on an undetected air attack by Israel to a construction site at Tall al-Abyad, Syria. Several witnesses have claimed that the Israeli aircraft approach from the Mediterranean Sea while others said that they found unmarked drop tanks in Turkey near the border with Syria. Some U.S. aerospace industry and retired military officials indicated that the Israelis utilized a technology like the U.S.-developed Suter airborne network attack system developed by BAE Systems.

This article reports that Boeing's first KC-767A tanker, destined for the Italian air force, has made its initial flight as a fully equipped aerial refueler and will soon leave on its first trip to Europe and display at the Paris air show. The flight was cut short to obey first-flight rules that the aircraft be on the ground an hour before sunset. Leon Robert, chief test pilot for the 767 program, and Kent Lund, flight test pilot for tankers, flew the aircraft. Boeing will conduct four or five more flights from Wichita before its transatlantic hop.

This article presents information related to electronic warfare and missile defense. The technological walls separating radar, electronic warfare and missile defense are coming down. This fundamental shift has resulted in development, not yet publicly acknowledged, of multifunction, active electronically scanned array radars that can locate stealthy airborne targets and then jam their computers and guidance systems with at least enough effect to drive them off course by using a focused beam of X-band radar energy. HPM weapon and the MP-RTIP radar operate in the X-band frequency because small X-band transmitter/receiver modules are now relatively cheap.

This article focuses on the E-8 Joint Stars which won its first combat laurels in 1991 by spotting Iraq's only offensive thrust, then peered through sandstorms in 2003's fighting to help decimate an armored division. Now, in 2005, it has adapted to the war against insurgents. In addition to finding new ways to use the aircraft in combat, E-8 operators have identified a series of upgrades that could make it an even more effective platform in this new type of warfare. While military and aerospace industry officials are cryptic about available analytical techniques, they indicate that they can play back a mission tape to see where a bomber's trip originated.

At the leading edge of the network-centric constellation is an array of new-generation sensors that jump-start the whole system by providing a more detailed view of the battlefield and seeking out key targets. For the moment, the crown jewel in that collection of sensors is the active electronically scanned aperture radar that is being installed on a wide range of aircraft. By focusing the radar's output power in a limited area of the sky with a small number of its total modules, the radar can extend its detection range. In fact, for the first time, U.S. fighter aircraft will have a radar that can locate targets beyond the range of its Aim-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles which allow critical additional time for tactical maneuvering.

Success of a multi-layered cruise missile defense would include being able to penetrate sophisticated enemy air defenses, a task that would depend heavily on jamming radars that control next-generation anti-aircraft missile systems. It was long a secret that the newly emerging active electronically scanned aperture radars on the F/A-22, F-35, F/A-18E/Fs and some modified F-15Cs will be able to jam enemy emitters as well as search for enemy aircraft and diminutive cruise missiles. But because the new radar's jamming capability is confined to a limited range of frequencies, a narrow geographic area and a restricted field of view, it must be carefully managed, targeted and aided by other onboard systems such as an improved radar warning receiver, the ALR-69A (V).

Reports on issues for concern among top United States military commanders in Europe during the Kosovo, Serbia air campaign. Possibility that Yugoslavia would introduce modern missiles and aircraft to the conflict; Security leaks in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Shortage of US troops and weapons; Testimony of military officials before the US House military readiness subcommittee.

Features the unmanned air vehicles (UAV) developed by the United States Air Force equipped to direct laser-guided bombs after they were released by manned aircraft above the clouds. Original plan of using the UAV during the Kosovo campaign in Serbia, Yugoslavia; Importance of UAV technology in air warfare; Areas of future conflict concerning air warfare revealed by the Kosovo conflict.

Focuses on the United States' Kosovo After-Action Review-Board's analysis of data on the aerial assault on Yugoslavia to produce an official report which would identify fundamental flaws and tactical miscalculations made during the attack. Timing of the report's release on President Bill Clinton's 2001 budget adjustment; Failures that led to the shooting down of a stealthy F-117; Objectives of the study.

The article examines air power tactics by U.S. French and British armed forces in their intervention in the revolution in Libya. Operations against the communications and reinforcements of the armed forces of the government of dictator Moammar Gadhafi are discussed. Closer coordination between air forces involved in the operations and the ground forces of the Libyan rebels is considered.

The article reports on the comment of a senior U.S. Air Force (USAF) F-15 pilot regarding the French and Indian performances at September Red Flag. The pilot said that pilots flying Su-30MKIs for the Indian air force are still learning how to use the aircraft. The pilot also said that French pilots followed the same procedure during 1991's Operation Desert Storm and peacekeeping exercises. The pilot predicted that the Indian pilots will regularly defeat the F-16C Block 50 and the F-15C.

The article analyzes the military blunders committed by Russian armed forces in their war against Georgia. Senior Russian military officials, both active and recently retired, are loudly criticizing early setbacks in Georgia which included problems in air defense suppression, intelligence analysis and warnings, air attack planning and speed of response. They also point to the deployment of older T-62 and T-72 tanks and outdated armored personnel carriers for the initial push into East Ossetia that were about an equal match for the Georgian armor.

The article discusses the deployment of U.S. and Ethiopian warplanes on Islamic insurgents in Somalia. Air strikes are targeting principal Al Qaeda leaders in the region and troops that fled from the north when Ethiopian forces moved into the war-ravaged country to save the transitional government. A U.S. AC-130 gunship hit what is being described by military officials as an Al Qaeda training camp. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, says the first strike was directed at those involved in attacks of U.S. embassies in Africa.

"The U.S. Air Force has the ability to render enemy air defenses ineffective by making anti-aircraft missiles ignore their assignments," says Hal Homburg, chief of U.S. Air Combat Command in what appears to be the first high-level acknowledgment that such a capability exists. That offensive capability is associated with computer network attack-the ability to penetrate a foe's digital communications networks. Homburg also expresses the desire to bring some classified, non-kinetic/non-explosive weapons into the open so they can be more easily developed and fielded. "I look forward to the day when we can convince a surface-to-air missile that it is a Maytag in a rinse cycle make it irrelevant to combat or render it inoperable non-kinetically" he says. That offensive capability is associated with computer network attack-the ability to penetrate a foe's digital communications networks.

Computer-attack technology, directed-energy weapons and cooperating fleets of unmanned aircraft to transport them over enemy lines might be the linchpins of warfighting in a decade or so, but right now they are mired in a technical and legal swamp. The most closely guarded secrets are the operational tools that can create key battlefield effects. These tools could make an enemy's integrated air defense systems suddenly go blind and stupid. An example is computer network attack. As envisioned, it would provide the ability to penetrate an enemy computer system and either mine it for data, spoof it with false information or damage it with crippling algorithms.

Focuses on critical problem areas that emerged from the aerial assault on Yugoslavia, identified by Pentagon senior military and aerospace industry officials in the United States. Need for larger inventories of new standoff and precision weapons production; Replacement for the EA-6B Prowler radar jamming aircraft; Improvements in stealth and electronic warfare.

Cites the early lessons learned by the United States military from the conflict in Kosovo, Serbia. Includes modifications to the B-2 stealth-bomber; Advantage that Joint-STARS offers; Intelligence collection; Electronic warfare.