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We study probabilistically informative (weak) versions of transitivity by using suitable definitions of defaults and negated defaults in the setting of coherence and imprecise probabilities. We represent p-consistent sequences of defaults and/or negated defaults by g-coherent imprecise probability assessments on the respective sequences of conditional events. Moreover, we prove the coherent probability propagation rules for Weak Transitivity and the validity of selected inference patterns by proving p-entailment of the associated knowledge bases. Finally, we apply our results to study selected probabilistic versions of classical categorical syllogisms and construct a new version of the square of opposition in terms of defaults and negated defaults.

Various semantics for studying the square of opposition and the hexagon of opposition have been proposed recently. We interpret sentences by imprecise (set-valued) probability assessments on a finite sequence of conditional events. We introduce the acceptability of a sentence within coherence-based probability theory. We analyze the relations of the square and of the hexagon in terms of acceptability. Then, we show how to construct probabilistic versions of the square and of the hexagon of opposition by forming suitable tripartitions of the set of all coherent assessments on a finite sequence of conditional events. Finally, as an application, we present new versions of the square and of the hexagon involving generalized quantifiers.

We generalize, in the setting of coherence, the notions of conjunction and disjunction of two conditional events to the case of n conditional events. Given a prevision assessment on the conjunction of two conditional events, we study the set of coherent extensions for the probabilities of the two conditional events. Then, we introduce by a progressive procedure the notions of conjunction and disjunction for n conditional events. Moreover, by defining the negation of conjunction and of disjunction, we show that De Morgan’s Laws still hold. We also show that the associative and commutative properties are satisfied. Finally, we examine in detail the conjunction for a family \(\mathcal F\) of three conditional events. To study coherence of prevision for the conjunction of the three conditional events, we need to consider the coherence for the prevision assessment on each conditional event and on the conjunction of each pair of conditional events in \(\mathcal F\).

We study the quasi conjunction and the Goodman & Nguyen inclusion relation for conditional events, in the setting of probabilistic default reasoning under coherence. We deepen two recent results given in (Gilio and Sanfilippo, 2010): the first result concerns p-entailment from a family F of conditional events to the quasi conjunction C(S) associated with each nonempty subset S of F; the second result, among other aspects, analyzes the equivalence between p-entailment from F and p-entailment from C(S), where S is some nonempty subset of F. We also characterize p-entailment by some alternative theorems. Finally, we deepen the connections between p-entailment and the Goodman & Nguyen inclusion relation; in particular, for a pair (F,E|H), we study the class K of the subsets S of F such that C(S) is included in E|H. We show that K is additive and has a greatest element which can be determined by applying a suitable algorithm.

We study, in the setting of coherence, the extension of a probability assessment defined on n conditional events to their quasi conjunction. We consider, in particular, two special cases of logical dependencies; moreover, we examine the relationship between the notion of p-entailment of Adams and the inclusion relation of Goodman and Nguyen. We also study the probabilistic semantics of the QAND rule of Dubois and Prade; then, we give a theoretical result on p-entailment.

We illustrate an approach to uncertain knowledge based on lower conditional probability bounds. We exploit the coherence principle of de Finetti and a related notion of generalized coherence (g-coherence), which is equivalent to the "avoiding uniform loss" property introduced by Walley for lower and upper probabilities. Based on the additive structure of random gains, we define suitable notions of non relevant gains and of basic sets of variables. Exploiting them, the linear systems in our algorithms can work with reduced sets of variables and/or constraints. In this paper, we illustrate the notions of non relevant gain and of basic set by examining several cases of imprecise assessments defined on families with three conditional events. We adopt a geometrical approach, obtaining some necessary and sufficient conditions for g-coherence. We also propose two algorithms which provide new strategies for reducing the number of constraints and for deciding g-coherence. In this way, we try to overcome the computational difficulties which arise when linear systems become intractable. Finally, we illustrate our methods by giving some examples.

We study probabilistic logic under the viewpoint of the coherence principle of de Finetti. In detail, we explore how probabilistic reasoning under coherence is related to model-theoretic probabilistic reasoning and to default reasoning in System P. In particular, we show that the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment can be expressed by combining notions in model-theoretic probabilistic logic with concepts from default reasoning. Moreover, we show that probabilistic reasoning under coherence is a generalization of default reasoning in System P. That is, we provide a new probabilistic semantics for System P, which neither uses infinitesimal probabilities nor atomic bound (or big-stepped) probabilities. These results also provide new algorithms for probabilistic reasoning under coherence and for default reasoning in System P, and they give new insight into default reasoning with conditional objects.