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In this paper, I contrast two mathematically equivalent ways of modeling the evolution of altruism, namely the classical inclusive fitness approach and a more recent, "direct fitness" approach. Though both are usually considered by evolutionists as mere different ways of representing the same causal process (i.e. that of kin selection), I argue that this consensus is misleading, for there is a fundamental ambiguity concerning the causal interpretation of the DF approach. Drawing on an analogy between the structure of inclusive fitness theory and that of causal decision theory (Stalnaker, 1972), I show that only the inclusive fitness framework can provide us with a proper, and unambiguous causal partition of the relevant variables involved in the evolution of altruism., (Copyright © 2019. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

This article is about the analogy between inclusive fitness and utility. In behavioral ecology, it is often assumed that individual organisms behave as if they were "striving" to maximize their inclusive fitness—a measure analogue to the kind of utility function that is used to represent the preferences of rational agents. Here, I explore some conceptual puzzles related to this view and question whether the kind of biological utility posited by the advocates of the "maximizing agent analogy" can be adequately interpreted in inclusive fitness terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]