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What makes lobbying coalitions successful? We contend that greater preference heterogeneity among members of a lobbying coalition enhances the credibility of its signals to a target audience. To test this theory, we analyze the relationship between the preference heterogeneity of state amicus coalitions at the agenda setting stage and the probability of the U.S. Supreme Court granting review in state-filed cases. The results suggest that petitions are more likely to be granted as the preference heterogeneity among members of amicus coalitions increases. Our theoretical and empirical approaches are easily adapted to the study of lobbying influence in other institutional contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

What determines state success when petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for review? We suggest that states can improve the likelihood of securing Supreme Court review by coordinating litigation efforts. This coordination occurs in two ways. First, some states coordinate their appellate litigation efforts internally through the creation of state solicitors general offices. Second, external coordination occurs when states join amicus briefs at the agenda setting stage urging the Supreme Court to grant review in state-filed cases. Using new data on all state-filed certiorari petitions from the 2001-2009 terms, we find that internal and external coordination is associated with an increased likelihood of the Supreme Court granting review in state-filed cases. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]