he question of the existence of a Hebrew concept of per suasion arises as a subordinate pofrit in James BCinneavy's book, The Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith. Kmneavy's thesis is that the Christian notion of TTIO-TIC, faith as dis tinct from the Hebrew concept of faithfulness or trust, 'emunâ, owes its origin to the Greek concept of TTIO-TIC, beUef as persuasion or proof. In the process of proving this thesis, Kinneavy cites G. Berfram's Hebrew supplement to Rudolf Bultmann's essay on -rreidu} in the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Berfram comments that bibUcal Hebrew has no word corresponding to TTeidu), "to persuade" (Bultmann 1). From this, and from the con cordance to the Septuagint which indeed shows that no Hebrew verb was franslated with Greek ireido) in its active fransitive form, Kirmeavy draws the conclusion that this apparent lack is conceptual—that what is lacking is "an awareness of a reflective and analytical concept of persuasion as such" (54). In my opinion, this conclusion, whUe not in itself incorrect, is unwarranted by the evidence Kinneavy attests, which instead points to a more specifie difference between disparate concepts of persuasion, whether pragmatic and impUdt, as in the Hebrew fradition, or reflective and analytical, as in the Greek.