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"Animal-based research should be held to the highest ethical standards" is becoming an increasingly common refrain. Though I think such a commitment is what we should expect of those using animals in science, much as we would if the participants were humans, some key insights of discussions in applied ethics and moral philosophy only seem to slowly impact what reasonably qualifies as the highest standards in animal research ethics. Early in my paper, I will explain some of these insights and loosely tie them to animal research ethics. Two emergent practices in laboratory animal science, positive reinforcement training and "rehoming," will then be discussed, and I will defend the view that both should be mandatory on no more ethical grounds than what is outlined in the first section. I will also provide reasons for foregrounding the moral significance of dissent and why, most of the time, an animal research subject's sustained dissent should be respected. Taken together, what I will defend promises to change how at least some animals are used in science and what happens to them afterwards. But I will also show how an objective ethics requires nothing less. Ignoring these constraints in the scientific use of animals comes at the cost of abandoning any claim to adhering to our highest ethical standards and, arguably, any claim to the moral legitimacy of such scientific use., (© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Human and animal research both operate within established standards. In the United States, criticism of the human research environment and recorded abuses of human research subjects served as the impetus for the establishment of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and the resulting Belmont Report. The Belmont Report established key ethical principles to which human research should adhere: respect for autonomy, obligations to beneficence and justice, and special protections for vulnerable individuals and populations. While current guidelines appropriately aim to protect the individual interests of human participants in research, no similar, comprehensive, and principled effort has addressed the use of (nonhuman) animals in research. Although published policies regarding animal research provide relevant regulatory guidance, the lack of a fundamental effort to explore the ethical issues and principles that should guide decisions about the potential use of animals in research has led to unclear and disparate policies. Here, we explore how the ethical principles outlined in the Belmont Report could be applied consistently to animals. We describe how concepts such as respect for autonomy and obligations to beneficence and justice could be applied to animals, as well as how animals are entitled to special protections as a result of their vulnerability.

Though there is a burgeoning interest in applied Buddhist ethics, Buddhist animal research ethics remains an underdeveloped area. In this paper I will explore how some central Buddhist ethical considerations can usefully engage our use of other animals (henceforth, animals) in science. As the scientific use of animals is broad, I will narrow my focus to laboratory science. I will show that, though a Buddhist abolitionism would not be unmotivated, it is possible to reject it. While doing so, it will be important to resist emphasizing elements of Buddhist thought that merely provide reasons to adopt the dominant ethical framework governing laboratory animal research ethics, known as the 3Rs. Though I will suggest how a Buddhist animal research ethics can sometimes permit the use of animals in harmful research, it will also require ethical constraints that resonate with some of the more progressive elements in 'Western' bioethics., (© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Among the "hard cases" of captive animal research is the continued use of chimpanzees in harmful experimental science. In a recent article I contend that contemporary animal welfare science and chimpanzee behavioral studies permit, if not require, a reappraisal of the moral significance of chimpanzee dissent from participation in certain experiments. In what follows, I outline my earlier argument, provide a brief survey of some central concepts in pediatric research ethics, and use these to enrich an understanding of chimpanzee dissent useful for research ethics.

ABSTRACT A recent argument in the neuroethics literature has suggested that brain-mental-state identities (one popular expression of what is commonly known as neuroreductionism) promise to settle epistemological uncertainties about nonhuman [...]

Simple Summary: In this paper we argue that the current oversight system for animal-based science in Canada needs major reform to keep pace with progressive legislation in other nations and to prioritize the replacement of animals as best scientific practice. Canada's current non-legislated oversight system for animal-based science not only fails to adequately incentivize the replacement of sentient animals as best scientific practice in any meaningful way, but also fails to adequately protect those animals bred, harmed, and killed in the name of science. In this paper, we outline the various shortcomings of the Canadian Council on Animal Care, and we highlight the need for Canada to move towards national legislation akin to that seen in other jurisdictions like the U.K. We conclude that while legislation alone cannot ensure the replacement of sentient animals in science, it appears to be a precondition for significant progress in animal protection and for the development and adoption of non-animal methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]