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People often see the human in the nonhuman, a process called anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism is particularly prolific regarding the humanization of pets. Some research suggests that people with autism may not anthropomorphize to the same degree as neurotypicals. In this study, we explored whether there were differences in how autistic and neurotypical pet owners anthropomorphized their pets. We also examined differences in levels of connectedness to nature and experiences of loneliness and how this corresponded to autistic traits in the entire sample. We found anthropomorphism was as common among autistic pet owners as in neurotypicals. However, autistic pet owners reported greater loneliness and were more likely to substitute pets for people. We also found that neurotypical pet owners rated pets more highly on physical, non‐anthropomorphic traits (i.e., muscular, active). In contrast, autistic pet owners were likelier to rate pets equally between physical and anthropomorphic traits. Moreover, we found that anthropomorphism and connection to nature were positively correlated with autistic traits. These findings challenge accounts stating that individuals with autism may not anthropomorphize to the same degree as neurotypicals. Implications for animal‐based interventions supporting adults on the spectrum are discussed. Lay Summary: Autistic people are often assumed to have deficits in the understanding and appreciation of mental states. In this study, we examined whether that was true in the context of animals and the natural environment. We found that autistic people were just as likely to anthropomorphise or humanize their pets and were more likely to think about pets using mental versus physical traits. We also found that autistic traits were correlated with anthropomorphism and connection to nature. These findings corroborate autistic accounts highlighting a strong connection to the natural world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research suggests that while autistic people may demonstrate poorer facial emotion recognition when stimuli are human, these differences lessen when stimuli are anthropomorphic. To investigate this further, this work explores emotion recognition in autistic and neurotypical adults (n = 196). Groups were compared on a standard and a cartoon version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test. Results indicated that autistic individuals were not significantly different from neurotypicals on the standard version. However, autistic people outperformed neurotypicals on the cartoon version. The implications for these findings regarding emotion recognition deficits and the social motivation account of autism are discussed and support the view of socio‐cognitive differences rather than deficits in this population. Lay Summary: The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test and a cartoon version were tested on autistic and neurotypical adults. Autistic adults were not significantly different on the original test compared to neurotypicals, but they outperformed neurotypical adults on the cartoon version. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People who have a high degree of autistic traits often underperform on theory of mind tasks such as perspective-taking or facial emotion recognition compared to those with lower levels of autistic traits. However, some research suggests that this may not be the case if the agent they are evaluating is anthropomorphic (i.e. animal or cartoon) rather than typically human. The present studies examined the relation between facial emotion recognition and autistic trait profiles in over 750 adults using either a standard or cartoon version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) test. Results showed that those scoring above the clinical cut off for autistic traits on the Autism Quotient performed significantly worse than those with the lowest levels of autistic traits on the standard RME, while scores across these groups did not differ substantially on the cartoon version of the task. These findings add further evidence that theory of mind ability such as facial emotion recognition is not at a global deficit in those with a high degree of autistic traits. Instead, differences in this ability may be specific to evaluating human agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autistic people are often described as being impaired with regard to theory of mind, though more recent literature finds flaws in the theory of mind deficit paradigm. In addition, the predominant methods for examining theory of mind often rely on "observational" modes of assessment and do not adequately reflect the dynamic process of real-life perspective taking. Thus, it is imperative that researchers continue to test the autistic theory of mind deficit paradigm and explore theory of mind experiences through more naturalistic approaches. This study qualitatively examined theory of mind in 12 autistic adolescents through a series of semi-structured interviews. Interpretive phenomenological analysis of the data revealed four core themes in participants' theory of mind experiences and strategies, all of which highlighted how a more accurate representation of autistic theory of mind is one of difference rather than deficit. For instance, data showed that autistic heightened perceptual abilities may contribute to mentalizing strengths and that honesty in autism may be less dependent on systemizing rather than personal experience and choice. Such findings suggest that future research should reexamine autistic characteristics in light of their ability to enhance theory of mind processing. Understanding how an autistic theory of mind is uniquely functional is an imperative step toward both destigmatizing the condition and advocating for neurodiversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research shows that the general population varies with regard to both autistic traits and theory of mind (ToM) ability. Other work has shown that autistic individuals may not underperform on ToM tests when the agent of evaluation is anthropomorphic rather than typically human. Two studies examined the relation between ToM and autistic trait profiles in over 650 adults using either the standard Faux Pas Recognition Test (FPT) or an anthropomorphized version of the FPT (FPTa). Results showed that autistic trait profiles were related to faux pas detection ability in the FPT but not the FPTa. Furthermore, while those with the broad autism phenotype scored significantly worse than those who were typically developed on the FPT, scores did not significantly differ on the FPTa. These findings add to a growing body of work suggesting that ToM ability is not at a global deficit in those on the autistic spectrum, but may relate to the mindreading of specifically human agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the process of taking another's perspective. Anthropomorphism can be seen as the extension of ToM to non-human entities. This review examines the literature concerning ToM and anthropomorphism in relation to individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), specifically addressing the questions of how and why those on the spectrum both show an increased interest for anthropomorphism and may even show improved ToM abilities when judging the mental states of anthropomorphic characters. This review highlights that while individuals with ASD traditionally show deficits on a wide range of ToM tests, such as recognizing facial emotions, such ToM deficits may be ameliorated if the stimuli presented is cartoon or animal-like rather than in human form. Individuals with ASD show a greater interest in anthropomorphic characters and process the features of these characters using methods typically reserved for human stimuli. Personal accounts of individuals with ASD also suggest they may identify more closely with animals than other humans. It is shown how the social motivations hypothesized to underlie the anthropomorphizing of non-human targets may lead those on the spectrum to seek social connections and therefore gain ToM experience and expertise amongst unlikely sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]