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Does rivalry influence selective reporting in scientific publications? Building on the notion that scientific publications help position a firm's innovation in the marketplace, we study how rivalry influences the selective reporting of key research outcomes in such publications. We define "rivalry" as a subset of competition that captures the subjective relationships between two competitors. Focusing on the context of comparative trials of pharmaceutical drugs and the phenomenon of selective reporting, we propose that the chances of selectively reporting drugs' side effects in scientific articles are higher when the drugs investigated in the trial are rivals than when the investigated drugs are non-rival opponents. We argue that the effect of the relational nature of rivalry on withholding information is strengthened when the scientific publication includes a firm scientist. We also suggest that the effect is weakened when the focal drug outperforms the rival drug in the focal clinical trial and when it pre-empted the rival drug at market entry. Using data on head-to-head clinical trials for antidepressants and expert-driven assessments of selective reporting, our preliminary results provide support for our main hypothesis but only weak support for the moderation effects. Our study is novel in that it is the first study that explores the link between relational rivalry, product-market competition, and content of scientific articles. While scientific publications can be a purposeful tool for competitive positioning and encouraging adoption of innovations, we reveal conditions that are likely to trigger a "dark side" in publication practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]