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Copyright of Szociológiai Szemle is the property of Hungarian Sociological Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Endoxa is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tópicos is the property of Asociacion Revista de Filosofia de Santa Fe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper deals with the connection between law and morality. Such a connection is relevant for political theory, since demonstrating that law necessarily implies a claim to justice would require fundamental rights to be considered the horizon of any legal system, instead of being considered as dependent on the axiological context of liberal democracies. The paper approaches the controversy starting from an overview of the work of the German philosopher Robert Alexy, in particular his attempt to establish an analytical link between law and morality, and to this end considers law as a speech act with a claim to correctness. It then examines the critique put forward by Joseph Raz, that points out the lack of objectivity of this claim to correctness. In order to establish a moral foundation for law, the paper argues that it is necessary to take account of Karl-Otto Apel's attempt to establish the transcendental foundation of language, as well as of Habermas' critique of that attempt. In conclusion, it is argued that the debate about a possible link between law and morality sheds new light on contemporary debates on liberal justification in political theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tópicos is the property of Asociacion Revista de Filosofia de Santa Fe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Praxis Filosófica is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper considers the criticisms made of the modern idea of progress which provoked negative consequences in history while it was equated with instrumental reason. This situation permitted those critics of reason to declare "the end of history". However, this paper aims to review the former considering the ethics of discourse as a conceptual framework, as in Apel and Habermas, who aimed to address and revalue the emancipatory potential of reason and maintain the idea of the sense for history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Enlightenment, the concept of‘critique’ broadened and acquired a political denotation, in which the expression of opinion alone could itself be already considered critique. This meaning of‘critique’ expresses acknowledgement of men as equal, free and rational. This broad concept of critique, however, also tends to negate certain more technical and specific forms. This paper goes back to conceptions of critique introduced by Kant and developed in an educational perspective by the neo-Kantian Paul Natorp. Kant's concept of critique concentrated on the conditions of possibility of judgemental powers, resulting in a transcendental critique of Reason. Natorp applied this conception of transcendental critique to education. Though Natorp relates education to society as a whole, his concept of critique does not uncover the social determinants of educational views but holds on to a transcendental critical idea of critical judgement that is not completely socially determined. Consequently, in the transcendental critical approach, the critical function of Reason is given priority over any political vision. This results in a conception of critique that primarily questions validity claims, stressing rational testing as opposed to other sources of validity, such as traditional or religious authority. The transcendental critical programme, further developed in twentieth-century Germany, still endorses the implied denial of the possibility of deriving the validity of propositions from experience. It can be distinguished from Karl-Otto Apel's brand of transcendental critique by its refusal to assume any primary criterion for critical judgement, in the manner of Apel's‘ideal communicative community’. Consequently, this programme cannot result in any positive conception of education. Its main contribution consists in exposing those presuppositions of educational views and practices that function as a priori ideas as conditions of the possibility of their justification. Though not denying the value and relevance of positive educational conceptions, this transcendental critical approach primarily aims at preventing metaphysical foundational questions from being forgotten or dogmatically fossilised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the primacy of communicative rationality in relation to other forms of rationality and to determine the status of openly strategic actions in the concept of Jürgen Habermas. In the theory of communicative actions, Habermas focuses on actions secretively strategic, recognizing them as "parasitic" in relation to communicative actions and explains the prevalence of communicative actions on the grounds of the theory of speech acts, in particular the concept of illocutionary force, the category of "social binding force", or practice in the lifeworld. By the same, Karl-Otto Apel challenges Habermas that he has skipped explicitly strategic class of actions, which entails the inadequacy of the justification for the status of communicative rationality. This raises a doubt - why should non-strategic actions take precedence over strategic ones? Karl-Otto Apel replies to this question with the help of transcendental-pragmatic procedure of an ultimate justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Veritas is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The title of the paper productively suggests a double-meaning of truth vis-à-vis dialogue. The claim is both that the concept of truth is essential for a comprehensive conception of dialogue, and that dialogue points toward a concept of truth beyond dogmatic infallibity or doxastic relativism. At stake is to show how truth entails an essentially dialogical moment, and dialogue, if conceived philosophically, must entail the concept of truth. In theological as well as philosophical dogmatism, a final (a priori or revealed) truth is assumed. Interesting are positions such as Cardinal Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI's or Karl-Otto Apel's "transcendental pragmatics" since they attempt to engage in dialogue yet assume an "infallible" or "ultimately grounded" foundation for their own assumptions. Radically opposed to this infallibilism is the postmodem relativistic view according to which the "groundless grounds" of human understanding make all claims to truth meaningless. Since understanding and dialogue are situated in contingent cultural contexts, as Richard Rorty argues, no ascent to truth is ever possible. The result of our analysis suggests that both positions lead to an insulation of experience from true dialogical challenge. Dogmatic positions miss the dialogical core of truth, as they believe that insulated truth-content remains "true" regardless of engaged and challenged reassertions. Doxastic conceptions miss the truth-relation of dialogue, as they fail to capture the seriousness and intentionality of intersubjective and intercultural dialogue. From these critical points emerges a productive concept of dialogue that entails truth as an open-ended and dynamic, and thereby indispensable, concept. Moreover, our analysis lays out that the basic dialogical notions involve truth, openness, and reciprocity in an interconnected way. Dialogue is unavoidable for truth, as much as truth is intrinsic to dialogue. But the new synthesis of mth and dialogue allows for a pluralistic understanding of mth that still, we hope, remains truthful to its content. As such, it alone can ground a non-relativistic notion of multiculturalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main goal of critical social justice is to ensure the agency of citizens, which enables them to take part, not only in public discussions about how resources are distributed, but also about matters such as what should be produced, how to do it and through what kind of production, among others. Critical social justice can be best formulated within the foundation programme of discursive ethics, in particular within Apel's version specified in his principle of co-responsibility. This principle establishes a telos that operates as a normative guide to formulate the constructive question about which the necessary conditions are for someone to be able to become a subject of dialogue. Answering this question leads, on the one hand, to the development of some constitutive elements of critical social justice and, on the other hand, to the identification of the social relations and structures that undermine the possibilities of a person to effectively participate in the discussion of the topics they consider relevant. As its constitutive elements, I propose reciprocal recognition autonomy, the metric of capabilities and a sufficientarian principle of justice, which work together with the well-known difference principle. These elements constitute a normative net that allows contemporary societies to be criticized from the perspective of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the critique of Karl-Otto Apel regarding the philosophy of Martin Heidegger of consciousness as associated to historical and social settings. It explores the assessment of Apel of Heidegger's hermeneutics as presented in "Being and Time," wherein Heidegger was compared with other philosophers. It also examines the project of Apel to show that the validity claims acted out in the rules of every speech act over a particular community.

Addresses the ongoing debate between transcendental pragmatics and philosophical hermeneutics. Discussion on Karl-Otto Apel's version of linguistic transcendentalism; Positions concerning the relationship between transcendental epistemology and hermeneutic ontology; Clarification of the hermeneutic medium-argumentative discourse.

The article discusses the characterization of the normative theory of knowledge in the justificationist and foundationist philosophical tenets. It says that the Munchausen trilemma is one way to characterize the theory of knowledge, in which it is an aporia or paradox to the reflective thinker. Karl-Otto Apel says that this type of characterization leads to a trilemma due to its three possible outcomes, where it could lead to infinite regress, a logical circle, or dogmatizing some premises.

The article focuses on the works of philosophers Giovanni Battista Vico, Peter Winch and Karl-Otto Apel. Vico's works explore the human "life-world" and on the significance of prereflective understanding for cognitive operations. Winch has developed a theory of sociological understanding which is incipiently hermeneutical in character. Apel's works combine the influence of existential phenomenology and recent linguistic theory.