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The Criminal Anarchy Acts of 1902 and 1903 are often seen as secondary in the history of American anarchism and legal history due to their limited use in court. This article focuses on the 1902 Criminal Anarchy Act of New York State, which was enacted following the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901 by alleged anarchist Leon Czolgosz. The paper delves into the international, national, and local circumstances that led to the passing of the law. It provides an analysis of the Act itself, highlighting its depoliticisation of anarchism, essentially criminalising it, and links its existence to America's legal approach to federalism. Furthermore, the article aims to uncover the repercussions of the Act: despite its limited use in court and the failed attempt to depoliticise anarchism, the Act left a significant mark on the anarchist movement in the United States. It also sparked debates on freedom of speech and ultimately contributed to the landmark Supreme Court decision in Gitlow v. New York (1925), which initiated the incorporation doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Victorian Court of Appeal was established in 1995. The Full Court of the Supreme Court, which it replaced, had an outstanding reputation as a court of criminal appeal. The first 10 years of the Court of Appeal in its criminal jurisdiction saw its judgments affirmed on 10 occasions and reversed twice by the High Court which disapproved of two authorities. The next 14 years have seen the Court of Appeal's judgments reversed 16 times and affirmed on six occasions with a large number of its decisions criticised, particularly in the area of sentencing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports that the Magistrate Judge Mick Hodges with support from the Idaho Pro Bono Commission and Idaho Supreme Court joined attorneys and judges around the state to encourage participation in pro bono work. Topics include considered the Practice with Purpose tour stopped in each judicial district that gathers attorneys together to discuss pro bono opportunities and the Emeritus limited license.

More than ever, the constitutionality of laws turns on judicial review of an underlying factual record, assembled by lawmakers. Some scholars have suggested that by requiring extensive records, the Supreme Court is treating lawmakers like administrative agencies. The assumption underlying this metaphor is that if the state puts forth enough evidence in the record to support the law, its action will survive constitutional scrutiny. What scholars have overlooked, however, is that the Court is increasingly questioning the credibility of the record itself. Even in cases where the state produces adequate evidence to support its action, the Court sometimes invalidates the law because it does not believe the state's facts. In these cases, the Court treats the state like a witness in its own trial, subjecting the state's record and the conclusions drawn from it to rigorous cross-examination and second-guessing. In this "credibility-questioning" review of the record, the Court appears to be animated by an implicit judgment about the operation of the political process. When Justices consider the political process to have functioned properly, they treat the state as a good faith actor and merely check the adequacy of its evidence in the record. But when Justices suspect that the democratic process has malfunctioned because opponents of the law were too politically weak or indifferent to challenge distortions in the record, they treat the state as a witness, suspecting bias in its factual determinations supporting the law. In this Article, I both support and critique this new form of review. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue courts should engage in credibility-questioning review of the record when the political process has malfunctioned. Public choice and pluralist defect theory imply that the record supporting a law is more likely to be distorted in contexts of democratic malfunction. But for reasons of institutional legitimacy and separation of powers, I argue courts should limit credibility-questioning review to contexts where there is actual proof of democratic malfunction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Courts deciding constitutional cases frequently have to make deference determinations--that is, decisions about whether to respect a political branch's factual findings and policy judgments because of that branch's institutional superiority. The U.S. Supreme Court's approach to a wide range of these determinations, however, is inconsistent and under-theorized. Indeed, the Court's difficulties with deference determinations mirror broader failures to resolve carefully and consistently a number of "stealth " determinations that recur in constitutional cases--determinations that fall outside the black-letter doctrinal framework but can still greatly impact a case's outcome Rather than relying on pithy platitudes about each government branch's strengths and weaknesses, courts should examine the actual behavior and processes of the relevant governmental institution before deciding whether deference is appropriate. This contextual, institutional approach would provide better incentives for Congress and administrative agencies to craft policy utilizing their expertise and reinforcing their political accountability. It would also offer a more searching, rigorous model for courts approaching other extra-doctrinal determinations, thus improving the legal status of both deference determinations themselves and stealth constitutional determinations more generally [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is a report written about the court reforms that occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002 that restructured the size, location, and number of that nation's courts. Also restructured was the territory and subject-matter jurisdiction associated with each court. Topics include the criteria for reforms such as court caseloads, population, and the associated geography of the courts. Also discussed are the closure of appellate courts, court branches, regional departments, and specialized court divisions.

Almost twenty years ago, the Supreme Court's decision in Tanner v. United States established that under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) juror intoxication was an "internal" influence to which jurors were incompetent to testify. Since that decision, many states have discarded their diverse approaches regarding the admissibility of juror testimony on juror misconduct in favor of Tanner's external/internal framework. This Note demonstrates why the policy considerations justifying restrictions on juror testimony are not well served by Tanner's external/internal framework. The Note offers states an alternative approach to the issue of juror misconduct which would better protect both jurors and litigants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., General Electric Co. v. Robert K. Joiner, Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, and Weisgram v. Marley changed the ground rules for whether a survey is admissible as evidence into a trial. This article provides a history of the criteria used to determine the admissibility of expert reports before Daubert and summarizes Daubert and the three other relevant opinions. It provides examples of how the Daubert criteria are being applied in cases involving survey research and provides recommendations for conducting surveys that are likely to survive a Daubert challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the law which tackles the issue regarding the human rights to freedom of speech in the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) in Europe. It cites number of cases involving the violation of the jurisprudence in Europe. It says that the Europe Supreme Court handled 44 cases between July 1999 and May 2002 and over 36 cases involves violation of European law. According to the Supreme Court, the belief for the freedom of speech is relevant not only to ideas and information that are favorably received as euphemistic, but also to those that shock, offend or disturb.

The article reports on the Judicial Administration and Evaluation Committee, which is working on the revision of the trial and appellate court judicial evaluation forms. The forms have been given a new name to be more inclusive to all judicial divisions, and working to place the evaluation forms online to be more accessible. The promotional materials about judicial evaluation program are being compiled and will be distributed at bar meetings and conferences.