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Past research suggests that people continue believing retracted misinformation more when it is consistent versus inconsistent with their attitudes. However, the psychological mechanism responsible for this phenomenon remains unclear. We predicted that retractions of attitude-consistent misinformation produce greater feelings of discomfort than retractions of attitude-inconsistent misinformation and that this discomfort predicts continued belief in and use of the misinformation. We report combined analyses across 10 studies testing these predictions. Seven studies (total N = 1,323) used a mediational framework and found that the more consistent misinformation was with participants' attitudes, the more discomfort was elicited by a retraction of the misinformation. Greater discomfort then predicted greater continued belief in the misinformation, which, in turn, predicted greater use of the misinformation when participants made relevant inferences. Three additional studies (total N = 574) utilized misattribution paradigms to demonstrate that the relation between discomfort and belief in misinformation is causal in nature.

The current research examined how people infer whether novel sources are biased based on their ability to justify their position. Across nine studies, when sources provided weak versus strong arguments, message recipients perceived the source as more biased. This effect held controlling for other possible inferences, such as lack of expertise or untrustworthiness. This research also examined whether perceived source bias on one message can carry over to ambiguously related future persuasive messages. Studies 6 to 8 demonstrated that perceivers use both the perceived bias from an initial message and the argument quality of the second message to determine a source's bias on the new topic. Finally, perceived bias carried over from an initial message can influence persuasion on a second topic (Study 9). Ultimately, the present work provides insight into factors that affect perceived bias and the dynamic consequences of those perceptions.

Consumer products are widely used as stimuli across several research fields. The use of consumer products as experimental stimuli lacks, however, the support of normative data regarding product features variability. In this work, we provide a first set of norms for people's perceptions of 150 consumer products regarding six relevant dimensions: product perceived complexity, quality objectivity, material/experiential nature, perceived price, familiarity and attitude. Products available in this normative database showed good overall distribution across the range of the dimensions evaluated. Obtained correlations between some of these dimensions provided evidence of how they can be confounded across products, further justifying the need to control for these dimensions. These norms should aid future research by allowing researchers to select products according to specific attributes and achieve appropriate experimental control. The norms here provided should also aid consumer behavior practitioners (such as marketers and advertisers) by providing insights as to how consumers perceive products along relevant dimensions., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Previous work has reliably demonstrated that when people experience more subjective ambivalence about an attitude object, their attitudes have less impact on strength-related outcomes such as attitude-related thinking, judging, or behaving. However, previous research has not considered whether the amount of perceived knowledge a person has about the topic might moderate these effects. Across eight studies on different topics using a variety of outcome measures, the current research demonstrates that perceived knowledge can moderate the relation between ambivalence and the impact of attitudes on related thinking, judging, and behaving. Although the typical Attitude × Ambivalence effect emerged when participants had relatively high perceived knowledge, this interaction did not emerge when participants were lower in perceived knowledge. This work provides a more nuanced view of the effects of subjective ambivalence on attitude impact and highlights the importance of understanding the combined impact of attitude strength antecedents.

"Strong" attitudes often have greater impact than "weak" attitudes. However, emerging research suggests that weak (uncertain) attitudes can substantially influence thinking or behavior. We propose metacognitive reflection as a moderator between traditional strength patterns and these emerging attitude bolstering patterns. Across six studies, research participants encountered a target person who agreed or disagreed with participants' attitudes. When focused on evaluating the target, attitudes predicted target evaluations better when the attitude was held with certainty (Study 1A), or after certainty had been primed (Studies 2A and 3; strength effects). However, when engaged in attitudinal social comparison (metacognitive reflection), attitudes better predicted target evaluation when the attitudes were held with doubt (Study 1B), or after doubt had been primed (Studies 2B and 3; bolstering effects). Expected change in certainty served as a mediator of attitude effects in metacognitive reflection but not target-focus conditions when doubt had been primed (Study 4).

Accessibility is one of the most basic structural properties of an attitude and an important factor to consider in attitude strength. Despite its importance, relatively little work has examined the role of attitude accessibility in an inter-attitudinal context, particularly as it relates to the strength of related attitudes in the network. The present research examines accessibility as a property of one attitude (toward an abstract goal or end-state, that is, a value) that might influence the strength of a different but related attitude (toward a social policy conceptually related to the value). In Study 1, a highly accessible evaluative component of a value increased resistance to change of attitudes and behavioral intentions toward a social policy related to that value. Similarly, a manipulation of value accessibility (Studies 2 and 3) led to increased resistance of attitudes and behavioral intentions toward a social policy related to that value. Implications for the role of accessibility in inter-attitudinal strength are discussed., (© 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.)

To date, little research has examined the impact of attitudinal ambivalence on attitude-congruent selective exposure. Past research would suggest that strong/univalent rather than weak/ambivalent attitudes should be more predictive of proattitudinal information seeking. Although ambivalent attitude structure might weaken the attitude's effect on seeking proattitudinal information, we believe that conflicted attitudes might also motivate attitude-congruent selective exposure because proattitudinal information should be effective in reducing ambivalence. Two studies provide evidence that the effects of ambivalence on information choices depend on amount of issue knowledge. That is, ambivalence motivates attitude-consistent exposure when issue knowledge is relatively low because less familiar information is perceived to be effective at reducing ambivalence. Conversely, when knowledge is relatively high, more unambivalent (univalent) attitudes predicted attitude-consistent information seeking.

Most research on persuasion examines messages that directly address the attitude of interest. However, especially when message recipients are inclined to resist change, indirect methods might be more effective. Because values are rarely attacked and defended, value change could serve as a useful indirect route for attitude change. Attitudes toward affirmative action changed more when the value of equality was attacked (indirect change) than when affirmative action was directly attacked using the same message (Experiments 1-2). Changes in confidence in the value were responsible for the indirect change when the value was attacked (controlling for changes in favorability toward the value), whereas direct counterarguments to the message were responsible for the relative lack of change when the attitude was attacked directly (Experiment 2). Attacking the value of equality influenced attitudes toward policies related to the value but left policy attitudes unrelated to the value unchanged (Experiment 3). Finally, a manipulation of value confidence that left attitudes toward the value intact demonstrated similar confidence-based influences on policies related to the value of freedom (Experiment 4). Undermined value confidence also resulted in less confidence in the resulting policy attitudes controlling for the changes in the policy attitudes themselves (Experiments 3 and 4). Therefore, indirect change through value attacks presented a double threat--to both the policy attitudes and the confidence with which those policy attitudes were held (potentially leaving them open to additional influence).

Compared to nonexperts, expert sources have been considered to elicit more processing of persuasive messages because of expectations that the information is likely to be valid or accurate. However, depending on the position of an advocacy, source expertise could activate other motives that may produce a very different relation from that found in past research. When messages are counterattitudinal (disagreeable), experts should motivate greater processing than nonexpert sources because of expectations that they will likely provide robust opposition to one's existing views. In contrast, when advocacies are proattitudinal (agreeable), nonexpert rather than expert sources should elicit more scrutiny because of perceptions that they will likely provide inadequate support to recipients' current views. Two studies offer evidence consistent with these predictions. Manipulations of source expertise created different expectations regarding the strength of opposition or support, and these perceptions accounted for effects of source expertise on the amount of message scrutiny.

Compared with nonentitative groups, entitative targets are considered to elicit more elaborative processing because of the singularity or unity they represent. However, when groups serve as sources of persuasive messages, other dynamics may operate. The current research suggests that entitativity is intrinsically linked to perceptions of a group's efficacy related to the advocacy, and this efficacy combines with the position of the appeal to determine message elaboration. When messages are counterattitudinal, entitative (efficacious) sources should elicit greater processing than nonentitative groups because of concern that the entitative sources may be more likely to bring about the negative outcomes proposed. However, when appeals are proattitudinal, sources low in entitativity (nonefficacious) should initiate more elaboration due to concern that they may be unlikely to facilitate the positive outcomes proposed. These hypotheses were supported in a series of studies. Preliminary studies established the entitativity-efficacy relation (Studies 1A and 1B). Primary persuasion studies showed that manipulations of source entitativity (Studies 2 and 3) and source efficacy (Studies 4A and 4B) have opposite effects on processing as a function of message discrepancy., ((PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).)

Attitudinal ambivalence has been found to increase processing of attitude-relevant information. In this research, the authors suggest that ambivalence can also create the opposite effect: avoidance of thinking about persuasive messages. If processing is intended to reduce experienced ambivalence, then ambivalent people should increase processing of information perceived as proattitudinal (agreeable) and able to decrease ambivalence. However, ambivalence should also lead people to avoid processing of counterattitudinal (disagreeable) information that threatens to increase ambivalence. Three studies provide evidence consistent with this proposal. When participants were relatively ambivalent, they processed messages to a greater extent when the messages were proattitudinal rather than counterattitudinal. However, when participants were relatively unambivalent, they processed messages more when the messages were counterattitudinal rather than proattitudinal. In addition, ambivalent participants perceived proattitudinal messages as more likely than counterattitudinal messages to reduce ambivalence, and these perceptions accounted for message position effects on amount of processing.

Past research showed that considering a persuasive message in light of important rather than unimportant values creates attitudes that resist later attack. The traditional explanation is that the attitudes come to express the value or that a cognitive link between the value and attitude enhances resistance. However, the current research showed that another explanation is plausible. Similar to other sources of involvement, considering important rather than unimportant values increases processing of the message considered in light of those values. This occurs when the values are identified as normatively high or low in importance and when the perceived importance differs across participants for the same values. The increase in processing creates resistance to later attacks, and unlike past research, individual-level measures of initial amount of processing mediate value importance effects on later resistance to change. Important values motivate processing because they increase personal involvement with the issue, rather than creating attitudes that represent or express core values., ((c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved)

The authors argue that specific emotions can alter the persuasive impact of messages as a function of the emotional framing of persuasive appeals. Because specific emotions inflate expectancies for events possessing matching emotional overtones (D. DeSteno, R. E. Petty, D. T. Wegener, & D. D. Rucker, 2000), the authors predicted that attempts at persuasion would be more successful when messages were framed with emotional overtones matching the emotional state of the receiver and that these changes would be mediated by emotion-induced biases involving expectancies attached to arguments contained in the messages. Two studies manipulating discrete negative emotional states and message frames (i.e., sadness and anger) confirmed these predictions. The functioning of this emotion-matching bias in parallel with emotion-induced processing differences and the limitations of a valence-based approach to the study of attitude change are also considered.