Search

This article deals with the contentious issue of the extent to which an intoxicated person, particularly one who has become inebriated of his or her own volition, should be permitted to escape liability on the basis that the degree of inebriation was sufficient to preclude the fact-finder from finding a volitional act or omission on the part of the accused and/or that he or she acted with the requisite mens rea, if any as defined by the common law or statutory definition of the offence. In addressing this issue, the article embarks upon a thorough analysis of the House of Lords seminal decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v Majewski [1977] AC 443 which, despite some very harsh criticism of late, continues to be the leading authority on this question in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia. /As part of this analysis, the article examines and ultimately attempts to resolve the longstanding controversy over what has proved to be the elusive distinction between crimes of basic or general intent and those of specific intent. The article concludes by rejecting the Majewski principles in favour of those enunciated by the High Court of Australia in R v O'Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 54 ALJR 349. In reaching this conclusion, the article notes various legislative and academic proposals for reform as well as statutory reforms in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In The Queen v Getachew, a recent decision of the High Court of Australia that was soon followed by the Victorian Court of Appeal, the High Court correctly noted that there is a fine line between the mens reas of belief and knowledge which turns upon the degree of conviction with which a belief is held. In particular, the court emphasised that a belief in the existence of a fact or circumstance that contemplates a real possibility or perhaps a higher degree of doubt as to the existence of that fact or circumstance is tantamount to knowledge or awareness that such fact or circumstance may not exist. When applied to the principle enunciated in DPP v Morgan, that type of belief would not be mutually exclusive with the alternative mens reas that require the Crown to prove that the accused was aware that the complainant was not or might not be consenting to the penetration at issue. In Getachew, the High Court merely pointed out that the mens reas of knowledge and belief, though similar in certain respects, are separate and distinct mental states that were incorrectly and inexplicably treated as though they were identical in Morgan and innumerable decisions that have followed and relied upon Morgan since it was decided by the House of Lords in 1976. In the aftermath of Getachew, therefore, the principle that an accused can act with a mental state that is mutually exclusive of the mens rea for rape remains intact. What has changed is that it is knowledge, rather than a mere belief that the complainant is not or might not be consenting, that is mutually exclusive of the requisite mens rea for rape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]