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Nowadays, The Universal Serial Bus (USB) is one of the most adopted communication standards. However, the ubiquity of this technology has attracted the interest of attackers. This situation is alarming, considering that the USB protocol has penetrated even into critical infrastructures. Unfortunately, the majority of the contemporary security detection and prevention mechanisms against USB-specific attacks work at the application layer of the USB protocol stack and, therefore, can only provide partial protection, assuming that the host is not itself compromised. Toward this end, we propose a USB authentication system designed to identify (and possibly block) heterogeneous USB-based attacks directly from the physical layer. Empirical observations demonstrate that any extraneous/malicious activity initiated by malicious/compromised USB peripherals tends to consume additional electrical power. Driven by this observation, our proposed solution is based on the analysis of the USB power consumption patterns. Valuable power readings can easily be obtained directly by the power lines of the USB connector with low-cost, off-the-shelf equipment. Our experiments demonstrate the ability to effectively distinguish benign from malicious USB devices, as well as USB peripherals from each other, relying on the power side channel. At the core of our analysis lies an Autoencoder model that handles the feature extraction process; this process is paired with a long short-term memory (LSTM) and a convolutional neural network (CNN) model for detecting malicious peripherals. We meticulously evaluated the effectiveness of our approach and compared its effectiveness against various other shallow machine learning (ML) methods. The results indicate that the proposed scheme can identify USB devices as benign or malicious/counterfeit with a perfect F1-score. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]