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We exploit a fixed rule constraining central bank credit provision in a regression discontinuity framework to analyse counterparties' behavioural responses to the (non-)receipt of liquidity during a crisis. In spring 1847, the Bank of England suddenly started rationing credit to avoid violating its gold reserve requirement. We show that counterparties that suffered rejection from the Bank were more likely to fail. Conditional on survival, rationed counterparties learned from their experience and changed their behaviour during a subsequent panic in fall 1847: they came to the discount window more often, but submitted smaller requests and relied less on central bank liquidity overall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes a sectoral empirical model of money and credit in the UK that can be used for analysing unconventional monetary policies that affect banks' balance sheets. The paper uses the model to assess the impact of QE on the UK economy focussing on the endogenous portfolio response of banks, financial companies and non-financial companies. The baseline results support the quantitative estimates found by other studies, but suggest the impact of QE is sensitive to the assumption about whether and to what extent QE affects bank lending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes a sectoral empirical model of money and credit in the UK that can be used for analysing unconventional monetary policies that affect banks’ balance sheets. The paper uses the model to assess the impact of QE on the UK economy focussing on the endogenous portfolio response of banks, financial companies and non‐financial companies. The baseline results support the quantitative estimates found by other studies, but suggest the impact of QE is sensitive to the assumption about whether and to what extent QE affects bank lending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]