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This paper offers a prospectus of what might be achievable in the development of emotional recognition devices. It provides a conceptual overview of the free energy principle; including Markov blankets, active inference, and—in particular—a discussion of selfhood and theory of mind, followed by a brief explanation of how these concepts can explain both neural and cultural models of emotional inference. The underlying hypothesis is that emotion recognition and inference devices will evolve from state-of-the-art deep learning models into active inference schemes that go beyond marketing applications and become adjunct to psychiatric practice. Specifically, this paper proposes that a second wave of emotion recognition devices will be equipped with an emotional lexicon (or the ability to epistemically search for one), allowing the device to resolve uncertainty about emotional states by actively eliciting responses from the user and learning from these responses. Following this, a third wave of emotional devices will converge upon the user's generative model, resulting in the machine and human engaging in a reciprocal, prosocial emotional interaction, i.e., sharing a generative model of emotional states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Active inference is a normative framework for explaining behaviour under the free energy principle—a theory of self-organisation originating in neuroscience. It specifies neuronal dynamics for state-estimation in terms of a descent on (variational) free energy—a measure of the fit between an internal (generative) model and sensory observations. The free energy gradient is a prediction error—plausibly encoded in the average membrane potentials of neuronal populations. Conversely, the expected probability of a state can be expressed in terms of neuronal firing rates. We show that this is consistent with current models of neuronal dynamics and establish face validity by synthesising plausible electrophysiological responses. We then show that these neuronal dynamics approximate natural gradient descent, a well-known optimisation algorithm from information geometry that follows the steepest descent of the objective in information space. We compare the information length of belief updating in both schemes, a measure of the distance travelled in information space that has a direct interpretation in terms of metabolic cost. We show that neural dynamics under active inference are metabolically efficient and suggest that neural representations in biological agents may evolve by approximating steepest descent in information space towards the point of optimal inference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we develop a computational model of obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). We propose that OCD is characterized by a difficulty in relying on past events to predict the consequences of patients' own actions and the unfolding of possible events. Clinically, this corresponds both to patients' difficulty in trusting their own actions (and therefore repeating them), and to their common preoccupation with unlikely chains of events. Critically, we develop this idea on the basis of the well-developed framework of the Bayesian brain, where this impairment is formalized as excessive uncertainty regarding state transitions. We illustrate the validity of this idea using quantitative simulations and use these to form specific empirical predictions. These predictions are evaluated in relation to existing evidence, and are used to delineate directions for future research. We show how seemingly unrelated findings and phenomena in OCD can be explained by the model, including a persistent experience that actions were not adequately performed and a tendency to repeat actions; excessive information gathering (i.e., checking); indecisiveness and pathological doubt; overreliance on habits at the expense of goal-directed behavior; and overresponsiveness to sensory stimuli, thoughts, and feedback. We discuss the relationship and interaction between our model and other prominent models of OCD, including models focusing on harm-avoidance, not-just-right experiences, or impairments in goal-directed behavior. Finally, we outline potential clinical implications and suggest lines for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]