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This research aims to understand Muslims' perceptions and beliefs regarding sunnah fasting, with the research problem focusing on how sunnah fasts, such as the fasts of Arafat and Ashura, are understood and practised by Muslims to expiate minor sins and improve their spiritual quality. The research method used is a desk-top research, in which the researchers' collected and analysed relevant data, including the Qur'an, hadith, tafsir, scholarly articles, and other literature on sunnah fasting in Islam. The results showed that sunnah fasting has a vital role in the spiritual life of Muslims, with many benefits, including positive behavioural changes, improved discipline, and increased faith and piety. Sunnah fasting is believed to erase minor sins, thus encouraging Muslims to be more diligent in practising it. Social and environmental dynamics, such as family support, community, and lectures at mosques, play an essential role in influencing Muslims' perceptions and participation in sunnah fasting. Although there are differing interpretations among scholars regarding the ability of sunnah fasting to erase major sins, consensus suggests that sunnah fasting provides many spiritual and moral benefits. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of sunnah fasting and its role in shaping Muslim behaviour and spirituality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antognazza ("The Benefit to Philosophy", "The Distinction in Kind"), Dutant ("The Legend"), and I ("Knowledge Before Gettier") have argued for the historical falsity of the claim that, prior to Gettier's famous counterexamples of sixty years ago, the so-called 'traditional' conception of knowledge was the justified true belief (JTB) conception. This note addresses a related historical question that, rather surprisingly, has not yet been addressed in the philosophical literature; to wit: when did this claim first appear in this literature? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that $\neg p$ ¬ p and yet is sincere in asserting that $p$ p. I argue that the agent qualifies as sincere in asserting the contrary of what they in the most basic sense believe in virtue of asserting what they are committed to believing. It is only by recognizing such commitments and distinguishing them from the more basic beliefs whose rational regulation is automatic that the tension between the self-deceived agent's actions and assertions can be explained in a core subset of cases of self-deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In academic contexts, failure, as compared to success, is likely to threaten self-esteem and thus, to increase the risk of psychological disengagement from one's studies. The goal of the present research is to examine whether belief in school meritocracy (BSM) increases (vs. decreases) the effect of academic performance on self-esteem and psychological disengagement. In two pre-registered studies, university students reported their BSM. Their self-esteem and psychological disengagement were assessed following a manipulated (Study 1, N = 465) or actual (Study 2, N = 375) academic performance. Results indicated that, in both studies, BSM was positively related to performance self-esteem and negatively related to psychological disengagement. However, BSM also increased the effect of performance (manipulated or actual) on psychological disengagement. Indeed, failure led to more disengagement than success, but more so at a high level of BSM than at a lower level of BSM. The double-edge effects of belief in meritocracy are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I offer a detailed examination of Margaret Macdonald's response to the Cartesian sceptical argument from dreaming. I show that Macdonald's views were not well understood by her contemporaries, and I suggest that this misunderstanding has led to her omission from subsequent discussions of this subject. I end with a brief demonstration of the fact that Macdonald's central claims have re-emerged in contemporary epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kalemname is the property of Kalemname and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Green marketing in the hotel industry is no longer just an option. As awareness of environmental issues has increased, more consumers have began to prefer eco-friendly products, the so-called "green option" in relation to their behavioral intentions despite higher cost. Previous literatures focused on the relationship from green marketing to value, belief, and norm separately. However, this research applied green marketing to VBN simultaneously. The purpose of the study is to clarify whether hotels' green marketing activities have a significant effect on the actual behavioral intentions and decision making. The eleven 5-star hotels located in Seoul, South Korea were selected for the survey. The survey was via online due to COVID-19 (coronavirus disease) from August 15, 2020 to August 30, 2020. A total of 318 responses were used for analysis. This study conducted an empirical analysis using SPSS 22 and Amos 22. The result shows that hotels' green marketing has a positive impact via the VBN theory at large, though the relationships from recycling to norm and pro-environmental programs to value are less significant. In other words, variables such as recycling and energy saving as they pertain to direct behavioral intentions influence hotel customers' value and belief in psychological perspectives and indirect variables such as pro-environmental programs also influence customer's belief and norm but not as significantly for value. The results of this study are expected to help us understand which attributes affect behavioral intentions, especially in the hotel industry which is conducting green marketing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of the present reflection is Christian religious belief. Specifically, we will use Husserlian tools in order to examine the positional nature of this particular type of belief. We will be less interested in the question concerning the success conditions of this experience and more in its noetic structure. According to our proposal, to believe by faith supposes (although it is not exhausted by) accepting the existence of mundane evidence speaking against this fundamental belief. The believer acknowledges the existence of this contradicting en-doxical basis and nevertheless believes what she believes. We will refer to this simultaneous movement of accepting and cancelling as the concessive structure of the religious attitude. The para-doxical movement of experiencing conflicting evidence as being subjectively ineffective is a key component of this attitude. At least some inchoative conflict with the world is required in order for the religious belief to be religious. Lastly, we will try to show that, with a distinctive terminology, the idea that the Christian religious attitude involves a conflict between subjectivity and world is present not only in Kierkegaard but also in phenomenological figures like Scheler and even Husserl. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are 'token-reflexives', in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Human Ecosystem is defined "as a coherent system of biophysical and social factors capable of adaptation and sustainability over time" (Machlis et al., 1997). This social-ecological model consists of two portions: Critical Resources (Biophysical Resources, Socioeconomic Resources, and Cultural Resources) and Social Systems (Social Institutions, Social Order, and Cyles). In the Human Ecosystem, 'Beliefs' is a variable of Cultural Resources, which is one of three Critical Resources. As a representative of 'Beliefs' in Taiwan's human ecosystem, the political ideology of Taiwan independence is selected as a case study. The quantitative study uses the content analysis method with literature studies on Taiwan's politics, especially, on the issues of Taiwan independence are the main sources of data. The Human Ecosystem Model is adopted as the main analysis tool to take a new exploration of how the political ideology of Taiwan Independence integrates, manifests, and functions in Taiwan's human ecosystem. The study suggests that land, population, and political subsystems are the main variables that integrate the political ideology of Taiwan independence. Also, the study proposes that there is a visible relationship between beliefs and identity. Consequently, Taiwan's social institutions such as government, education, security, and defence are forced to interact according to the rise of the political ideology of Taiwan independence. Besides, indigenous peoples' governance focuses on solidifying the territorial and cultural background, which significantly strengthens the political ideology. The initial findings suggest that indigenous peoples' territories, cultural resources, and ideological security are key variables to solidify the political ideology of Taiwan independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Ippolito and Farkas (Linguist Philos, 45(4):943–984, 2022b) (I &F) question the premise that Italian future is epistemic necessity; in this brief response we want to show that there is no empirical motivation for abandoning it once we employ a more flexible framework of modality such as the one advanced in Giannakidou and Mari (Linguist Philos 41(6): 623–664, 2018) (G &M) which posits a ranking meta-evaluation in the modal structure that explains the empirical objections raised by I &F. We show that the core of the account in I &F shares the main ingredients with G &M and that, unlike what I &F propose, Italian future is not pure credence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epistemic akrasia describes a non-ideal situation in which an agent holds a belief like, “P, but my evidence does not support P.” It is controversial whether it is possible or rational to hold such an akratic belief. In this paper, I attempt to explain akratic beliefs in terms of an updated notion of yin and yang in Chinese philosophy. Epistemologists evaluate akratic beliefs as if they are the end of an inquiry or inference. Drawing from the updated notion of yin/yang in which yin is conceived as receptivity and yang is conceived as direct purpose (or impulsion), an akratic belief is shown to be an unstable, intermediate temporal belief state in the middle of the entire process. It is not the end result, rather, it is a transitional episode of an inquiry or inference in progress. Hence, it is the entire process to be evaluated rather than the temporal belief state in the middle of the process. Given this notion of yin/yang, an akratic belief illustrates that an agent is open-minded in the sense that she is receptive to evidence, which motivates her to proceed through further investigation. Ultimately, the socalled akratic beliefs are segments of a diachronic process of belief concatenation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between inquiry and epistemology? Are epistemic norms the norms that guide us as inquirers—as agents in the pursuit of knowledge and understanding? Recently, there has been growing support for what I, following Friedman (Philosophical Review 129(4):501–536, 2020), will call the zetetic turn in epistemology, the view that all epistemic norms are norms of inquiry. This paper investigates the prospects of an inquiry-centered approach to epistemology and develops several motivations for resisting it. First, I argue that the norms of inquiry are most plausibly seen as practical, not as distinctively epistemic. Second, I argue that a zetetically-grounded epistemology is unable to properly account for the rationality of belief. It fails to account for cases where intuitively irrational beliefs promote inquiry, or where intuitively rational beliefs are zetetically useless or counterproductive to inquiry. The main upshot is this: there must be a source of epistemic normativity that isn't ultimately zetetic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the thesis of doxastic wronging, our beliefs can non-derivatively wrong others. A recent criticism of this view claims that proponents of the doxastic wronging thesis have no principled grounds for denying that credences can likewise non-derivatively wrong, so they must countenance pervasive conflicts between morality and epistemic rationality. This paper defends the thesis of doxastic wronging from this objection by arguing that belief bears distinctive relationships to inquiry and blame that can explain why beliefs, but not credences, can non-derivatively wrong. First, forming a belief (but not updating one's credence) closes inquiry, and suspending judgment (but not updating one's credence) opens inquiry. Consequently, beliefs can distinctively wrong others by prematurely closing inquiry or inappropriately opening inquiry. Second, beliefs (but not credences) can constitute blame. Unfittingly blaming someone can wrong them, and hence beliefs which constitute unfitting blame can distinctively wrong. In addition to defending the claim that only beliefs can non-derivatively wrong, this paper gestures towards an ethics of belief which attends to the relationship between belief and attitudes such as inquiry, faith, trust, and blame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the question of whether and under what conditions teaching open-mindedness to students could have negative effects. While there has been much discussion in the literature about the potential downsides of being open-minded, the question of whether teaching this trait to young, untutored minds could result in more negative effects than positive has received little attention. Yet, given that a primary focus of the literature is providing models for use in educational contexts, exploring the potential risks of encouraging students to emulate such models is imperative. In this regard, the article presents three concerns. The first is that students may lack the full intellectual character to avoid the pitfalls of open-mindedness that have already been noted in the literature. The second concern is that students who exercise open-mindedness may incur social costs that cannot be compensated for by epistemic goods. The third concern is that educators, particularly at universities, often face certain non-ideal conditions that may make it difficult for them to effectively cultivate open-mindedness in students. I ultimately conclude that, in light of these concerns, we should approach teaching for open-mindedness with great caution. However, we should not avoid it altogether. Preliminary suggestions are offered on how instructors may attune their approach to teaching for open-mindedness to mitigate the identified concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how everyday concerns related to Irish emigration are symbolically addressed in a range of supernatural legends documented in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It seeks to illuminate how uncanny tales that feature emigrants departing from Ireland relate to the shared worlds of meaning of those who told and listened to them, showing how legends about affliction and miraculous abundance both draw on and construct cultural scripts. It also considers stories that articulate and reinforce traditional ideas about community members who were said to be abducted by the fairies and living in their midst. This was just one aspect of supernatural beliefs that was condemned as part of a larger rationalist and religious campaign by the Catholic Church and others to root out vernacular customs or "superstition," a theme that informs a number of legends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I have proposed wedding the theories of belief known as dispositionalism and interpretivism. Krzysztof Poslajko objects that dispositionalism does just fine on its own and, moreover, is better off without interpretivism's metaphysical baggage. I argue that Poslajko is wrong: in order to secure a principled criterion for individuating beliefs, dispositionalism must either collapse into psychofunctionalism (or some other non-superficial theory) or accept interpretivism's hand in marriage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various philosophers authors have argued—on the basis of powerful examples—that we can have compelling moral or practical reasons to believe, even when the evidence suggests otherwise. This paper explores an alternative story, which still aims to respect widely shared intuitions about the motivating examples. Specifically, the paper proposes that what is at stake in these cases is not belief, but rather acceptance—an attitude classically characterized as taking a proposition as a premise in practical deliberation and action. I suggest that acceptance's theoretical usefulness in the ethics of belief has been hidden by its psychological obscurity. I thus aim to develop an empirically adequate and mechanistically specific psychological profile of acceptance. I characterize acceptance as centrally involving a cognitive gating function, in which we prevent a target belief state from having its characteristic downstream effects on reasoning, cognition, and action, and restructure those downstream processes. I then argue that there is substantial empirical support for the existence of the cognitive mechanisms needed to instantiate this view, coming from the science of emotion regulation. I argue that acceptance involves deploying the same mechanisms used in emotional response modulation to belief states: acceptance is doxastic response modulation. I then propose that having a better understanding of the psychological profile of acceptance leaves us better positioned to appreciate its potential usefulness for making progress on various puzzles within the ethics of belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a series of papers, Schwitzgebel has attempted to revive the dispositionalist account of belief by tweaking it a little and claiming a previously unconsidered advantage over representationalism. The tweaks are to include phenomenal and cognitive responses, in addition to overt behaviour, in the manifestations of a given belief; and to soften the account of dispositions by allowing for dispositional stereotypes. The alleged advantage is that dispositionalism can deal with what Schwitzgebel calls cases of in‐between belief, whereas representationalism cannot. In this paper we argue that Schwitzgebel's attempted improvements do not succeed and that, as an account of belief, dispositionalism is seen to be unsatisfactory. The case for this verdict also enables the representationalist position to be enhanced by drawing attention to the diversity of formats in which beliefs are stored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When are we obligated to believe someone? To what extent are people authorities about their own experiences? What kind of harm might we enact when we doubt? Questions like these lie at the heart of many debates in social and feminist epistemology, and they're the driving issue behind a key conceptual framework in these debates—gaslighting. But while the concept of gaslighting has provided fruitful insight, it's also proven somewhat difficult to adjudicate, and seems prone to over-application. In what follows, I argue that Katherine Hawley's theory of trust can provide a useful alternative lens for looking at contested testimony. To do this, I focus on a particularly complex—but increasingly popular—application of gaslighting: the physician/patient relationship, and the idea of 'medical gaslighting'. I argue that, even though patients can experience harm when they are disbelieved, there are nevertheless good reasons for physicians not to trust patients about at least some of their own narratives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yeni Üroloji Dergisi is the property of Ali Ihsan Tasci and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Asthma is a disease characterized by the narrowing of the airways and resulting shortness of breath. Anxiety is a condition that is frequently observed in patients with asthma and causes worsening of symptoms. Coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) has influenced the mental health of many individuals. 'The aim of this study is to determine the anxiety levels of asthma patients during the pandemic period and to reveal the contribution of these patients' metacognition to anxiety'. This study was planned retrospectively Twenty-eight asthma patients were evaluated for asthmatic symptoms and anxiety levels. before the COVID-19 pandemic and 28 healthy controls were included. During the COVID-19 pandemic, patients were re-evaluated for asthmatic symptoms and anxiety levels. The Asthma Control Test (ACT), Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) and Metacognition Scale-30 (MCS) were applied to all participants to evaluate levels of asthmatic symptoms, anxiety and metacognitive beliefs. During the pandemic, while patients' ACT scores increased significantly (p=0.011), the BAI score decreased significantly (p=0.039), compared to the pre-pandemic values. BAI score was negatively correlated with pre- and post-pandemic ACT scores (p=0.029, p=0.006, respectively). During the pandemic, patients' BAI score and "need to control thoughts" subscale score of MCS-30 were found significantly higher than those of controls (p=0.003). Additionally, patients' anxiety levels during the pandemic were correlated with the metacognitive scale score (p=0.036). Asthma symptoms were observed to remit, and anxiety levels to decrease during the pandemic in asthma patients, compared to the pre-pandemic values. Patients' anxiety levels during the pandemic were found higher than those of controls. Therefore, we consider that current anxiety is related to metacognitive beliefs, and our study findings are important in terms of understanding anxiety developing in asthma patients during the pandemic and reflecting the findings to psychotherapeutic modalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper articulates and defends a novel view of the strict distinction that Aristotle makes between human and non-human mental life. We examine two crucially relevant but overlooked arguments that turn on the human capacity for reasoning and inference (syl/logismos) to reconstruct his view of what makes some cognitive processes rational and how they differ from non-rational counterparts. A creature is rational just in case its occurrent cognitive states exhibit a sequential coherence wherein prior cognitive activity constrains subsequent activity for the sake of attaining truth. Processes are rational, then, in virtue of how constituent states relate to each other, not whether any given state involves some peculiar content or grasps some distinct object. This study aids, but does not exhaust, a systematic examination of the rational soul in Aristotle's writing, based on (a) the human/animal comparisons through which he often elucidates rational cognitive capacities and (b) the distinctions that he draws between elements of rational cognition and non-rational counterparts in terms of what minimally suffices to distinguish between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I defend the claim that justification is closed under conjunction, and confront its most alarming consequence — that one can have justification for believing propositions that are unlikely to be true, given one's evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human has built-in faith in Myth and culture. The man who myths are people's constant belief from ancient times. Trusting the habits followed by the ancestors and making them a reality in the current scenario. Making way for facts and turning them to lie as the myth which people believed shows in the limelight was the view of Barthes in his writings. Comparing the reality and showing the outcome of it either to trust or it simply a fact which a normal man can understand. In Mythologies, Barthes shows people's belief in the unrealistic or unanswerable quest for having faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific-consensus communication is among the most promising interventions to minimize the gap between experts' and the public's belief in scientific facts. There is, however, discussion about its effectiveness in changing consensus perceptions and beliefs about contested science topics. This preregistered meta-analysis assessed the effects of communicating the existence of scientific consensus on perceived scientific consensus and belief in scientific facts. Combining 43 experiments about climate change, genetically modified food, and vaccination, we found that a single exposure to consensus messaging had a positive effect on perceived scientific consensus (g = 0.55) and on belief in scientific facts (g = 0.12). Consensus communication yielded very similar effects for climate change and genetically modified food, whereas the low number of experiments about vaccination prevented conclusions regarding this topic. Although these effects are small, communicating scientific consensus appears to be an effective way to change factual beliefs about contested science topics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the possible existence of doctrines in modern Paganism. Generally, Pagan studies scholars widely consider modern Paganism a religion without doctrines. Furthermore, Margot Adler, one of the early researchers of modern Paganism, established a narrative that practice is more important than beliefs in modern Paganism. However, based on ethnographic research conducted among modern European Pagans between 2014 and 2017, along with additional secondary data, this article argues that doctrines may emerge in situations of pressure or conflict, or while delineating boundaries and gatekeeping Paganism against other religions. In such situations, beliefs become enforced and turn into the basis of potential doctrines. Doctrines are authoritatively defined theoretical components of religion, comprising teaching, beliefs, and confessions. Their authoritative character has its historical roots in Christianity and tries to keep the doctrinal contents fixed using a dynamic of truth and falsity, which determines orthodoxy--distinguishing right faith from error. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study is to examine the effect of educational movies on the pedagogical beliefs of pre-service teachers. The study was conducted using phenomenology design, one of the qualitative research designs. In the study, 12 educational movies were used. Criterion sampling, one of the purposeful sampling methods, was used in the study. 25 first-year pre-service teachers were included in the study. Each week a movie was watched and pedagogically and critically oriented discussions were held about the movie. Weekly evaluations were obtained through pre-service teachers' written reports. A semi-structured interview form and movie evaluation reports filled out by pre-service teachers were used as data collection tools. The data obtained from the interviews and movie evaluation reports before and after the implementation were analyzed comparatively and transformed into findings. When the findings were analyzed, it was concluded that there were changes in pre-service teachers' knowledge, skills, attitudes and awareness levels towards the teaching profession. In general, it is thought that educational movies may have an effect on pre-service teachers' pedagogical beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many authors distinguish belief from acceptance, it seems almost universally agreed that no similar distinction can be drawn between degrees of belief, or credences, and degrees of acceptance. I challenge this assumption in this paper. Acceptance comes in degrees and acknowledging this helps to resolve problems in at least two philosophical domains. Degrees of acceptance play vital roles when we simplify our reasoning, and they ground the common ground of a conversation if we assume context probabilism, i.e. that the common ground must be represented with probability spaces rather than possible worlds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The practice of Occultism knows no place and time. Even though the world has undergone radical changes marked by advances in science and technology, there are still people who want to practice Occultism. Many of these occult practices are generally inherited from their ancestors and passed down from generation to generation until now. Many Christians carry out Occult actions for various reasons, such as fear of ancestral spirits, not being protected by them, or feeling that ancestral spirits do not bless them. Occult practices are actions that are far from Christian truth. The occult does exist on this earth. The purpose of this study is to analyze the current occult practice. The method used is qualitative research in the form of library research method. Therefore, a believer must be vigilant and on guard to avoid this occult practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A question of recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind is that of how belief and credence relate to each other. A number of philosophers argue for a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, what it is to have a credence just is to have a particular kind of belief—that is, a belief whose content involves probabilities or epistemic modals. Here, I argue against the belief-first view: specifically, I argue that it cannot account for agents who have credences in propositions that they barely comprehend. I conclude that, no matter how credences differ from beliefs, they do not differ in virtue of adding additional content to the believed proposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship of the French philosopher Roland Barthes (1915-1980) to religion, specifically Christianity. For this purpose, I will examine the presence of religion as motivation, object, and theme in Barthes’s philosophical works as well as some of his personal writings. In conclusion, I will show that Christianity is present throughout his work and has importance for understanding his perspective as an author. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Karma is the notion that one's current actions will have consequences in the future. The present research links the belief in karma with a guilt appeal and examines how believing in karma influences the individuals' donation behaviors. The results of four studies demonstrate that for people who hold a strong belief in karma, guilt appeals can arouse the motivation to engage in prosocial activities to remedy past demerits. This "remedy demerits" motivation is the reason why individuals who hold a strong (vs. weak) belief in karma are more likely to donate time (rather than money) and donate money in lump sums (rather than in installments) when the charitable appeal is framed in terms of guilt. Our findings contribute to the literature on specific beliefs, individuals' prosocial behaviors, and the motivations of individuals who believe in karma as concerns their responses to charitable appeals. Charitable organizations can apply the findings by targeting their donor solicitations to individuals who believe in karma to enhance engagement in prosocial activities, and by using karma priming advertisements to induce individuals to think karmically, thus more efficiently promoting specific donation choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will present a puzzle for logical analyses, such as Russell's analysis of definite descriptions and Recanati's analysis of 'that'-clauses. I will argue that together with Kripke's disquotational principles connecting sincere assent and belief such non-trivial logical analyses lead to contradictions. Following this, I will compare the puzzle about logical analysis with Frege's puzzle about belief ascriptions. We will see that although the two puzzles do have similarities, the solutions to Frege's puzzle cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to the puzzle about logical analysis. Hence, to say it with Kripke, the main thesis of this paper is that the puzzle is a puzzle. A complete solution to the puzzle promises a better understanding of both logical analyses and belief ascriptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We hypothesize that there are two mechanisms by which religion can affect prosocial behaviors. Being reminded about religion can induce prosocial behaviors through an external, triggering effect. The underlying beliefs can have an effect through internal mechanisms. To untangle these competing effects, a lab‐in‐the‐field experiment was conducted in West Africa in which we asked people participating in a survey if they would like to donate their participation fee to a local charity. We randomly assigned respondents a question asking about belief in heaven and hell. We also vary the donation price to test whether there are limits on the prosocial behaviors. We find that the trigger has no effect on the decision to donate, but that belief in heaven/hell has a positive, large, statistically significant effect on the likelihood of donations. Religious belief does encourage prosocial behavior but those effects dissipate as the opportunity cost of giving increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Event concepts are unstructured atomic concepts that apply to event types. A paradigm example of such an event type would be that of diaper changing, and so a putative example of an atomic event concept would be DADDY'S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER. I will defend two claims about such concepts. First, the conceptual claim that it is in principle possible to possess a concept such as DADDY'S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER without possessing the concept DIAPER. Second, the empirical claim that we actually possess such concepts and that they play an important role in our cognitive lives. The argument for the empirical claim has the form of an inference to the best explanation and is aimed at those who are already willing to attribute concepts and beliefs to infants and nonhuman animals. Many animals and prelinguistic infants seem capable of re-identifying event-types in the world, and they seem to store information about things happening at particular times and places. My account offers a plausible model of how such organisms are able to do this without attributing linguistically structured mental states to them. And although language allows adults to form linguistically structured mental representations of the world, there is no good reason to think that such structured representations necessarily replace the unstructured ones. There is also no good reason for a philosopher who is willing to explain the behavior of an organism by appealing to atomic concepts of individuals or kinds to not use a similar form of explanation when explaining the organism's capacity to recognize events. We can form empirical concepts of individuals, kinds, properties, event-types, and states of affairs, among other things, and I assume that such concepts function like what François Recanati calls 'mental files' or what Ruth Millikan calls 'substance concepts' (Recanati 2012; Millikan 1999, 2000, 2017). To possess such a concept one must have a reliable capacity to re-identify the object in question, but this capacity of re-identification does not fix the reference of the concept. Such concepts allow us to collect and utilize useful information about things that we re-encounter in our environment. We can distinguish between a perception-action system and a perception-belief system, and I will argue that empirical concepts, including atomic event concepts, can play a role in both systems. The perception-action system involves the application of concepts in the service of (often skilled) action. We can think of the concept as a mental file containing motor-plans that can be activated once the individual recognizes that they are in a certain situation. In this way, recognizing something (whether an object or an event) as a token of a type, plays a role in guiding immediate action. The perception-belief system, in contrast, allows for the formation of beliefs that can play a role in deliberation and planning and in the formation of expectations. I distinguish between two particular types of belief which I call where-beliefs and when-beliefs, and I argue that we can model the formation of such perceptual beliefs in nonlinguistic animals and human infants in terms of the formation of a link between an empirical concept and a position on a cognitive map. According to the account offered, seemingly complex beliefs, such as a baby's belief that Daddy changed her diaper in the kitchen earlier, will not be linguistically structured. If we think that prelinguistic infants possess such concepts and are able to form such beliefs, it is likely that adults do too. The ability to form such beliefs does not require the capacity for public language, and we can model them in nonlinguistic terms; thus, we have no good reason to think of such beliefs as propositional attitudes. Of course, we can use sentences to refer to such beliefs, and thus it is possible to think of such beliefs as somehow relations to propositions. But it is not clear to me what is gained by this as we have a perfectly good way to think about the structure of such beliefs that does not involve any appeal to language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What should advocates of phenomenal intentionality say about unconscious intentional states? I approach this question by focusing on a recent debate between Tim Crane and David Pitt, about the nature of belief. Crane argues that beliefs are never conscious. Pitt, concerned that the phenomenal intentionality thesis coupled with a commitment to beliefs as essentially unconscious embroils Crane in positing unconscious phenomenology, counter-argues that beliefs are essentially conscious. I examine and rebut Crane's arguments for the essential unconsciousness of beliefs, some of which are widely endorsed. On the way I sketch a model of how belief states could participate in the stream of consciousness. I then consider Pitt's position, arguing in reply, along Freudian lines, that we should posit not just dispositional but occurrent unconscious beliefs. This result, I argue, indeed requires advocates of phenomenal intentionality to posit unconscious qualia to fix these unconscious occurrent thoughts, and I defend the coherence of the notion of unconscious qualia against some common attacks. Ultimately, I claim, the combination of taking seriously the occurrent unconscious, and a commitment to phenomenal intentionality, should lead us to expand William James's conception of the stream of consciousness to encompass, additionally, a stream of unconscious mental life—or, perhaps better, to posit a single partly conscious partly unconscious qualia-stream of mental goings-on. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Metaethical expressivism is typically characterised as the view that normative statements express desire-like attitudes instead of beliefs. However, in this paper I argue that expressivists should claim that normative statements express beliefs in normative propositions, and not merely in some deflationary sense but in a theoretically robust sense explicated by a theory of propositional attitudes. I first argue that this can be achieved by combining an interpretationist understanding of belief with a nonfactualist view of normative belief content. This results in a view I call 'interpretative expressivism'. I then argue that traditional arguments employed by expressivists that normative statements express noncognitive attitudes can just as well support the claim that normative statements express nonfactual or nonrepresentational beliefs. Finally, I argue that this view has a number of advantages to versions of expressivism that deny that normative statements express non-deflationary normative beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops an account that connects the value of knowledge to socially situated agency twice over. We value the exercise of agency in connection with outcomes we value, and true belief is such an outcome. But true belief is valuable to us because belief is the form of information-possession most directly suited to feed into the interpersonal dimensions of our agency, both epistemic and otherwise. In the first place, the credit-worthiness approach to the value of knowledge locates that value in the broad domain of epistemic agency. An account in terms of the exercise of epistemic agency puts us in position to address criticisms of the creditworthiness account by mobilizing insights from feminist work on relational autonomy. Meanwhile, epistemic agency is an essential component of agency tout court. Effective action requires information. If our agency is paradigmatically exercised in socially embedded contexts, our information must be in substantial measure communicable in sentences--that is, it must take the form of beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne have recently presented a thought experiment—Mirror Man—designed to refute internalist theories of belief and content. We distinguish five ways in which the case can be interpreted and argue that on none does it refute internalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this reply to Bart Schuurman's response to my two-part article "Bringing Religiosity Back In: Critical Reflection on the Explanation of Western Homegrown Religious Terrorism," I address how we are speaking at cross-purposes and this leads to misunderstandings. When it comes to discussions of the role of religiosity in motivating jihadist terrorism this situation is common, and hence it is instructive to reexamine how we agree and disagree. Relative to some other prominent scholars, we agree that religiosity can play a role in radicalization and that the level of someone's religious knowledge is a poor way of determining this on a case-by-case basis. Schuurman implies incorrectly, however, that I treat people's beliefs as a sufficient explanation for their violent actions. My critique focuses instead on his reliance (with his coauthor John Horgan) on a modern Western privatized conception of religion that reduces the religio-political commitments of Western jihadists to "personal" (i.e., largely psychological) motivations, when religious motivations, which are intrinsically social, play a more independent role in the social ecology of radicalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emotion is an essential component of human nature, and therefore it is necessary to explore the issue of a desirable emotional state if we want to properly discuss human well-being. This article examines the issue by advocating a new understanding of the Zhuangzi's 莊子 ideas on emotion. In terms of the Zhuangzi's ideas on the desirable emotional state, scholars have presented various interpretations to date, even arguing that the ideas themselves are mutually contradictory or inconsistent. This article shows that the Zhuangzi's ideas about emotions are in fact consistent by dividing emotions into two types: "conventional knowledge-dependent emotions" and "true knowledge-dependent emotions." It then examines the characteristics of a desirable emotional state and the conditions necessary to reach it and explores the implications of the Zhuangzi's ideas for discussions on well-being in modern times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

L'électrohypersensibilité (EHS) est un phénomène, apparu dans les années 1980, qui semble attribuer la survenue de certains symptômes à une exposition aux champs électromagnétiques (CEM). Depuis cette apparition, le nombre de cas n'a cessé d'augmenter, laissant imaginer une sorte de contagion. Cependant, le lien de corrélation entre exposition et apparition des symptômes a été testé à de nombreuses reprises et n'a jamais été confirmé. L'hypothèse qu'un effet psychogénique, l'effet nocebo, pouvait être à l'œuvre a alors pris corps, amenant avec elle une prise de conscience quant à notre exposition sans cesse croissante à des informations anxiogènes sur la présence des CEM. Ce contexte d'attentes négatives démultiplie l'action de l'effet nocebo, déjà contagieux en lui-même, mais n'explique pas, à lui seul, le cheminement d'une majorité des victimes chez qui la survenue des symptômes a précédé la connaissance d'un possible effet nocif des CEM. Différents travaux ont montré que dans ce dernier cas, il pourrait s'agir d'un phénomène de mauvaise attribution des symptômes. Les victimes, laissées sans réponse par la communauté médicale, vont se mettre en recherche d'une cause et seront confrontées à l'orientation du marché cognitif vers les CEM. Cette confrontation sera d'autant plus déséquilibrée que la victime ignore qu'elle est soumise à de nombreux biais cognitifs dans sa manière d'appréhender les informations qui lui sont proposées. Dès lors que l'attribution est constituée, l'effet nocebo pourra à nouveau entrer en jeu et venir consolider la sensation, pour la personne, d'être atteinte d'EHS. Quel que soit le cheminement, la victime entre dans un cercle vicieux duquel il apparaît très compliqué de s'extraire. Electro-hypersensitivity (EHS) is a phenomenon that emerged in the 1980s and which seems to attribute the occurrence of some symptoms to an exposure to electromagnetic fields (EMF). Since it has appeared, the number of cases has not stopped increasing, suggesting some kind of contagion. However, the correlation between exposure and the onset of symptoms has been tested repeatedly and has never been confirmed. The hypothesis that a psychogenic effect named the "nocebo effect" could be at work then took shape, bringing us to an awareness of our ever-increasing exposure to anxiety-inducing news about the presence of EMFs. This context of negative expectations reinforces the action of the nocebo effect (an effect which is inherently contagious) but does not, in itself, explain the path of a majority of victims in whom the onset of symptoms preceded knowledge of a possible harmful effect of EMFs. Different studies have shown that in the latter case, it could be a phenomenon of wrong attribution of symptoms. The victims, left unanswered by the medical community, will seek a cause and will be confronted with the orientation of the cognitive market towards EMF. This confrontation will be all the more unbalanced as the victim is unaware that it is subject to many cognitive biases in its way of understanding the information offered to it. Once the attribution is established, the nocebo effect can again come into play and strengthen the feeling of being a victim of EHS. Whatever the path, the victim enters a vicious circle from which it appears very complicated to escape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most venerable and enduring intuitions in epistemology concerns the relationship between true belief and knowledge. Famously articulated by Socrates, it holds that true belief does not suffice for knowledge. I discuss a matching intuition about ignorance according to which true belief does not suffice for the absence of ignorance. I argue that the latter intuition undercuts the New View of Ignorance (according to which ignorance is the absence of true belief) and supports the Standard View of Ignorance (according to which ignorance is the absence of knowledge). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that there is at least one genuine state of besire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text discusses three documentary films (a fake documentary, an episode of a scientific documentary series and a documentary on flat-Earthers) to discuss the limits of knowledge and belief for scientific discourse, and how psychoanalysis enters this debate by insisting in the presence of a subject (a subject of the signifier, not the psychological subjectivity). This, in turn, reflects on a political task for documentary cinema: to assume a subjective position, insofar as they are not films that are true or manipulative, but films about the structural place of Truth, and as such, they reflect on the gap between knowledge and belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a previously unexamined factor instrumental in learning vocabulary accounting for the differences between learning a native and a foreign language: the development of critical thinking in adolescence. We hypothesize that the difficulties experienced in foreign vocabulary development result from the learner’s readiness to question new information. Following Gilbert’s (1991) claim that rigorous critical thought is the last to emerge and children are prone to accept propositions uncritically, we suggest that it is to this absence of doubt that children owe their success in remembering lexical items after a single exposure, a phenomenon referred to as fast mapping. The rationale is that the mental belief systems are memory’s filtering mechanism for what to retain: information labelled as questionable is allowed to decay without being granted access to long-term memory. We present the results of an experiment suggesting that memory of new language forms is enhanced by the learner’s conviction in their validity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]