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This study investigated whether perspective-taking reduces belief bias independently of argument strength. Belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favourably than belief-inconsistent arguments. Undergraduates (n = 93) read arguments that varied with respect to belief-consistency (i.e., belief-consistent or belief-inconsistent) and strength (i.e., strong or weak) about the topic of climate change. After participants read each argument, those in the perspective-taking condition rated the argument's strength from a perspective of a climate scientist and then from their own perspectives, whereas those in the no perspective-taking condition only rated the arguments from their own perspectives. Perspective-taking eliminated belief bias for weak arguments, but not for strong arguments. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed, and directions for future research are provided.

This mixed methods study investigated high school students’ evaluations of scientific arguments. Myside bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent information more favorably than belief-inconsistent information. In the quantitative phase, participants (n = 72 males) rated belief-consistent arguments more favorably than belief-inconsistent arguments; however, they also rated strong arguments more favorably than weak arguments, which indicated they did not evaluate the arguments exclusively on whether they were belief-consistent. In the follow-up qualitative phase, we conducted interviews with purposefully-sampled students who showed either higher or lower levels of myside bias. Results indicated that students in both groups applied normative evaluation criteria to the arguments. However, students who showed little or no myside bias applied the same evaluation criteria to arguments independent of whether they were belief-consistent, whereas students who showed high levels of myside bias applied different evaluation criteria to belief-inconsistent arguments. These findings suggest that procedural and conceptual metacognition may play a role in the extent to which individuals reason independent of their beliefs.