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This paper opens a critical conversation about the ethics of international bioethics conferencing and proposes principles that commit to being anti-discriminatory, global, and inclusive. We launch this conversation in the Section, Case Study, with a case example involving the International Association of Bioethics' (IAB's) selection of Qatar to host the 2024 World Congress of Bioethics. IAB's choice of Qatar sparked controversy. We believe it also may reveal deeper issues of Islamophobia in bioethics. The Section, Principles for International Bioethics Conferencing, sets forth and defends proposed principles for international bioethics conferencing. The Section, Applying Principles to Site Selection applies the proposed principles to the case example. The Section, Applying Principles Beyond Site Selection addresses other applications of the proposed principles. The Section, Objections responds to objections. We close (in the Section, Conclusion) by calling for a wider discussion of our proposed principles. One-Sentence Capsule Summary: How should bioethicists navigate the ethics of global bioethics conferencing?

In 2022, the International Association of Bioethics (IAB) announced that the 17th World Congress of Bioethics would be held in Doha, Qatar. In response to ethical concerns expressed about the Qatar selection, the IAB Board of Directors developed and posted to the IAB website a response using a Q&A format. In this Letter, we (the IAB President and Vice President) address concerns about the ethics of bioethics conferencing raised in a 2023 Letter to the Editor of Bioethics by Van der Graaf et al. We do not represent the Board of Directors, and this Letter expresses solely our own views., (© 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Across sub-Saharan Africa, bioethics is an emerging field of scholarly inquiry, informed by contextual features distinct to the region. A cultural mix comprised of Euro-American influences, indigenous traditions, Christian faiths and Muslim communities, a bioethics for the sub-Saharan region must be responsive to this milieu. This paper asks, what values and methods can best promote the practice of bioethics in Africa? We set forth a strategy that leans one way or another in response to contextual features of a particular setting. Since our aim is to be responsive to context, we begin with a series of cases and develop values and methods in response to each case as we work through its ethical analysis. Section I introduces a case involving setting priorities for public funding of services that produce large benefits for a small group of people, using the example of dialysis in Ghana. Section II presents a situation involving determining the permissibility of a double standard of quality for healthcare devices in rich and poor nations, using the example of explanting pacemakers from deceased people in wealthy nations for use by people in low- and middle-income nations. Section III describes a scenario where international groups clash with religious and spiritual healers over the chaining of people with severe mental illness at prayer camps and healing centers in Ghana. Section IV articulates a three-pronged strategy for engaging in bioethics brought to light by the case analyses and defends it against objections. Throughout the paper, we tag certain views 'African' and others 'Western' to indicate ethical beliefs commonly found in these regions and less commonly found elsewhere. We do not mean to imply that all Africans hold a certain ethical stance or that all Westerners do; nor do we mean to suggest that people outside these regions do not hold the views in question., (© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Previously, we introduced a capability approach to assess the responsible use of brain-computer interface. In this commentary, we say more about the ethical basis of our capability view and respond to three objections. The first objection holds that by stressing that capability lists are provisional and subject to change, we threaten the persistence of human dignity, which is tied to capabilities. The second objection states that we conflate capabilities and abilities. The third objection claims that the goal of using neuroenhancements should be preserving capabilities, not altering them., Author(s): Nancy S. Jecker [sup.1] [sup.2] [sup.3], Andrew Ko [sup.4] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.34477.33, 0000000122986657, Department of Bioethics and Humanities, University of Washington School of Medicine, , Box 357120, 1959 [...]

AbstractThis paper argues that bioethics as a field should broaden its scope to include the ethics of war, focusing on war’s public health effects. The “Introduction” section describes the bioethics literature on war, which emphasizes clinical and research topics while omitting public health. The section, “War as a public health crisis” demonstrates the need for a public health ethics approach by framing war as a public health crisis. The section, “Bioethics principles for war and public health” proposes six bioethics principles for war that address its public health dimensions: health justice, accountability, dignified lives, public health sustainability, nonmaleficence, and public health maximization. The section, “Justifying and applying bioethical principles” shows how these principles inform ethical analysis, including just war theory and military ethics. The section, “From principles to practice” envisions ways in which bioethicists can promote these principles in practice through research, teaching, and service. The “Conclusion” section urges bioethicists to engage with war as a public health crisis, including calling attention to war’s impact on civilians, especially women, children, and other vulnerable groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper replies to a commentary by John-Stewart Gordon on our paper, 'The Moral Standing of Social Robots: Untapped Insights from Africa.' In the original paper, we set forth an African relational view of personhood and show its implications for the moral standing of social robots. This reply clarifies our position and answers three objections. The objections concern (1) the ethical significance of intelligence, (2) the meaning of 'pro-social,' and (3) the justification for prioritizing humans over pro-social robots., Author(s): Nancy S. Jecker [sup.1] [sup.2], Caesar A. Atiure [sup.3], Martin Odei Ajei [sup.3] [sup.4] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.34477.33, 0000000122986657, Department of Bioethics and Humanities, University of Washington School of [...]

Social isolation and loneliness are growing concerns around the globe that put people at increased risk of disease and early death. One much‐touted approach to addressing them is deploying artificially intelligent agents to serve as companions for socially isolated and lonely people. Focusing on digital humans, we consider evidence and ethical arguments for and against this approach. We set forth and defend public health policies that respond to concerns about replacing humans, establishing inferior relationships, algorithmic bias, distributive justice, and data privacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on practical fields like bioethics. Topics include addressing cutting-edge challenges like human-brain organoids, artificial intelligence (AI), and interspecies chimeras; and concern arises specifically when individuals lack intellectual capacities that Western views deem necessary for personhood, such as sentience, consciousness, autonomy, and rationality.

Global scarcity of COVID‐19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID‐19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case‐based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, contributing to global disparities of COVID‐19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID‐19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This letter replies to the letter "Colonial and Neocolonial Barriers to Companion Digital Humans in Africa," by Luís Cordeiro‐Rodrigues, in the same, May‐June 2024, issue of the Hastings Center Report. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While people are still alive, we owe them respect. Yet what, if anything, do we owe the newly dead? This question is an urgent practical concern for aged societies, because older people die at higher rates than any other age group. One novel way in which Japan, the frontrunner of aged societies, meets its need to accommodate high numbers of newly dead is itai hoteru or corpse hotels. Itai hoteru offer families a way to wait for space in over‐crowded crematoriums while affording an environment conducive to grieving. Drawing on conversations with itai hoteru employees, we delineate the values this contemporary death practice expresses and show how these values comprise part of the broader idea of a good death. A good death implies duties on both sides of death's divide: to both the dying and the newly dead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should healthcare systems prepare to care for growing numbers and proportions of older people? Older people generally suffer worse health than younger people do. Should societies take steps to reduce age-related health inequalities? Some express concern that doing so would increase age-related inequalities in healthcare. This paper addresses this debate by (1) presenting an argument in support of three principles for distributing scarce resources between age groups; (2) framing these principles of age group justice in terms of life stages; and (3) indicating policy implications that merit further attention in light of rapidly aging societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do neurosurgical procedures ever result in the patient prior to the procedure not being identical with the individual who wakes up postsurgery in the hospital bed? We address this question by offering an analysis of the persistence of persons that emphasizes narrative, rather than numerical, identity. We argue that a narrative analysis carries the advantage of highlighting what matters to patients in their ordinary lives, explaining the varying degrees of persistence of personal identity, and enhancing our understanding of patients' experiences. We illustrate these points in cases involving temporal lobectomy for treatment of refractory epilepsy and deep brain stimulation for refractory Parkinson's disease. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Clarifies the author's previous proposal of a patient benefit-centered definition of medical futility that included both quantitative and qualitative components. Attempt to increase the power of the physician over the patient; Arguments on the absence of professional or societal consensus about medical futility.

Focuses on the functions of the theory of professionalism in the medical setting. Resolution of ethical problems; Exposure of invidious bias; Gain of a broader perspective.