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International audience; Spatial structure is known to affect the evolution of social behaviour, but little is known on how this evolution depends on simultaneous competition for resources. In simple models, competition for resources tends to counteract altruism, but ecologically more realistic models suggest that competition for resources might actually reinforce altruism. Here we set up a probabilistic cellular automaton (PCA) model and analyse it using the Correlation Dynamics (CD) approach, to study how competition for resources affects the evolution of altruism. If the resource diffuses across space, spatially separate clusters of relatives may still compete for resources, thus creating a larger competitive kernel than the immediate neighbourhood. This increases the separation of clusters of relatives and thus reinforces the selection of altruistic behaviour.

Obligate symbiosis evolved from free-living individuals most likely via the intermediate stage of facultative symbiosis. However, why should facultative symbionts, who can live independently but also benefit from their partners if these are available, give up this best of both worlds? Using the adaptive dynamics approach, we analyse a simple model, focusing on one partner of the symbiosis, to gain more insight into the selective forces that make individuals forgo the ability to reproduce in the free-living state. Our results suggest that, similar to the parasitism-mutualism continuum, the free-living way of life and obligate symbiosis are two extremes of a continuum of the ability to reproduce independently of a partner. More importantly, facultative symbiosis should be the rule as for many parameter combinations completely giving up independent reproduction or adopting a pure free-living strategy is not so easy. We also show that if host encounter comes at a cost, individuals that put more effort into increasing the chances to meet with their partners are more likely to give up the ability to reproduce independently. Finally, our model does not specify the ecological interactions between hosts and symbionts but we discuss briefly how the ecological nature of an interaction can influence the transition from facultative to obligate symbiosis.

In kin selection theory in the evolution of social behaviours, the relatedness between interacting individuals is influenced by the spatial structure of the population. It is generally considered that in the 'viscous' population competition among individuals tends to suppress the evolution of altruism. We consider that more complex interactions produce specific spatial patterns in the presence of competitive interaction, which could alter the process of kin selection in a given space. Here, we theoretically studied the joint evolution of altruism and resource exploitation in a spatially structured population. The simulations indicated that joint evolution can result in self-organisation of regularly arranged cluster structures, which creates a new 'level of selection', and significantly promotes the evolution of altruism through a promotion of kin selection. The analysis also suggested synergetic effects of the joint evolution of two traits, including an evolutionary suicide of the population.

International audience; Information is a crucial currency for living organisms as it allows them to adjust their behaviour to environmental fluctuations. Thus, natural selection should have favoured the capacity of collecting information from different sources, including social interactions whereby individuals could quickly gain reliable information. However, such conditions may also favour the gathering of potentially detrimental information, such as false or misinterpreted accounts of environmental and social phenomena such as rumours, which may spread via informational cascades. We applied ecological and evolutionary principles to investigate how the propagation of social information at a populational level affects the propensity to assimilate it, here defined as the gullibilty. Our results show that the evolution of an individual's susceptibility to assimilate information strongly depends on eco-evolutionary feedbacks, in particular when both useful and detrimental information circulate. We discuss our results regarding the different information transmission mechanisms involved with particular attention to specific cases of social learning.

Understanding the effect of multiple infections is essential for the prediction (and eventual control) of virulence evolution. Some theoretical studies have considered the possibility that several strains coexist in the same host (coinfection), but few have taken their within-host dynamics explicitly into account. Here, we develop a nested approach based on a simple model for the interaction of parasite strains with their host's immune system. We study virulence evolution by linking the within-host dynamics to an epidemiological framework that incorporates multiple infections. Our model suggests that antigenically similar parasite strains cannot coexist in the long term inside a host. We also find that the optimal level of virulence increases with the efficiency of multiple infections. Finally, we notice that coinfections create heterogeneity in the host population (with susceptible hosts and infected hosts), which can lead to evolutionary branching in the parasite population and the emergence of a hypervirulent parasite strategy. We interpret this result as a parasite specialization to the infectious state of the hosts. Our study has experimental and theoretical implications in a virulence management perspective.

We present a general epidemiological model of host-parasite interactions that includes various forms of superinfection. We use this model to study the effects of different host life-history traits on the evolution of parasite virulence. In particular, we analyze the effects of natural host death rate on the evolutionarily stable parasite virulence. We show that, contrary to classical predictions, an increase in the natural host death rate may select for lower parasite virulence if some form of superinfection occurs. This result is in agreement with the experimental results and the verbal argument presented by Ebert and Mangin (1997). This experiment is discussed in the light of the present model. We also point out the importance of superinfections for the effect of nonspecific immunity on the evolution of virulence. In a broader perspective, this model demonstrates that the occurrence of multiple infections may qualitatively alter classical predictions concerning the effects of various host life-history traits on the evolution of parasite virulence.

The occurrence of polygyny and polyandry in social insects has long puzzled evolutionary biologists. If cooperation requires genetic relatedness, how do we explain the occurrence and maintenance of mechanisms that reduce the degree of relatedness among colony members? A much‐discussed hypothesis states that genetically diverse colonies are more resistant to parasitism than homogenous colonies because genetic diversity reduces the spread of a disease within a colony. However, as we will argue in this note, a necessary condition for the parasite hypothesis is that genetically heterogeneous colonies have a larger suite of parasites that are capable of infecting them. This implicit relationship is important because it implies that even if the cost per infection is reduced, this may not be sufficient to offset the increased rate of acquiring infections. The advantages of genetic heterogeneity as a defense against parasites thus may not be as big as commonly thought.

Many ecological interactions that are called mutualistic are in fact mixtures of antagonistic and mutualistic aspects. For example, plasmids exploit their bacterial hosts but also protect them against external threats. In this study, we analyse the conditions for the evolution of what we call ‘dangerous liaisons’: interactions combining mutualistic and antagonistic aspects. Starting point of our analysis is a model that was proposed as early as 1934. In this model, partners have to form a complex (either temporary or long lasting) in order to interact. Using this model framework we then set out to define and tease apart private interests of the interacting partners from their common good. This dichotomy provides a unifying perspective to classify ecological interactions. We discuss some examples to illustrate how the outcome of the interaction may depend on densities or on other contextual variables. Finally, we note that having a common good is not a necessary condition for partners to have aligned interests. In a dangerous liaison partners may have interest to cooperate even when this does not bolster the common good.

Bacteria produce a great diversity of siderophores to scavenge for iron in their environment. We suggest that this diversity results from the interplay between siderophore producers (cooperators) and non-producers (cheaters): when there are many cheaters exploiting a siderophore type it is beneficial for a mutant to produce a siderophore unusable by the dominant population. We formulated and analysed a mathematical model for tagged public goods to investigate the potential for the emergence of diversity. We found that, although they are rare most of the time, cheaters play a key role in maintaining diversity by regulating the different populations of cooperators. This threshold-triggered feedback prevents any stain of cooperators from dominating the others. Our study provides a novel general mechanism for the evolution of diversity that may apply to many forms of social behaviour.

In harsh environments, sessile organisms can make their habitat more hospitable by buffering environmental stress or increasing resource availability. Although the ecological significance of such local facilitation is widely established, the evolutionary aspects have been seldom investigated. Yet addressing the evolutionary aspects of local facilitation is important because theoretical studies show that systems with such positive interactions can exhibit alternative stable states and that such systems may suddenly become extinct when they evolve (evolutionary suicide). Arid ecosystems currently experience strong changes in climate and human pressures, but little is known about the effects of these changes on the selective pressures exerted on the vegetation. Here, we focus on the evolution of local facilitation in arid ecosystems, using a lattice-structured model explicitly considering local interactions among plants. We found that the evolution of local facilitation depends on the seed dispersal strategy. In systems characterized by short-distance seed dispersal, adaptation to a more stressful environment leads to high local facilitation, allowing the population to escape extinction. In contrast, systems characterized by long-distance seed dispersal become extinct under increased stress even when allowed to adapt. In this case, adaptation in response to climate change and human pressures could give the final push to the desertification of arid ecosystems.

Spatial self-structuring has been a focus of recent interest among evolutionary ecologists. We review recent developments in the study of the interplay between spatial self-structuring and evolution. We first discuss the relative merits of the various theoretical approaches to spatial modelling in ecology. Second, we synthesize the main theoretical studies of the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations. We show that population viscosity is generally beneficial to cooperation, because cooperators can reap additional benefits from being clustered. A similar mechanism can explain the evolution of honest communication and of reduced virulence in host-parasite interactions. We also discuss some recent innovative empirical results that test these theories. Third, we show the relevance of these results to the general field of evolutionary ecology. An important conclusion is that kin selection is the main process that drives evolution of cooperation in viscous populations. Many results of kin selection theory can be recovered as emergent properties of spatial ecological dynamics. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of multilevel selection and evolutionary transitions. We conclude by sketching some perspectives for future research, with a particular emphasis on the topics of evolutionary branching, criticality, spatial fluctuations and experimental tests of theoretical predictions. Space is the place - Sun Ra.

There is ample theoretical and experimental evidence that virulence evolution depends on the immune response of the host. In this article, we review a number of recent studies that attempt to explicitly incorporate the dynamics of the immune system (instead of merely representing it by a single black box parameter) in models for the evolution of parasite virulence. A striking observation is that the type of infection (acute or chronic) is invariably considered to be a constraint that model assumptions have to satisfy rather than as a potential outcome of the interaction of the parasite with its host's immune system. We argue that avoiding making assumptions about the type of infection will lead to a better understanding of infectious diseases, even though a number of fundamental and technical problems remain. Dynamical modeling of the immune system opens a wide range of perspectives: for understanding how the immune system eradicates a parasite (which it does for most pathogens but not for all, HIV being a notorious example of a virus that is not completely eliminated), for studying multiple infections through concomitant immunity, for understanding the emergence and evolution of the immune system in animals, and for evolutionary epidemiology in general (e.g., predicting evolutionary consequences of new therapies and public health policies). We conclude by discussing new approaches based on embedded (or nested) models and identify future perspectives for the modeling of infectious diseases.

We investigate the evolution of manipulation of host dispersal behaviour by parasites using spatially explicit individual-based simulations. We find that when dispersal is local, parasites always gain from increasing their hosts' dispersal rate, although the evolutionary outcome is determined by the costs-to-benefits ratio. However, when dispersal can be non-local, we show that parasites investing in an intermediate dispersal distance of their hosts are favoured even when the manipulation is not costly, due to the intrinsic spatial dynamics of the host–parasite interaction. Our analysis highlights the crucial importance of ecological spatial dynamics in evolutionary processes and reveals the theoretical possibility that parasites could manipulate their hosts' dispersal.

The evolution of altruism, especially as directed to non-kin, is an enigma of evolutionary biology. Explanations would come easier, however, if altruists were readily recognized. Arguably the simplest recognition system is a conspicuous, heritable tag. A green beard would do it. A few examples of the ‘green beard effect’ have been reported in human interactions, though beards per se and greenness tend not to feature. A problem with this explanation is the improbability of one gene encoding all three functions (altruism, tag and recognition). Based on modelling, Jansen and van Baalen identify a further problem with this theory: even if green beard genes can be selectively advantageous, altruism is unstable under previous assumptions. But, they add, the evolution of cooperation using a recognition mechanism may be more likely if many beard colours coexist. Resolving the enigma of the evolution of altruism is helped along by models showing that the coexistence of many tags makes the evolution of cooperation using a recognition mechanism more likely. The evolution of altruism, a behaviour that benefits others at one's own fitness expense, poses a darwinian paradox. The paradox is resolved if many interactions are with related individuals so that the benefits of altruism are reaped by copies of the altruistic gene in other individuals1, a mechanism called kin selection2. However, recognition of altruists could provide an alternative route towards the evolution of altruism1,3,4,5. Arguably the simplest recognition system is a conspicuous, heritable tag, such as a green beard1,3. Despite the fact that such genes have been reported6,7,8, the ‘green beard effect’3 has often been dismissed because it is unlikely that a single gene can code for altruism and a recognizable tag1,3,9. Here we model the green beard effect and find that if recognition and altruism are always inherited together, the dynamics are highly unstable, leading to the loss of altruism. In contrast, if the effect is caused by loosely coupled separate genes, altruism is facilitated through beard chromodynamics in which many beard colours co-occur. This allows altruism to persist even in weakly structured populations and implies that the green beard effect, in the form of a fluid association of altruistic traits with a recognition tag, can be much more prevalent than hitherto assumed.

We investigate how the evolution of communication strategies affects signal credibility when there is common interest as well as a conflict between communicating individuals. Taking alarm calls as an example, we show that if the temptation to cheat is low, a single signal is used in the population. If the temptation increases cheaters will erode the credibility of a signal, and an honest mutant using a different signal ('a private code') will be very successful until this, in turn, is cracked by cheaters. In such a system, signal use fluctuates in time and space and hence the meaning of a given signal is not constant. When the temptation to cheat is too large, no honest communication can maintain itself in a Tower of Babel of many signals. We discuss our analysis in the light of the Green Beard mechanism for the evolution of altruism.

Most models for coevolution of hosts and parasites are based on the assumption that resistance of hosts to parasites is an all–or–nothing effect. In many cases, for example where parasites require an appropriate receptor on host cells, this is a reasonable assumption. However, in many other cases, for example where hosts mount an immune response, this picture may be too simple. An immune system is expensive to maintain, which poses a question as to how much of its resources a host should allocate to resist parasites: if the risk of infection is low, natural selection may favour hosts with less effective immune systems. As optimal allocation to defence will depend on the force of infection, and the force of infection, in turn, depends on the level of defence in the rest of the host population, a game–theoretic approach is necessary. Here I analyse a simple model for the evolution of the ability to recover from infection. If parasites are not allowed to coevolve, the outcome is a single evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). If the parasites coevolve, multiple evolutionary outcomes are possible, one in which the parasites are relatively avirulent and common and the hosts invest little in recovery ability, and another (the escalated arms race) where parasites are rare but virulent and the hosts invest heavily in defence.