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The rubber hand illusion paradigm allows investigating human body ownership by inducing an illusion of owning a life-sized fake hand. Despite the wide consensus on the fact that integration of multisensory signals is the main interpretative framework of the rubber hand illusion, increasing amount of data show that additional factors might contribute to the emergence of the illusion and, in turn, explain the strong inter-individual differences of the illusory patterns. Here, we explored whether and how personality features contribute to the emergence of the illusion by administering to healthy participants the rubber hand illusion paradigm along with two well-known personality tests, i.e., the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) and the Rorschach test. Results showed that two Rorschach domains (i.e., "Perception and Thinking Problems" and "Self and Other Representation") were positively correlated with the illusory mislocalization of the own left hand toward the fake hand. Further analyses suggested that while the tendency to perceive unconventionally is related to mislocalizing the own hand toward the fake hand, the association of the RHI index and other personality features measured by the Rorschach remain uncertain. However, our findings in general suggest that personality features might have a role in the emergence of the rubber hand illusion. This, in turn, could explain the high inter-individual variability of the illusory effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the fact that any successful achievement of willed actions necessarily entails the sense of body ownership (the feeling of owning the moving body parts), it is still unclear how this happens. To address this issue at both behavioral and neural levels, we capitalized on sensory attenuation (SA) phenomenon (a self-generated stimulus is perceived as less intense than an identical externally generated stimulus). We compared the intensity of somatosensory stimuli produced by one's own intended movements and by movements of an embodied fake hand. Then, we investigated if in these two conditions SA was equally affected by interfering with the activity of the supplementary motor area (SMA; known to be related to motor intention and SA) using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation. We showed that ownership of the fake hand triggered attenuation of somatosensory stimuli generated by its movements that were comparable to the attenuation of self-generated stimuli. Furthermore, disrupting the SMA eliminated the SA effect regardless of whether it was triggered by actual participant's movements or by illusory ownership. Our findings suggest that SA triggered by body ownership relies, at least in part, on the activation of the same brain structures as SA triggered by motor-related signals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pathological embodiment (E+) is a specific contralesional delusion of body ownership, observed following brain damage, in which patients embody someone else's arm and its movements within their own body schema whenever the contralesional 'alien' arm is presented in a body-congruent position (i.e., 1st person perspective and aligned with the patient's shoulder). This disorder is often associated with spatial neglect, a neurological syndrome in which patients are unaware of stimuli presented in the contralesional (often the left) space. Capitalizing on previous evidence demonstrating that prismatic adaptation of the ipsilesional arm to right-deviating prisms is effective in ameliorating neglect symptoms, here we investigated whether such amelioration also occurs in E+ patients with neglect when prismatic training is performed by the 'alien' embodied arm. Four left neglect patients (one with and three without pathological embodiment) underwent visuomotor prismatic training performed by an 'alien' arm. Specifically, while patients were wearing prismatic goggles shifting the visual field rightward, a co-experimenter's left arm presented in a body-congruent perspective was repeatedly moved toward visual targets by another examiner. In a control condition, the co-experimenter's arm was moved toward the targets from a body-incongruent position (i.e., 3rd person perspective). Neglect symptoms were assessed before and after training through paper-and-pencil tasks. In the E+ patient, neglect improved significantly more in 1st than in 3rd person perspective training, suggesting that prismatic adaptation of the 'alien' embodied arm is effective in modulating spatial representation. Conversely, for control E- patients (not embodying the 'alien' arm), we observed more limited improvements following training. These findings indicate that the 'alien' embodied arm is so deeply embedded in the patient body and motor schema that adaptation to prismatic lenses can affect multiple processing stages, from low level sensory-motor correspondences, to higher level body, motor and spatial maps, similarly as it occurs in normal subjects and neglect patients without pathological embodiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A crucial aspect for the cognitive neuroscience of pain is the interplay between pain perception and body awareness. Herewe report a novel neuropsychological condition in which right brain-damaged patients displayed a selective monothematic delusion of body ownership. Specifically, when both their own and the co-experimenter's left arms were present, these patients claimed that the latter belonged to them.We reasoned that this was an ideal condition to examine whether pain perception can be "referred" to an alien arm subjectively experienced as one's own. Seventeen patients (11 with, 6 without the delusion), and 10 healthy controlswere administered a nociceptive stimulation protocol to assess pain perception. In the OWN condition, participants placed their arms on a table in front of them. In the ALIEN condition, the co-experimenter's left (or right) arm was placed alongside the participants' left (or right) arm, respectively. In the OWN condition, left (or right) participants' hand dorsum were stimulated. In the ALIEN condition, left (or right) co-experimenter's hand dorsum was stimulated. Participants had to rate the perceived pain on a 0-5 Likert scale (0=no pain, 5=maximal imaginable pain). Results showed that healthy controls and patients without delusion gave scores higher than zero only when their own hands were stimulated. On the contrary, patients with delusion gave scores higher than zero both when their own hands (left or right) were stimulated and when the co-experimenter's left hand was stimulated. Our results show that in pathological conditions, a body part of another person can become so deeply embedded in one's own somatosensory representation to effect the subjective feeling of pain. More in general, our findings are in line with a growing number of evidence emphasizing the role of the special and unique perceptual status of body ownership in giving rise to the phenomenological experience of pain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The feeling of owning one's body underlies human self-awareness. Body-ownership illusions allow temporarily modulating body ownership, which has observable effects on the behavior and cognitive processes. However, the extent of those effects is unclear. Here, we investigated whether illusory ownership of a virtual body extended to ownership of the value/meaning of its actions. A variation of detection-of-deception procedure (Concealed Information Test) was performed by an embodied virtual avatar (first-person perspective, 1PP), or a non-embodied one (third-person perspective, 3PP), while the skin conductance responses (SCRs) were recorded from passively observing participants. Target stimuli (i.e., concealed information) evoked significantly larger SCRs than the neutral ones only when the avatar was embodied (in 1PP). Such pattern of SCR differences corresponds to that observed when participants perform the task themselves, thus suggesting that the sole experience of owning a virtual body can trigger physiological responses related to the subjective significance of the body's actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At present, most of the neurocognitive models of human sense of agency (ie, "this action is due to my own will") have been traditionally rooted in a variety of internal efferent signals arising within the motor system. However, recent neuroscientific evidence has suggested that also the body-related afferent signals that subserve body ownership (ie, "this body is mine") might have a key role in this process. Accordingly, in the present review paper, we briefly examined the literature investigating how and to what extent body ownership contributes to building up human motor consciousness. Evidence suggests that, if required by the context, body ownership per se can act on agency attribution (ie, independently from efferent signals). Hence, a unitary and coherent subjective experience of willed actions (ie, "this willed action is being realized by my own body") requires both awareness of being an agent and of owning the body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Body ownership illusion over an avatar is determined by visuo-motor coupling. • First-person avatar movements induce kinesthetic illusions. • The kinesthetic illusion is not modulated by the body ownership illusion. • Body ownership and kinaesthetic illusions reflect distinct body representations. Seeing an embodied humanoid avatar move its arms can induce in the observer the illusion that its own (static) arms are moving accordingly, the kinematic signals emanating from this avatar thus being considered like those from the biological body. Here, we investigated the causal relationship between these kinaesthetic illusions and the illusion of body ownership, manipulated through visuomotor synchronisation. The results of two experiments revealed that the sense of body ownership over an avatar seen from a first-person perspective was intimately linked to visuomotor synchrony. This was not the case for kinaesthetic illusions indicating that when superimposed on the biological body, the avatar is inevitably treated at the sensorimotor level as one's own body, whether consciously considered as such or not. The question of whether these two bodily experiences (body ownership and kinaesthetic illusion) are underpinned by distinct representations, the body image, and the body schema, is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relation between sense of body ownership and sense of agency is still highly debated. Here we investigated in a large sample of healthy participants the associations between several implicit and explicit indexes of the two senses. Specifically, we examined the correlations between proprioceptive shift (implicit measure) and questionnaire on the subjective experience of ownership (explicit measure) within the rubber hand illusion paradigm (body ownership), and intentional binding (implicit measure), attenuation of the intensity of auditory outcomes of actions (implicit measure) and questionnaire on the subjective experience of authorship (explicit measure) within the Libet's clock paradigm (sense of agency). Our results showed that proprioceptive shift was positively correlated with the attenuation of auditory outcomes. No significant correlations were found between the explicit measures of the two senses. We argue that the individual spatiotemporal constraints subserving the integration of sensory-related signals (implicit signature) would be common to both senses, whereas their subjective experience (explicit signature) would rely on additional processes specific for any given sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, an increasing number of studies employed the full body illusion paradigm (i.e., the experimentally induced illusory ownership over a fake/virtual body) to investigate the role of body ownership in higher-level cognition. However, to date, no systematic review of this topic is present. To fill this gap, here we identified 102 papers classifiable in 4 cognitive domains and 12 subdomains. Overall, they manipulated the identity of the fake body, and/or its spatial perspective, and/or the kind of multisensory stimulation, and/or its spatiotemporal congruency. The effects were measured through implicit and/or explicit indices. In summary, results showed that participants' behavior shifted away from the self and/or towards that of the embodied fake/virtual body. The findings have been interpreted within various exploratory frameworks, with the most common being the Proteus effect, the cortical body matrix and the inverse model of motor control. Future studies should focus on building a unitary theoretical explanation of the effects, gaining solid neural evidence, creating standard experimental procedures, and exploring the practical applications. • Full Body Illusion induces a feeling of owning a fake/virtual body. • Participants' behavior shifts towards that of the fake/virtual body. • Ownership over a different body entails embodiment of its features. • This effect occurs across cognitive domains, from perception to social cognition. • Future studies should focus on unitary theoretical explanation and neural evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent findings suggest that body ownership can activate the motor system in the absence of movement execution. Here, we investigated whether such a process promotes motor recovery in stroke patients. A group of patients with left-hemisphere damage (N = 12) and chronic motor deficits completed an immersive virtual reality training (three sessions of 15 min each week for 11 weeks). Patients sat still and either experienced (first-person perspective) or did not experience (third-person perspective) illusory ownership over the body of a standing virtual avatar. After the training, in which the avatar walked around a virtual environment, only patients who experienced the illusion improved gait and balance. We argue that representing the virtual body as their own allowed patients to access motor functioning and promoted motor recovery. This procedure might be integrated with rehabilitative approaches centered on motor execution. These findings also have an impact on the knowledge of the motor system in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is no consensus on whether, and to what extent, actions contribute to constructing awareness of one's own body. Here we investigated at both physiological and behavioral level whether a prolonged limb immobilization affects body ownership. We tested a group of healthy participants, whose left-hand movements were prevented by a cast for one week, and a control group without any movement restriction. In both groups, we measured the strength of the rubber hand illusion (i.e., proprioceptive shift and questionnaire on ownership) and the physiological parameters known to be modulated by short-term arm immobilization (i.e., resting motor threshold, motor evoked potentials and force parameters) before and after the week of immobilization. Our results showed stronger illusory effects on the immobilized hand on both behavioral indexes and weaker illusory effects on the non-immobilized hand on the questionnaire. Additionally, the increased proprioceptive shift was positively correlated to the motor threshold of the contralateral hemisphere. Our findings show at both behavioral and physiological level that altering those movement-related signals which constantly stem from our own body parts, modulates the experience of those body parts as mine. This, in turn, supports the view of a direct role of actions in the developing and maintaining a coherent body ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether and how body ownership ("this body is mine") contributes to human conscious experience of voluntary action is still unclear. In order to answer this question, here we incorporated two signatures (i.e., an ad hoc questionnaire and the sensory attenuation paradigm) of human's sense of agency ("this action is due to my own will") within a well-known experimental manipulation of body ownership (i.e., the rubber hand illusion paradigm). In two different experiments, we showed that the illusory ownership over a fake hand (induced by the rubber hand illusion) triggered also an illusory agency over its movements at both explicit and implicit level. Specifically, when the fake (embodied) hand pressed a button delivering an electrical stimulus to the participant's body, the movement was misattributed to participant's will (explicit level) and the stimulus intensity was attenuated (implicit level) exactly as it happened when the own hand actually delivered the stimulus. Our findings suggest that body ownership per se entails also motor representations of one's own movements. Whenever required by the context, this information would act upon agency attribution even prospectively (i.e., prior to action execution). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sensory attenuation (i.e., the phenomenon whereby self-produced sensations are perceived as less intense compared to externally occurring ones) is among the neurocognitive processes that help distinguishing ourselves from others. It is thought to be rooted in the motor system (e.g., related to motor intention and prediction), while the role of body awareness, which necessarily accompanies any voluntary movement, in this phenomenon is largely unknown. To fill this gap, here we compared the perceived intensity, somatosensory evoked potentials, and alpha-band desynchronization for self-generated, other-generated, and embodied-fake-hand-generated somatosensory stimuli. We showed that sensory attenuation triggered by the own hand and by the embodied fake hand had the same behavioral and neurophysiological signatures (reduced subjective intensity, reduced of N140 and P200 SEP components and post-stimulus alpha-band desynchronization). Therefore, signals subserving body ownership influenced attenuation of somatosensory stimuli, possibly in a postdictive manner. This indicates that body ownership is crucial for distinguishing the source of the perceived sensations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]