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Heart rate variability (HRV) has been linked to resilience and emotion regulation (ER). How HRV and brain processing interact during ER, however, has remained elusive. Sixty-two subjects completed the acquisition of resting HRV and task HRV while performing an ER functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) paradigm, which included the differential strategies of ER reappraisal and acceptance in the context of viewing aversive pictures. We found high correlations of resting and task HRV across all emotion regulation strategies. Furthermore, individuals with high levels of resting, but not task, HRV showed numerically lower distress during ER with acceptance. Whole-brain fMRI parametrical modulation analyses revealed that higher task HRV covaried with dorso-medial prefrontal activation for reappraisal, and dorso-medial prefrontal, anterior cingulate and temporo-parietal junction activation for acceptance. Subjects with high resting HRV, compared to subjects with low resting HRV, showed higher activation in the pre-supplementary motor area during ER using a region of interest approach. This study demonstrates that while resting and task HRV exhibit a positive correlation, resting HRV seems to be a better predictor of ER capacity. Resting and task HRV were associated with ER brain activation in mid-line frontal cortex (i.e. DMPFC)., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Empathy for pain involves sensory and visceromotor brain regions relevant also in the first-person pain experience. Focusing on brain activations associated with vicarious experiences of pain triggered by artistic or non-artistic images, the present study aims to investigate common and distinct brain activation patterns associated with these two vicarious experiences of pain and to assess whether empathy for pain brain regions contributes to the formation of an aesthetic judgement (AJ) in non-art expert observers. Artistic and non-artistic facial expressions (painful and neutral) were shown to participants inside the scanner and then aesthetically rated in a subsequent behavioural session. Results showed that empathy for pain brain regions (i.e. bilateral insular cortex, posterior sector of the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior portion of the middle cingulate cortex) and bilateral inferior frontal gyrus are commonly activated by artistic and non-artistic painful facial expressions. For the artistic representation of pain, the activity recorded in these regions directly correlated with participants' AJ. Results also showed the distinct activation of a large cluster located in the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus for non-artistic stimuli. This study suggests that non-beauty-specific mechanisms such as empathy for pain are crucial components of the aesthetic experience of artworks., (© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press.)

Few studies have explored the specificities of contextual modulations of the processing of facial expressions at a neuronal level. This study fills this gap by employing an original paradigm, based on a version of the filmic "Kuleshov effect". High-density EEG was recorded while participants watched film sequences consisting of three shots: the close-up of a target person's neutral face (Face_1), the scene that the target person was looking at (happy, fearful, or neutral), and another close-up of the same target person's neutral face (Face_2). The participants' task was to rate both valence and arousal, and subsequently to categorize the target person's emotional state. The results indicate that despite a significant behavioural 'context' effect, the electrophysiological indexes still indicate that the face is evaluated as neutral. Specifically, Face_2 elicited a high amplitude N170 when preceded by neutral contexts, and a high amplitude Late Positive Potential (LPP) when preceded by emotional contexts, thus showing sensitivity to the evaluative congruence (N170) and incongruence (LPP) between context and Face_2. The LPP activity was mainly underpinned by brain regions involved in facial expressions and emotion recognition processing. Our results shed new light on temporal and neural correlates of context-sensitivity in the interpretation of facial expressions.

Schizophrenia has been described as a self-disorder, whereas social deficits are key features of the illness. Changes in "resting state" activity of brain networks involved in self-related processing have been consistently reported in schizophrenia, but their meaning for social perception deficits remains poorly understood. Here, we applied a novel approach investigating the relationship between task-evoked neural activity during social perception and functional organization of self-related brain networks during a "resting state". "Resting state" functional MRI was combined with task-related functional MRI using a social perception experiment. Twenty-one healthy control participants (HC) and 21 out-patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (SCH) were included. There were no significant differences concerning age, IQ, education and gender between the groups. Results showed reduced "resting state" functional connectivity between ventromedial prefrontal cortex and dorsal posterior cingulate cortex in SCH, compared to HC. During social perception, neural activity in dorsal posterior cingulate cortex and behavioral data indicated impaired congruence coding of social stimuli in SCH. Task-evoked activity during social perception in dorsal posterior cingulate cortex co-varied with dorsal posterior cingulate cortex-ventromedial prefrontal cortex functional connectivity during a "resting state" in HC, but not in SCH. Task-evoked activity also correlated with negative symptoms in SCH. These preliminary findings, showing disrupted prediction of social perception measures by "resting state" functioning of self-related brain networks in schizophrenia, provide important insight in the hypothesized link between self and social deficits. They also shed light on the meaning of "resting state" changes for tasks such as social perception., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

In spite of their striking differences with real-life perception, films are perceived and understood without effort. Cognitive film theory attributes this to the system of continuity editing, a system of editing guidelines outlining the effect of different cuts and edits on spectators. A major principle in this framework is the 180° rule, a rule recommendation that, to avoid spectators' attention to the editing, two edited shots of the same event or action should not be filmed from angles differing in a way that expectations of spatial continuity are strongly violated. In the present study, we used high-density EEG to explore the neural underpinnings of this rule. In particular, our analysis shows that cuts and edits in general elicit early ERP component indicating the registration of syntactic violations as known from language, music, and action processing. However, continuity edits and cuts-across the line differ from each other regarding later components likely to be indicating the differences in spatial remapping as well as in the degree of conscious awareness of one's own perception. Interestingly, a time-frequency analysis of the occipital alpha rhythm did not support the hypothesis that such differences in processing routes are mainly linked to visual attention. On the contrary, our study found specific modulations of the central mu rhythm ERD as an indicator of sensorimotor activity, suggesting that sensorimotor networks might play an important role. We think that these findings shed new light on current discussions about the role of attention and embodied perception in film perception and should be considered when explaining spectators' different experience of different kinds of cuts., (Copyright © 2016 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.)

We challenge Cook et al.'s claim about the vagueness of the notion of action understanding in relation with mirror neurons. We show the multidimensional nature of action understanding and provide a definition of motor-based action understanding, shedding new light on the various components of action understanding and on their relationship. Finally, we propose an alternative perspective on the origin of mirror neurons, stressing the necessity to abandon the dichotomy between genetic and associative hypotheses.

It is an open question whether the motor system is involved during understanding of concrete nouns, as it is for concrete verbs. To clarify this issue, we carried out a behavioral experiment using a go-no go paradigm with an early and delayed go-signal delivery. Italian nouns referring to concrete objects (hand-related or foot-related) and abstract entities served as stimuli. Right-handed participants read the stimuli and responded when the presented word was concrete using the left or right hand. At the early go-signal, slower right-hand responses were found for hand-related nouns compared to foot-related nouns. The opposite pattern was found for the left hand. These findings demonstrate an early lateralized modulation of the motor system during noun processing, most likely crucial for noun comprehension.

In social life actions are tightly linked with emotions. The integration of affective- and action-related information has to be considered as a fundamental component of appropriate social understanding. The present functional magnetic resonance imaging study aimed at investigating whether an emotion (Happiness, Anger or Neutral) dynamically expressed by an observed agent modulates brain activity underlying the perception of his grasping action. As control stimuli, participants observed the same agent either only expressing an emotion or only performing a grasping action. Our results showed that the observation of an action embedded in an emotional context (agent's facial expression), compared with the observation of the same action embedded in a neutral context, elicits higher neural response at the level of motor frontal cortices, temporal and occipital cortices, bilaterally. Particularly, the dynamic facial expression of anger modulates the re-enactment of a motor representation of the observed action. This is supported by the evidence that observing actions embedded in the context of anger, but not happiness, compared with a neutral context, elicits stronger activity in the bilateral pre-central gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus, besides the pre-supplementary motor area, a region playing a central role in motor control. Angry faces not only seem to modulate the simulation of actions, but may also trigger motor reaction. These findings suggest that emotions exert a modulatory role on action observation in different cortical areas involved in action processing.

We challenge the classic experience/expression dichotomous account of emotions, according to which experiencing and expressing an emotion are two independent processes. By endorsing Dewey's and Mead's accounts of emotions, and capitalizing upon recent empirical findings, we propose that expression is part of the emotional experience. This proposal partly challenges the purely constructivist approach endorsed by the authors of the target article.

Background: The humanoid robot WE4-RII was designed to express human emotions in order to improve human-robot interaction. We can read the emotions depicted in its gestures, yet might utilize different neural processes than those used for reading the emotions in human agents., Methodology: Here, fMRI was used to assess how brain areas activated by the perception of human basic emotions (facial expression of Anger, Joy, Disgust) and silent speech respond to a humanoid robot impersonating the same emotions, while participants were instructed to attend either to the emotion or to the motion depicted., Principal Findings: Increased responses to robot compared to human stimuli in the occipital and posterior temporal cortices suggest additional visual processing when perceiving a mechanical anthropomorphic agent. In contrast, activity in cortical areas endowed with mirror properties, like left Broca's area for the perception of speech, and in the processing of emotions like the left anterior insula for the perception of disgust and the orbitofrontal cortex for the perception of anger, is reduced for robot stimuli, suggesting lesser resonance with the mechanical agent. Finally, instructions to explicitly attend to the emotion significantly increased response to robot, but not human facial expressions in the anterior part of the left inferior frontal gyrus, a neural marker of motor resonance., Conclusions: Motor resonance towards a humanoid robot, but not a human, display of facial emotion is increased when attention is directed towards judging emotions., Significance: Artificial agents can be used to assess how factors like anthropomorphism affect neural response to the perception of human actions.

Recent years have seen convergence in research on brain mechanisms and neurocomputational approaches, culminating in the creation of a new generation of robots whose artificial "brains" respect neuroscience principles and whose "cognitive" systems venture into higher cognitive domains such as planning and action sequencing, complex object and concept processing, and language. The present article gives an overview of selected projects in this general multidisciplinary field. The work reviewed centres on research funded by the EU in the context of the New and Emergent Science and Technology, NEST, funding scheme highlighting the topic "What it means to be human". Examples of such projects include learning by imitation (Edici project), examining the origin of human rule-based reasoning (Far), studying the neural origins of language (Neurocom), exploring the evolutionary origins of the human mind (Pkb140404), researching into verbal and non-verbal communication (Refcom), using and interpreting signs (Sedsu), characterising human language by structural complexity (Chlasc), and representing abstract concepts (Abstract). Each of the communication-centred research projects revealed individual insights; however, there had been little overall analysis of results and hypotheses. In the Specific Support Action Nestcom, we proposed to analyse some NEST projects focusing on the central question "What it means to communicate" and to review, understand and integrate the results of previous communication-related research, in order to develop and communicate multimodal experimental hypotheses for investigation by future projects. The present special issue includes a range of papers on the interplay between neuroinformatics, brain science and robotics in the general area of higher cognitive functions and multimodal communication. These papers extend talks given at the NESTCOM workshops, at ICANN (http://www.his.sunderland.ac.uk/nestcom/workshop/icann.html) in Porto and at the first meeting of the Federation of the European Societies of Neuropsychology in Edinburgh in 2008 (http://www.his.sunderland.ac.uk/nestcom/workshop/esn.html). We hope that the collection will give a vivid insight into current trends in the field.

The implications of the discovery of mirroring mechanisms and embodied simulation for empathetic responses to images in general, and to works of visual art in particular, have not yet been assessed. Here, we address this issue and we challenge the primacy of cognition in responses to art. We propose that a crucial element of esthetic response consists of the activation of embodied mechanisms encompassing the simulation of actions, emotions and corporeal sensation, and that these mechanisms are universal. This basic level of reaction to images is essential to understanding the effectiveness both of everyday images and of works of art. Historical, cultural and other contextual factors do not preclude the importance of considering the neural processes that arise in the empathetic understanding of visual artworks.

Understanding the intentions of others while watching their actions is a fundamental building block of social behavior. The neural and functional mechanisms underlying this ability are still poorly understood. To investigate these mechanisms we used functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-three subjects watched three kinds of stimuli: grasping hand actions without a context, context only (scenes containing objects), and grasping hand actions performed in two different contexts. In the latter condition the context suggested the intention associated with the grasping action (either drinking or cleaning). Actions embedded in contexts, compared with the other two conditions, yielded a significant signal increase in the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the ventral premotor cortex where hand actions are represented. Thus, premotor mirror neuron areas-areas active during the execution and the observation of an action-previously thought to be involved only in action recognition are actually also involved in understanding the intentions of others. To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and this is an operation that the motor system does automatically.

To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the causal profile of the brain's motor output and its representational deep structure, in particular of the conscious mind arising from it (its "phenomenal output")? How do they constrain high-level phenomena like conscious experience, the emergence of a first-person perspective, or social cognition? By reviewing a series of neuroscientific results and integrating them with a wider philosophical perspective, we will emphasize the contribution the motor system makes to this process. As it will be shown, the motor system constructs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role to them. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the brain models movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object-relations. Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be conceived of as an internal, dynamic representation of the intentionality-relation itself. We will show how such a complex form of representational content, once it is in place, can later function as a functional building block for social cognition and for a more complex, consciously experienced representation of the first-person perspective as well.

The article cites a study which use functional magnetic resonance imaging to show that the mirror neuron system tracks not only the actions, but also the intentions, of others. The study was conducted by researcher Marco Iacoboni and colleagues. Mirror neurons are a set of neurons in the premotor area of the brain that are activated not only when performing an action oneself, but also while observing someone else perform that action. It is believed mirror neurons increase an individual's ability to understand the behaviors of others, an important skill in social species such as humans.