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Much of the cooperation on criminal justice matters between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland is based on EU level instruments. While there has been consideration of the broader impact of Brexit on the Good Friday Agreement and consensus on the need to avoid a return to a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, more detailed consideration has not been given to the effect that Brexit may have on continued criminal justice cooperation across the border. This article highlights the combined risks that Brexit presents for Northern Ireland in the form of increased criminality at a time when the loss of EU police cooperation mechanisms may result in a reduction of operational capacity and the removal of the legal architecture underpinning informal cooperation. Part 1 seeks to highlight the historical context of UK-Irish cooperation in policing matters. Part 2 explores the risk that post Brexit the Irish border may become a focus for criminal activity. The risks relating to increased immigration crime, smuggling of commodities and potential rise in terrorist activities are explored. Part 3 considers how the risks of increased criminal threats are exacerbated by the loss of EU criminal justice cooperation mechanisms and how this will affect UK-Irish cooperation specifically. Consideration is particularly given to the loss of information sharing systems. Part 4 considers how loss of EU level cooperation mechanisms could be mitigated. The viability of bilateral agreements between the UK and Ireland is considered alongside ways which police cooperation can be formalised to compensate for the potential loss of EU criminal justice information sharing systems. Nordic police cooperation is considered as a potential blueprint for the UK and Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom have a long, close and difficult history. The most recent phase of which dates from 1998 and the conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement. Since 1921, however, there has been unique practice between Ireland and the UK as regards the transfer of accused and convicted persons from one to the other. Indeed, there has been a special and close relationship between the two in that regard; albeit one not without difficulties. In recent times EU Justice and Home Affairs measures and the Good Friday Agreement have supplemented and strengthened the relationship. These include, since January 2004, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The EAW has been particularly important in streamlining the extradition process between the Ireland and the UK. This phase of history and co-operation is coming to an end. The UK's membership of the EU has now ceased, and a transition period during which the UK remains part of the EAW will end on 31st December 2020. The extradition relationship between the two is therefore facing a considerable challenge. There are several options open to Ireland, the UK and the EU as a replacement. Time, political will and the interests of third states, however, may well stand in the way of the conclusion of an agreement that optimally serves the interests of all parties and criminal justice. This paper considers the origins of extradition between the UK and Ireland and the alternative methods of extradition open to the UK and Ireland after Brexit. Consideration is given to the likely operation of a Norway-Iceland style agreement and whether such an agreement will be in place by the end of the transition and, if it was, whether its terms are likely to be sufficient for the needs of Ireland and the UK. The possibility of a bilateral arrangement on extradition between Ireland and the UK is also explored. Underlying the discussion is the critical point that the future extradition relationship must retain its 'special' characteristics, and therefore maintain the trust and good will that has developed over the years and given rise to an effective extradition relationship between the two countries. In other words, the lessons of history must be remembered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special edition of the I Journal of Criminal Law i emanates from an Arts Humanities Research Council project which funded the UK-Irish Criminal Justice Cooperation Network.[3] The network is a collaboration between Northumbria University, Queen's University Belfast and the Association for Criminal Justice Research and Development in Ireland (ACJRD). The aim was to understand the challenges that the UK and Ireland might face, post-Brexit, in relation to criminal justice cooperation, and assist in meeting those challenges where possible. 7 Gemma Davies and Adam Jackson, 'UK-Irish Criminal Justice Cooperation: Finding Solutions to a Multi-Faceted Problem' in I ACJRD 20th Annual Conference "The Brexit Impact on Criminal Justice Cooperation in Ireland" i (2017) accessed 3 November 2020. [Extracted from the article]

Criminal record information has various uses, including, in the detection of crime, as evidence in criminal proceedings, in consideration of an appropriate sentence after conviction and in determining the suitability of an individual for, or providing a bar to, employment. As such this information can have a high value but can also significantly interfere with a person's right to private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The importance of Article 8 in this area has been increasingly recognised both domestically and in Strasbourg, with such case law making clear the imperative that criminal record information is accurate, retained and disclosed only in proper circumstances and, where appropriate, is capable of being subject to proper challenge. The operation of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) for exchange of criminal records between Member States is explored and the benefits and risks of exchanging criminal records information within such an automated system are identified. The compliance of ECRIS to Article 8 ECHR is considered and suggestions made for future improvements. Evidence is provided that ECRIS constitutes a singular improvement on earlier ad hoc arrangements and should therefore be retained by the United Kingdom post-Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]