Search

The outbreak of COVID-19 unleashed a severe crisis in society. The suddenness and speed with which the disease spread into a global pandemic makes it an outstanding case for showing how bureaucracy acts in response to a crisis marked by uncertainty and urgency. This article focuses on the role played by the central government bureaucracy in preparing and enacting the Danish government’s response to the COVID-19 crisis. It is based on full access to internal government files related to crisis management during the winter and spring of 2020. These files include memos, e-mails, decision notes, and draft decisions from key civil servants. The article demonstrates the strength of the theory of bounded rationality when it comes to analyzing the interaction between top civil servants and political executives. Moreover, it shows how administrative and political executives can mold a governmental organization to overcome the inertia inherent in bureaucratic organization and procedures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the effect of incentive to the improvement of public sector management. It states that reform on the public management that is based on principal agent theory and private management recommends pay-for-performance. It says that the hypothesis was applied in the performance management system that was introduced to the central government of Denmark. It says that based on the system, heads of the government agencies are given bonus based on their performance of their agency. It concludes that reform is not possible based on the private sector experience and bureaucratic theory.