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Both income and wealth inequality have been on the minds of voters, politicians and academics for decades, especially as evidence has accumulated that inequality is not only high but, for [...]

In politically competitive jurisdictions, there can be strong electoral incentives to underfund public pensions in order to keep current taxes low. I examine this hypothesis using panel data for over 2,000 local pension plans from Pennsylvania spanning the period 1985-2017. The results suggest that more politically competitive municipalities tend to have pension plans that are less funded. The effects of political competition are driven by municipalities that have a higher proportion of uninformed voters and are absent for pension plans offered by municipal authorities. The negative relationship between political competition and funding status is present for state pensions as well. KEYWORDS actuarial funded ratio, political competition, public-sector pensions, unfunded liabilities, The sky really is falling. The people of Jacksonville need to know this. When they look at the roads that are crumbling. When they look at the neglected infrastructure. When [...]

Rising inequality in income and wealth is certainly the preoccupation pation du jour in much of the world these days, as politicians and policymakers struggle to manage public discontent with [...]