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To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2010.00707.x Byline: Scott Latham (2), Michael R. Braun (1) Abstract: We employ three views of agency theory in unison to investigate managerial risk-taking in uncertain markets. Using 124 firms that filed to go public toward the end of the technology boom (2000-2002), we explore the influence of CEO ownership on the decision to continue or withdraw an initial public offering (IPO) in deteriorating public equity markets. We find an inverse U-shaped relationship between CEOs' equity participation and the decision to proceed with a public offering: the probability of IPO cancellation in weak capital markets increases as CEOs hold too little or too much ownership. Our results also indicate that a firm's debt levels are positively linked with the IPO decision. CEO ownership and leverage intensity interact to influence the decision to take a firm public. Author Affiliation: (2)University of Massachusetts - Lowell, College of Management, 1 University Avenue, Lowell, MA 01854, USAEmail:scott_latham@uml.edu (1)University of Montana - Missoula, School of Business Administration, Gallagher Business Building, 32 Campus Drive, Missoula, MT 59812, USAEmail:michael.braun@business.umt.edu more...

In this article, we examine the role financial slack plays in a particularly hostile environment: economic recession. We employ competing theoretical views on the function of financial slack to examine its relationship to firm performance in a population of firms facing extreme resource scarcity. Using econometric data from 450 software firms from 2001 to 2003, we find that higher levels of financial slack are detrimental at the onset of a recession but can accelerate recovery. Our results suggest that financial slack, as a discretionary tool for managers, can be manipulated both to speed strategic reaction to environmental shifts and to favorably position firms for eventual economic rebound., Much has been written in the strategic management literature on whether slack resources help or hinder the successful management of the firm (e.g., O'Brien, 2003; Cheng and Kesner, 1997; Nohria [...] more...

Empirical results of a study reveal various insights on why reverse leveraged buyouts go private, the extent of board restructuring during the buyout stage, and the effects of those changes in firm performance. The findings support the argument that boards represent a supplemental source of value creation in the buyout process. more...

The role of boards of directors as source of value creation during leveraged buyouts is presented.