1. Mechanised Models and Proofs for Distance-Bounding
- Author
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Constantin Catalin Dragan, François Dupressoir, Pascal Lafourcade, Ioana Boureanu, and David Gerault
- Subjects
Theoretical computer science ,Computer science ,business.industry ,Cryptography ,Gas meter prover ,Mathematical proof ,Payment terminal ,law.invention ,Relay ,law ,Bounding overwatch ,Encoding (memory) ,business ,Protocol (object-oriented programming) - Abstract
In relay attacks, a man-in-the-middle adversary impersonates a legitimate party and makes it this party appear to be of an authenticator, when in fact they are not. In order to counteract relay attacks, distance-bounding protocols provide a means for a verifier (e.g., an payment terminal) to estimate his relative distance to a prover (e.g., a bankcard). We propose FlexiDB, a new cryptographic model for distance bounding, parameterised by different types of fine-grained corruptions. FlexiDB allows to consider classical cases but also new, generalised corruption settings. In these settings, we exhibit new attack strategies on existing protocols. Finally, we propose a proof-of-concept mechanisation of FlexiDB in the interactive cryptographic prover EasyCrypt. We use this to exhibit a flavour of man-in-the-middle security on a variant of MasterCard’s contactless-payment protocol.
- Published
- 2021
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