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This article develops a game-theoretic model to value the bidirectional option in a one-manufacturer and one-component-supplier system. The production process of the supplier is subject to random yield. The manufacturer contracts the supplier with bidirectional options to obtain components, and assembles them into end products to meet a stochastic demand. In addition, both firms can sell or/and buy the components on a spot market. First, the unique optimal order and production strategies of the decentralized system under bidirectional option contracts are derived. Second, resorting to numerical example and comparing the bidirectional option model with the call option model, we find that the manufacturer’s optimal firm and total order as well as expected profit under bidirectional options are larger than that of under call options, but the option quantity has the opposite tendency. The supplier’s optimal production quantity are larger under bidirectional options than that of under call options, but only when the option (exercise) price exceeds a certain value, the supplier’s expected profit under bidirectional options will be larger than that of under call options. Third, the coordination of the decentralized system under bidirectional option contracts is analyzed and a coordination mechanism with the contract is designed.

This research studied the duopoly manufacturers’ decision-making considering green technology investment and under a cap-and-trade system. It was assumed there were two manufacturers producing products which were substitutable for one another. On the basis of this assumption, the optimal production capacity, price, and green technology investment of the duopoly manufacturers under a cap-and-trade system were obtained. The increase or decrease of the optimal production quantity of the duopoly manufacturers under a cap-and-trade system was decided by their green technology level. The increase of the optimal price as well as the increase or decrease of the maximum expected profits were decided by the initial carbon emission quota granted by the government. Our research indicates that the carbon emission of unit product is inversely proportional to the market share of an enterprise and becomes an important index to measure the core competitiveness of an enterprise.

In this paper, we used Super-efficient DEA methodology and panel data analysis methods to analysis of the relationship between the performance of state-owned enterprises of Sichan and its shareholding structure. The results showed that: there is no significant correlation between the ownership concentration and corporate performance; there exists significant negative correlation between the proportion of state-owned shares and corporate performance; there is no significant correlation between the proportion of corporate shares and corporate performance. Thus, that moderate control the proportion of state-owned shares will be benefit to the state-owned enterprises of Sichuan.