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Until now, the processes of global regionalisation have not been adequately reflected in the formation of systemic approaches to the management of financial relations within the Eurasian Economic Union. It leads to the search for new financial policy mechanisms necessary to stimulate the economies of the EAEU countries in the context of emerging economic and geopolitical constraints, as well as the creation of the necessary prerequisites for industrial cooperation in the context of anti-Russian sanctions and de-globalisation trends intensified by the COVID-19 pandemic. Currently, the vulnerability of the economies of the EAEU member states is due to their extreme dependence on external extra-regional demand, international capital and technology markets, as well as international settlement and payment systems based on the US dollar. The study is based on a dialectical approach. In conducting the research, we used general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis, generalisation, as well as methods of systemic, historical-logical and comparative analysis. The contradictory nature of the development of the world economy at the present stage was revealed. The role of the EDB in creating conditions for sustainable development of the EAEU member states has been substantiated. Changes in the structure of the EDB’s investment portfolio were analysed. The advantages and disadvantages of the EDB’s current activities in the context of the implementation of the Bank’s Strategy for 2018–2020 were summarised. Comparative characteristics of financing of EDB member countries through multilateral development banks were presented. The impact of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic on the current and future activities of the EDB was shown.

Given their attractiveness as a source of financing for the least developed countries, multilateral development banks (MDBs) have grown in quantity and size supported by their sources of financing. We believe that this ‘resource dependency’ has not been sufficiently questioned in the literature, especially regarding the credit exposure these organizations have with their largest borrowing members. This article characterizes and identifies the differential effects of the three sources that make up the dependence on resources in the MDBs: capital contributions, leverage in the markets and their credit function. We analysed these sources particularly at the International Development Bank (IBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) and in two recent events: the risk exchange implemented by the referred MDBs in 2015 and the effect of the Argentina’s selective default on the IDB’s capital adequacy (2014). We find an increasing relevance of leverage and the size of loans, which models a dependence on resources that weakens the development mandate of these organizations. Resumo Dada sua atratividade como fonte de financiamento para os países menos desenvolvidos, os bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento (BMDs) cresceram em quantidade e tamanho apoiados por suas fontes peculiares de financiamento. Acreditamos que essa ‘dependência de recursos’ não tenha sido suficientemente questionada na literatura dos BMDs, especialmente no que diz respeito à exposição de crédito que essas organizações têm com seus maiores membros tomadores de empréstimos. Este trabalho caracteriza e identifica os efeitos diferenciais das três fontes que compõem a dependência de recursos nos BMDs: aportes de capital, alavancagem nos mercados e sua função de crédito. Analisamos essas fontes particularmente no Banco Internacional para Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (BIRD), no Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (BID) e no Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento (BAD) e em dois eventos recentes: a troca de riscos implementada pelos referidos BMDs em 2015 e o efeito da inadimplência seletiva da Argentina na adequação de capital do BID (2014). Encontramos uma crescente relevância da alavancagem e do tamanho dos empréstimos, que modela a dependência de recursos que enfraquece o mandato de desenvolvimento dessas organizações.

This article criticises the growing reliance on environmental and social (ES) policies by development finance institutions (DFIs), and the increasing use of corresponding accountability mechanisms to challenge development projects. The concept of juridification is used to explain this phenomenon and shows the crucial role of global civil society in expanding the reach of ES policies and accountability mechanisms. Linked to the competition between DFIs in the “marketplace” of international development finance, juridification also enables legal avoidance practices by the DFIs. The article shows that juridification in international development finance is “tragic” because the expansion of ES policies further marginalises the affected groups needing legal protection.

This paper aims to provide empirical evidence for demonstrating financial additionality of multilateral development banks (MDBs) in private participation in infrastructure (PPI) projects in terms of financing beyond what is available in the markets. To verify MDB financial additionality, this study examines whether the PPI projects with multilateral support have significantly larger investment commitments than the total average projects by using the PPI database of the World Bank for 1996–2020. The empirical analysis identifies MDB financial additionality, in that the larger investment commitments of multilateral-supported projects beyond the average are confirmed in any income levels and regions in host countries and any sectors and types in the projects. In particular, MDB financial additionality is valid even in low-income countries where private finance is still too premature to be available. In the host countries where their government effectiveness is in the poorest edge, however, MDB financial additionality loses its significance, thereby requiring the governance enhancement and capacity building in the host countries and innovative blended finance instruments for its additionality to work.

The subject of the researchis the functioning of multilateral development banks in the world economy and prospects for their cooperation with Russia.The relevanceof the problem is due, firstly, to the need to make a revision of the Russian policy of cooperation with international financial organizations so as to use their practices in programs of socioeconomic transformations and expand the country’s presence in the global economy, and, secondly, to the availability of huge resources accumulated by the largest multilateral banks with prospects of their use for the domestic economy modernization.The purpose of the researchwas to consider the business specifics and prospects of cooperation of multilateral development banks with Russia with a focus on investment activities carried out by the World Bank divisions and three multilateral development banks — the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank — that are analyzed in terms of their functions at the regional level and in the world economy. The paper gives an assessment of the current state of Russia’s cooperation with multilateral development banks and examines its prospects.It is concludedthatRussia needs to develop an understanding of its own position with regard to the activities of the above organizations and build a cooperation system that would contribute to the realization of its national interests and be in line with the country’s economic development policies.

he 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, adopted by the UN in September 2015, drew attention of the international community to the problem of finding resources to finance various initiatives and programs necessary to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The availability of the required long-term financing from state budgets and multilateral development banks (MDBs) remains limited, and its structure is not optimal due to unstable market conditions and cyclical fluctuations in the global economy, as well as a number of long-term economic trends. At the same time, private investment, primarily from the largest institutional investors, could become another important source of additional financing for development, which could partially compensate for the abovementioned deficit. Given that, on the one hand, private investors have considerable funds, which they are not inclined to invest in infrastructure development for various reasons, and on the other hand, MDBs’ investment in this sector remain limited, despite their vast experience and unique institutional characteristics, demand has increased for multilateral banks to perform a more active role in developing and using new financial instruments, addressing information problems and providing their own financial resources, that is, co-financing projects with the private sector. This article examines the main approaches used by the MDBs to mobilize private investment, assesses their “major catalytic role” of co-financing with the private sector, and gives some recommendations on strengthening their mobilization role. According to the author, the data on direct private investment mobilization provided by MDBs indicate the need to expand the use of mobilization tools. In this regard, measures aimed at solving the main problems in this area - the limited MDBs’ resources and their conservative credit policy – seem to be the most promising. Among these measures are easing capital requirements for banks, optimization of “concessional windows”, and partial transfer of MDBs’ obligations to private investors, including through creating investment platforms and special funds. Although these mechanisms in various forms have already been adopted by key MDBs, given insufficient levels of mobilization, it is necessary to remove obstacles to their more active use.

This article addresses selected issues enmeshed into global economic governance debate. It focus¬es on a role of international institutions in transforming world order, in particular the rise of emerging powers increasingly categorised or acronymised as BRICS, their resources, power and vested interests. The main narrative brings close the phenomenon of the new reshuffling in multilateral development banking (MDB). The New Development Bank (NDB), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as ‘products’ of the third wave of MDB emergence, fit well into the proc¬ess coined as ‘the recalibration of the world economy.’ It is expressed by shift of the centre of glo¬bal economic gravity towards non-western actors and can be explained by arguments derived from game theory. They elucidate exit - voice nexus, where the cost of exit for both organisation leaders (Western donors) and members (EMDCs, BRICS) is fragmented multilateralism and where the cost of voice is decreasing capacity to influence principles and procedures of multilateral develop¬ment lending. The article in the first section starts with overview of three waves of multilateral development banking, where the most recent of them is partially explained using game theory argument. Second section starts from accentuating common characteristics of NDB and AIIB and then examines the differences between NDB and AIIB - entities which emerged during the third wave. The final section provides summaries and conclusions. Artykuł porusza wybrane zagadnienia związane z debatą na temat globalnego zarządzania gospodarczego. Koncentruje się na roli instytucji międzynarodowych w przekształcaniu porządku światowego, w szczególności w odniesieniu do wzrostu znaczenia potęg wschodzących, coraz częściej kategoryzowanych lub akronimizowanych jako BRICS, ich zasobów, władzy i żywotnych interesów. Główna narracja przybliża zjawisko najnowszych tendencji rozwojowych w wielostronnej bankowości rozwojowej (MDB). Nowy Bank Rozwoju (NDB) i Azjatycki Bank Inwestycji Infrastrukturalnych (AIIB) jako “produkty” trzeciej fali pojawiania się MDB, dobrze wpisują się w proces określany jako “rekalibracja gospodarki światowej.” Wyraża się on poprzez przesunięcie środka globalnej grawitacji ekonomicznej w stronę niezachodnich aktorów, co można to wytłumaczyć argumentami wywodzącymi się z teorii gier. Wyjaśniają one związek między wyjściem a głosami, w którym kosztem wyjścia zarówno dla liderów organizacji (dawców z Zachodu), jak i dla członków organizacji (EMDC, BRICS) jest rozdrobniony multilateralizm, a kosztem głosu jest zmniejszenie zdolności wpływania na zasady i procedury wielostronnych pożyczek rozwojowych. W pierwszej części artykułu dokonuje się przeglądu trzech fal wielostronnej bankowości rozwojowej, przy czym ostatnią z nich częściowo wyjaśniono za pomocą argumentów zaczerpniętych z teorii gier. Drugą część zaczęto od zaakcentowania wspólnych cech NDB i AIIB, po czym zbadano różnice pomiędzy NDB i AIIB - podmiotami, które pojawiły się podczas trzeciej fali. Ostatnia sekcja artykułu zawiera podsumowanie i wnioski.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are designed to finance investments that promote global economic and social development. The objective of this paper is to discuss a key component in meeting the demand for investment in developing countries, namely the ability of MDBs to provide loans in local rather than foreign currency. To explain how these institutions fulfill this purpose, we distinguish “traditional” from “new” MDBs, discuss the problems generated from foreign currency indebtedness, and explore a way out, or an alternative explanation, based on New Developmentalism theory and the challenge of local currency financing. RESUMO Os bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento (MDBs) são projetados para financiar investimentos que promovam o desenvolvimento econômico e social global. O objetivo deste artigo é discutir um componente-chave para atender à demanda por investimentos em países em desenvolvimento, ou seja, a capacidade dos bancos multilaterais de fornecer empréstimos em moeda local e não em moeda estrangeira. Para explicar como essas instituições cumprem esse propósito, distinguimos os MDBs “tradicionais” dos “novos”, discutimos os problemas gerados pelo endividamento em moeda estrangeira e exploramos uma saída ou uma explicação alternativa, baseada na teoria do Novo Desenvolvimentismo e no desafio da comunidade local quanto a financiamento de moeda.

The new global agenda, with Agenda 2030 at its core, is ambitious, comprehensive, and universal. The three central goals now are to reignite growth, deliver on the sustainable development goals (SDGs), and meet the ambitions of the Paris climate agreement aimed at mitigating climate change and adapting to its effects. Achieving these goals will require a significant scaling up and reorientation of investments, especially for sustainable infrastructure and human development.Implementing this agenda is urgent, as the world is witnessing the largest wave of urban expansion in history and more infrastructure will come on stream over the next 15 years than the world’s existing stock. This is also the last opportunity to manage remaining significant demographic transitions. The capital investments and technological choices made in the coming two decades will lock-in carbonization, urbanization, and demographic trends that will determine the future of humanity and our planet for the rest of the century and beyond. The backdrop for achieving these ambitions is challenging. In many countries, investment and productivity growth have decelerated, there is growing inequality and persistent unemployment, fragility and tensions are rising, and the incidence and vulnerability to shocks has grown. At the same time, major opportunities exist to tap the potential of new technologies and the growing capacity of the private sector. Today’s hyper-connected world requires a mix of activities spanning private goods, national public goods, and regional/global public goods to meet the challenges of sustainable development. The agenda requires government intervention to reach adequate scale, to take social and environmental sustainability seriously, and to manage spillovers across sectors and borders. It also requires stepped up international cooperation to drive transformative change and mobilize financing on an unprecedented scale. With their highly effective capacity to help countries strengthen policy and institutional foundations and to leverage finance, multilateral development banks (MDBs) have a central role to play. They are trying to respond, but human and financial constraints and unclear and expanded mandates from shareholders are holding them back. Clarifying their mandates and addressing the constraints are essential to enable them to scale up and make more effective their support for the new global agenda. The unique financial structure of the MDBs allows them to leverage contributions from MDB shareholders and multiply them into financing at low cost. This financial capacity can in turn further crowd-in other sources of finance, especially from the private sector. With better system-wide coordination, MDBs can scale up their impact to deliver for increasingly differentiated clients, but this requires shareholder consensus on, and financial support for, expanded efforts. Independent evaluations suggest that each MDB is individually performing well, but the system as a whole is not delivering enough. This paper suggests ways to improve policy and operational coherence among MDBs and outlines how better shareholder governance could bring this about. It focuses on the need for stepped-up financing of investments in developing countries, but should be viewed in the broader context of managing globalization, especially with regard to trade and financial stability.

Since its establishment, the New Development Bank (NDB) has been actively seeking to establish cooperation with other multilateral financial institutions. This strategy was stimulated by the fact that projects funded by multilateral banks often require large-scale investments and significant expert resources, or are associated with risks that a single lender cannot undertake independently. The purpose of this article is to study the mechanisms of cooperation between the NDB and “traditional” multilateral banks, as well as the national development banks of the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. This article seeks to forecast the future of cooperation in order to better understand the overall prospects of the NDB. To do so, existing formats of engagement between the NDB and other development banks are analyzed, as are their approaches to participation in joint projects. The article finds that the NDB, despite its differences from the “traditional” banks, seeks to establish an effective division of labour and cooperation with them, primarily because of their common goal of reducing the large-scale deficit in infrastructure investments. Despite the fact that none of the projects approved by the NDB so far involves other multilateral development banks, the launch of official cofinancing with them is expected in the very near future. Depending on the scenarios of NDB expansion, its joint loan portfolio with other multilateral banks in five years could reach $58 to $82 billion. As for national development banks of the BRICS, the NDB has also laid a formal framework for cooperation with them, even while it has not yet resulted in any concrete projects. Thus, in order to successfully implement its strategy of engagement with other financial institutions in the future, the NDB needs to intensify practical cooperation with national banks in the areas identified in the relevant declarative documents.

The article is focused on the activities of two recently established multilateral development banks (MDBs) - the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) - in mobilizing private infrastructure investment. Unlike other MDBs, these banks specialize exclusively on sustainable infrastructure projects and are currently creating mechanisms to attract private investment. These factors, as well as Russia’s leading role in both banks, make it necessary to study the mechanisms used by the NDB and AIIB to mobilize private sector funds and make recommendations for their further expansion and development. To achieve this goal, this article presents an analysis of both banks’ documents providing for their engagement with the private sector and mobilizing its resources, and compares qualitative and quantitative characteristics of practical cooperation between private investors and the two MDBs. Based on the analysis, the author makes recommendations on improving and expanding the list of mechanisms used to mobilize private financing. In particular, the AIIB, following the NDB example, should start attracting capital in the member countries financial markets as soon as possible. The NDB needs to ensure the prompt launch of its Project Preparation Fund operations, while the similar AIIB’s fund should focus on raising funds from private investors to finance its activities. It will also be instrumental for the NDB to clearly formulate a strategy for financing loans without sovereign guarantees. In addition, both banks should expand the set of tools used for mobilizing private investment and consider provision of guarantees, expert work and support directly to borrowing countries, as well as exchange of experience and participation in joint projects.

This article applies ‘macro’ legal analysis to the challenge of legal reform related to corporate responsibility for human rights violations and degradation of the environment. It recognises that the approaches from different communities of lawyers to the negative impacts on human rights and the environment caused by companies, sometimes operate in isolation from each other, are not always mutually supportive, can lead to a fragmentation of effort, and may not address the root causes of the problem. In particular, this article analyses the extent to which existing approaches tend to address symptoms of the issues, rather than the root causes themselves. It makes the case that in this regard specific root causes exist within the frameworks of corporate law in all jurisdictions and various aspects of international economic law too. To carry out the study, it employs macro legal analysis, a methodology not previously applied in this field, as a means of developing an understanding of the legal frameworks that, it argues, influence corporate decision making that can affect human rights and the environment. It undertakes an analysis that incorporates relevant corporate law, World Trade Organisation (WTO) law, international investment law, the law relating to multilateral development banks (MDBs), and international insurance law. By using this form of anlaysis it is possible to show how legal frameworks can operate in unison, reinforcing each other providing a cumulative effect that can influence corporate decision makers. Finally, based on the results of the analysis, it suggests a possible strategy of macro-level reforms that could be applied to the re-design of relevant legal frameworks to better facilitate the full protection of human rights and to achieve net zero degradation of the environment. As a result it seeks to demonstrate how this approach can be strategically applied by both human rights and environmental lawyers as a common pathway towards effective legal reform.

Most experts on multilateral development banks (MDBs) mention the possibility of large-scale co-financing in their forecasts concerning their future operations. However, interaction between MDBs and other actors, including co-financing, is rarely considered as a research problem for analytical and scientific papers. Yet this type of cooperation is one of the most important factors of effectiveness for the entire system of MDB financing. Thus, working in partnership with governmental institutions (development assistance agencies, export credit agencies, etc.), MDBs help attract additional financial resources and expertise in the countries where they are active. Working on state, regional and global levels, multilateral banks cooperate not only with governmental institutions, but also with private sector and civil society representatives. Such cooperation benefits both parties. In addition to mobilizing additional financial resources, it improves project preparation and implementation, taking into account national peculiarities, while partner institutions get a chance to use their experience and expertise. Given the recent establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), they are unlikely to achieve their main goal of narrowing the infrastructure financing deficit in developing countries without active cooperation with other institutions. This article discusses the results and examines the prospects of the NDB and AIIB cooperating with traditional MDBs. It also focuses on the new banks’ engagement with other financial institutions, including commercial banks and national development banks. The author analyzes interbank memorandums and agreements as a formal basis for cooperation between various institutions, and examines in detail the examples of co-financing infrastructure projects by the new and traditional MDBs, as well as new multilateral cooperation mechanisms established by development banks. The author concludes that the new banks’ strategies differ from those of other institutions, and each has its own advantages. The AIIB seeks to establish cooperation primarily with large institutions to use their considerable experience and explore co-financing opportunities for large-scale projects. The NDB, with limited membership and geographical representation, focuses on, inter alia, cooperation with MDBs with a small number of participants, national development banks and commercial banks, which allows it to adopt the best international practices and gain experience in specific countries, receive consultative support for issuing bonds and improve financial management.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) highlights the role of large infrastructures in promoting socioeconomic progress. Environmental and social planning will play a pivotal role to ensure that the BRI is tuned with the protection of nature and societal needs. This paper appraises environmental and social safeguards employed by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), one of BRI’s key actors. Results show that their rationale, scope, and function are aligned with international practice. Their efficacy however may be jeopardized by the limited capacity of the Bank to oversee the screening and assessment of impacts. More importantly, AIIB’s safeguards endorse an obsolete conceptualization of sustainability, centred on the mitigation of impacts, rather than on the transformation of socioeconomic development patterns.

This article discusses climate-related standards that development finance institutions establish or apply to projects supported by their investments. It focuses particularly on multilateral development banks given their major role in providing finance to developing countries, where the bulk of the world’s fastest growing emissions are taking place. It looks at proposed and recently adopted standards, as well as different perspectives developed and developing countries have regarding these standards. It also discusses how these standards might be impacted by the evolution of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations and concludes that there will be continuing challenges to implement these standards unless developed countries fulfill their pledge of expected finance.

This article takes a closer look at the complex web of financial assistance mechanisms in the climate change sector. These mechanisms are important tools for assisting developing countries to address the challenges associated with climate change. Mapping the various types of institutions and funds in this sector, the author underlines the important role played by the private sector but also highlights the increasing presence of financial mechanisms under the aegis of international organizations, such as the World Bank. Moreover, a particular focus is placed on the Green Climate Fund and the way in which the establishment of this mechanism may affect the functioning of existing financial mechanisms. In calling for better communication, coordination, and coherence among these actors and mechanisms, the author suggests that these ends may be achieved by placing an emphasis on plurality, complementarity, and mutual support through, inter alia, more effective policy oversight and enhanced inter-institutional relations.

About a third of development projects fail to achieve satisfactory outcomes, according to agencies' independent evaluation units. To a large extent, these outcomes appear to be baked into projects at their inception due to inadequate project design or relevance. This prompts questions about the diffusion of project design concepts: To what extent are better-designed or better-performing projects more likely to be emulated? Do factors of bureaucratic or political attractiveness -- such as ease of set-up and rapidity of disbursement -- play a role? To address these questions, this paper explores the use of methods from network science. It constructs a network graph of the relationship among the components of all World Bank investment projects initiated from 1996 to 2014, based on the semantic similarity of the component descriptions. It uses the network to assess the characteristics of projects that are more 'prolific' in the sense of having closely related followers, and as tool for visualizing diffusion of design concepts. This illustrative exercise defines a measures of project 'influence' on subsequent projects and tests simple, nonexclusive hypotheses about the determinants of influence. It finds no significant impact of project outcome or quality of entry (as independently rated) on 'influence.' Nor does ease of project preparation (as proxied by time from concept note to effectiveness) have any significant effect. However, very small projects (less than $10 million) have markedly lower 'influence' on average. This finding may have implications for the usefulness of small projects as pilots for subsequent scale up.

In this article the author focuses on the recently established New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It identifies two factors of demand for this new model of multilateral development banks (MDBs), namely a lack of infrastructure financing and the aspirations of developing countries for a greater role in the global financial system. The author also compares the NDB and AIIB according to membership, management structure, distribution of capital and votes, and options for attracting capital in the financial market. Based on this comparison, he forecasts the banks’ credit portfolios growth until 2025. The author concludes that both institutions should accumulate and use the best practices of existing MDBs, improve their image to attract investors and actively engage in sharing expertise and co-financing projects with development institutions as well as commercial banks. By doing so, the volume of their operations could reach $40 billion per year in 10 years, which is close to the volume of infrastructure financing provided by major traditional banks, and could contribute substantially to addressing the financing needs of developing countries.