21 results on '"Wright, Julian"'
Search Results
2. Competing Payment Schemes
- Author
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Guthrie, Graeme and Wright, Julian
- Published
- 2007
3. Marketplace or reseller?
- Author
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Hagiu, Andrei and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Marketing -- Methods -- Analysis ,Value-added resellers ,Business, general ,Business - Abstract
Intermediaries can choose between functioning as a marketplace (in which suppliers sell their products directly to buyers) or as a reseller (by purchasing products from suppliers and selling them to buyers). We model this as a decision between whether control rights over a noncontractible decision variable (the choice of some marketing activity) are better held by suppliers (the marketplace mode) or by the intermediary (the reseller mode). Whether the marketplace or the reseller mode is preferred depends on whether independent suppliers or the intermediary have more important information relevant to the optimal tailoring of marketing activities for each specific product. We show that this trade-off is shifted toward the reseller mode when marketing activities create spillovers across products and when network effects lead to unfavorable expectations about supplier participation. If the reseller has a variable cost advantage (respectively, disadvantage) relative to the marketplace, then the trade-off is shifted toward the marketplace for long-tail (respectively, short-tail) products. We thus provide a theory of which products an intermediary should offer in each mode. We also provide some empirical evidence that supports our main results. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2042 Keywords: intermediation; multisided platforms; control rights; marketing History: Received July 9, 2013; accepted July 7, 2014, by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy. Published online in Articles in Advance November 21, 2014., 1. Introduction Retailers such as 7-Eleven, Eastbay, Lowe's, and Zappos act as intermediaries by reselling the products they purchase from suppliers to buyers. Other intermediaries, such as the Alibaba Group, [...]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. Exclusive dealing and entry, when buyers compete: comment
- Author
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Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Competition (Economics) -- Research ,Exclusive dealing agreements -- Economic aspects ,Market entry ,Business ,Economics - Abstract
An economic model measuring the effect of exclusive dealing and entry where buyers are homogenous price competitors is examined. Anticompetitive exclusive deals can still arise in an economy with competition among buyers.
- Published
- 2009
5. Pricing access: Forward-looking versus backward-looking cost rules
- Author
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Guthrie, Graeme, Small, John, and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Pricing -- Analysis ,Product price ,Business ,Business, international ,Economics - Abstract
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.08.004 Byline: Graeme Guthrie (a), John Small (b), Julian Wright (c) Abstract: Regulators across many different jurisdictions and industries have recently adopted the practice of setting access prices based on the current costs of providing the relevant facilities. Though widely regarded as being efficient, the efficiency implications of using current costs instead of historical costs have not been formally analyzed. Our analysis shows that given stochastic costs, forward-looking access prices retard investment and are generally dominated by access prices determined by historical cost whenever investment is desired. Author Affiliation: (a) School of Economics and Finance, P.O. Box 600, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand (b) University of Auckland, New Zealand (c) National University of Singapore, Singapore Article History: Received 23 June 2004; Accepted 5 August 2005
- Published
- 2006
6. The determinants of optimal interchange fees in payment systems
- Author
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Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Credit card processing services -- Evaluation ,Sales promotions -- Methods ,Banking industry -- Prices and rates ,Banking industry -- Evaluation ,Business ,Economics - Abstract
A new card payment system for similar mindset consumers and merchants in competitive markets is presented. The model focuses on optimal fee payment charges of both customers and merchants.
- Published
- 2004
7. The optimal design of interest rate target changes
- Author
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Guthrie, Graeme and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Interest rates -- Analysis ,Central banks -- Finance -- Analysis ,Banking, finance and accounting industries ,Business ,Company financing ,Finance ,Analysis - Abstract
Most central banks currently implement monetary policy by targeting a short-term interest rate. This paper asks: 'What is the optimal form for such interest rate targeting, given the objectives facing central banks?' We find the optimal role is for the central bank to change the target rate whenever the deviation between its preferred rate and the current target rate reaches some critical level, and in this case the target rate is changed by a discrete amount in the direction of its preferred rate. Despite the simplicity of this role, we are able to replicate a number of puzzling features of interest rate targeting observed in practice, as well as explain some dynamic properties of market interest rates. Keywords: central banks, interest rate smoothing, monetary policy., MOST CENTRAL BANKS currently use interest rate targets as their operating objective in the implementation of monetary policy. Central banks in Australia, Canada, Japan, and the U.S. all target an [...]
- Published
- 2004
8. Optimal card payment systems
- Author
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Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Debit cards -- Finance ,Company financing ,Business ,Business, international ,Economics - Abstract
This paper presents a model of a card payment system to address the pricing and roles that govern such systems. It evaluates the social optimality of privately set interchange fees and the adoption of a rule by payment systems to prevent merchants surcharging for card transactions using two extremes of merchant pricing--monopolistic pricing and perfect competition. Both types of merchant pricing constrain the ability of card schemes to use interchange fees and the no-surcharge role in anticompetitive ways, although for quite different reasons. The positive role of the no-surcharge rule in preventing excessive merchant surcharging is also highlighted. JEL classification: G21; L31; L42 Keywords: Payment systems; Banks; Credit; Debit cards; Interchange fees
- Published
- 2003
9. Asymmetric network interconnection
- Author
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Carter, Michael and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Interconnection (Telecommunications) -- Prices and rates ,Competition (Economics) -- Models ,Telecommunications services industry -- Management ,Telecommunications services industry -- Laws, regulations and rules ,Communications industry ,Telecommunications services industry ,Company pricing policy ,Company business management ,Government regulation ,Business ,Economics - Abstract
A competition model for interconnected networks is analyzed. Simple regulation allows for identical access price assignment.
- Published
- 2003
10. Access Pricing under Competition: an Application to Cellular Networks
- Author
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Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Cellular telephone equipment industry -- Analysis ,Access charges (Telephone) -- Analysis ,Business ,Economics - Abstract
This paper analyses access pricing when a firm's customers create a bottleneck facility when a call made to a person with cellphone requires access to the firm of the subscriber. Thus, the cellular firms are free to set termination charges for fixed-line calls.
- Published
- 2002
11. Interconnection in Network Industries
- Author
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Carter, Michael and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Telecommunications services industry -- Laws, regulations and rules ,Communications industry -- Laws, regulations and rules ,Telecommunications services industry ,Government regulation ,Business ,Economics ,Telecommunications Act of 1996 - Abstract
Byline: Michael Carter (1), Julian Wright (1) Keywords: Deregulation; interconnection; networks; telecommunications Abstract: Recent deregulation of telecommunications in the U.S. and elsewhere has highlighted the importance of interconnection in network industries. In this paper, we analyse interconnection in a deregulated network where the participants compete in the final retail market. We consider both the case of a mature industry as well as one where a new entrant challenges the incumbent. In the later case, network externalities allow the incumbent to use the terms of interconnection to maintain its dominant position. Moreover, in either case, competition in the retail market can be undermined by collusion over access prices. We discuss the implications for some of the provisions of the new U.S. Telecommunications Act, specifically mandatory interconnection and reciprocity of tariffs, comparing these to the simple 'bill and keep' rule. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Economics, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand Article History: Registration Date: 15/10/2004
- Published
- 1999
12. Exclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition
- Author
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Abito, Jose Miguel and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Contract agreement ,Business ,Business, international - Abstract
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.004 Byline: Jose Miguel Abito (a), Julian Wright (b) Keywords: Exclusive contracts; Foreclosure; Naked exclusion; Vertical restraints Abstract: The existing literature on exclusive dealing is extended to take into account that buyers signing exclusive deals are typically competing firms that are differentiated from the perspective of their customers. We show, provided such downstream firms are not too differentiated or provided upstream firms can compete in two-part tariffs, exclusive dealing forecloses entry to a more efficient rival. An established upstream firm and competing downstream firms raise their joint profit by signing exclusive deals to protect the industry from upstream competition. Naked exclusion arises despite the Chicago School logic that buyers only sign contracts that make themselves (jointly) better off. Author Affiliation: (a) Midi-Pyrenees School of Economics, University of Toulouse, 1 Manufacture des Tabacs 31042, Toulouse Cedex, France (b) Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, 117570 Singapore Article History: Received 27 December 2005; Revised 2 October 2006; Accepted 20 November 2006 Article Note: (footnote) [star] We benefited from comments from seminar participants at the 2006 EARIE meetings, the National University of Singapore, and especially the suggestions of two anonymous referees and our editor. Any errors are exclusively our own.
- Published
- 2008
13. Optimal currency denomination of public debt in New Zealand
- Author
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Fowlie, Kerryn and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
New Zealand -- Finance ,Public debts -- New Zealand ,Monetary policy -- New Zealand ,Business ,Business, international ,Economics ,Regional focus/area studies - Abstract
A study has been made of the New Zealand public debt and of whether it should be denominated in domestic or foreign currencies. All net public debt is now in New Zealand dollars. An optimal debt portfolio should not have any nominal domestic debt. The dominance of demand or supply shocks is susceptible to the economic environment at any given time. More study will be needed to see effects of New Zealand's new economic environment on its public debt portfolio., This paper addresses the issue of whether New Zealand's public debt obligations should be denominated in domestic or foreign currency. Using the tax-smoothing approach of Bohn (1990), we estimate optimal [...]
- Published
- 1997
14. Multihoming and compatibility
- Author
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Doganoglu, Toker and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Business ,Business, international - Abstract
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.07.004 Byline: Toker Doganoglu (a), Julian Wright (b) Keywords: Multihoming; Compatibility; Network effects; Standards; Two-sided markets Abstract: When competing firms make their services compatible, consumers enjoy greater network benefits. These benefits can also be realized if firms remain incompatible and consumers multihome by purchasing from each of the firms. We find that such multihoming may be a poor substitute for compatibility. Multihoming weakens competition and introduces costs that firms do not internalize. As a result, multihoming can increase the social desirability of compatibility, while making compatibility less attractive for firms. Surprisingly, policymakers should generally be more concerned about the lack of compatibility when multihoming is present. Our results extend to two-sided markets. Author Affiliation: (a) Center for Information and Network Economics, University of Munich, Germany (b) Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, Singapore Article History: Received 26 February 2004; Revised 3 November 2004; Accepted 17 July 2005 Article Note: (footnote) [star] We would like to thank two anonymous referees and our editor, Simon Anderson, for their very helpful comments.
- Published
- 2006
15. Price structure in two-sided markets: Evidence from the magazine industry
- Author
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Kaiser, Ulrich and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Periodicals ,Periodical publishing ,Business ,Business, international - Abstract
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.06.002 Byline: Ulrich Kaiser (a)(b)(c), Julian Wright (d) Keywords: Two-sided markets; Magazine markets; Advertising Abstract: We present and estimate a model of competition in a two-sided market: the market for magazine readership and advertising. Using data on magazines in Germany, we find evidence that magazines have properties of two-sided markets. The results are consistent with the perception that prices for readers are 'subsidized' and that magazines make all their money from advertisers. Consistent with advertisers valuing readers more than readers value advertisements, our results imply that higher demand on the reader side increases ad rates, but that higher demand on the advertising side decreases cover prices. Author Affiliation: (a) University of Southern Denmark at Odense, Department of Business and Economics, Campusvej 55, 5230 Odense M, Denmark (b) Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany (c) Centre for Economic and Business Research, Copenhagen, Denmark (d) Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, AS2 Level 6, 1 Arts Link, Singapore 117570, Singapore Article History: Received 10 March 2004; Revised 5 November 2004; Accepted 30 June 2005
- Published
- 2006
16. Network interconnection with participation constraints
- Author
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Poletti, Stephen and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Telecommunications services industry -- Economic aspects ,Pricing -- Management ,Reciprocity (Commerce) -- Prices and rates ,Interconnection (Telecommunications) -- Management ,Communications industry -- Economic aspects ,Telecommunications services industry ,Product price ,Company business management ,Company pricing policy ,Business ,Computers and office automation industries ,Economics ,Library and information science - Abstract
The role of interconnection and reciprocal charging between networks on competitive behavior is discussed. The influence of reciprocal charging and non-linear retail pricing on profits in telecommunications industry is presented.
- Published
- 2004
17. Competition in telecommunications: an introduction
- Author
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Peitz, Martin, Valletti, Tommaso M., and Wright, Julian
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Interconnection (Telecommunications) -- Models ,Interconnection (Telecommunications) -- Prices and rates ,Telecommunication -- Management ,Communications technology ,Company pricing policy ,Company business management ,Business ,Computers and office automation industries ,Economics ,Library and information science - Abstract
The role of interconnection charges between telecommunication networks in competition, price discrimination and customer discrimination are presented. The various interconnection models and their result on access prices are listed.
- Published
- 2004
18. Adaptive mesh generation applied to switched-reluctance motor design
- Author
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Jack, Alan G., Finch, John W., and Wright, Julian P.
- Subjects
Reluctance motors -- Research ,Magnetic flux -- Research ,Rotors -- Dynamics ,Business ,Computers ,Electronics ,Electronics and electrical industries - Published
- 1992
19. Testing the Expectations Theory of the Term Structure for New Zealand
- Author
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Guthrie, Graeme, Wright, Julian, and Yu, Jun
- Subjects
United States. Federal Reserve Board -- Influence ,New Zealand -- Economic aspects ,Interest rates -- Economic aspects ,Rational expectations (Economics) -- Research ,Business ,Business, international ,Economics ,Regional focus/area studies - Abstract
This paper tests the rational expectations theory of the term structure using recent daily, weekly, and monthly observations on New Zealand interest rates. We find that for many maturities we cannot reject the expectations hypothesis using both short and long versions of the theory. These results are interpreted as further evidence that the failure of the expectations hypothesis in the United States is due to the specific interest rate smoothing behaviour of the Federal Reserve., 1. Introduction The rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure is one of the fundamental building blocks of financial and macroeconomic theory. It has important implications for predicting future movements [...]
- Published
- 1999
20. Mobile Call Termination
- Author
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Armstrong, Mark and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Business ,Economics - Abstract
To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02276.x Byline: Mark Armstrong (1), Julian Wright (2) Abstract: We analyse charges levied by mobile telephone networks to deliver calls. We integrate two literatures: one analysing calls from the fixed network, where predicted unregulated termination charges are too high, and one analysing calls from rival mobile networks, where predicted charges are too low. In practice, however, networks adopt uniform charges for terminating both kinds of traffic, as do regulators. We show how incorporating wholesale arbitrage and demand-side substitution helps to reconcile theory with practice. In our framework, the unregulated charge is uniform and typically lies between the efficient and monopoly benchmarks. There remains a rationale for regulation, albeit reduced. Author Affiliation: (1)University College London (2)National University of Singapore
- Published
- 2009
21. Credit card interchange fees
- Author
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Julian Wright, Jean-Charles Rochet, University of Zurich, and Wright, Julian
- Subjects
Economics and Econometrics ,media_common.quotation_subject ,2002 Economics and Econometrics ,Discount points ,Outcome (game theory) ,Microeconomics ,credit card networks, credit card pricing, interchange fees ,credit card pricing ,ddc:330 ,media_common ,Kreditkarte ,interchange fees ,Economic surplus ,Payment ,10003 Department of Banking and Finance ,330 Economics ,Bankentgelt ,Credit card ,2003 Finance ,ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY ,credit card networks ,Anreizregulierung ,Konsumentenrente ,Business ,Monopoly ,Theorie ,Finance ,Monopol - Abstract
We build a model of credit card pricing that explicitly takes into account credit functionality. We show that a monopoly card network always selects an interchange fee that exceeds the level that maximizes consumer surplus. If regulators only care about consumer surplus, a conservative regulatory approach is to cap interchange fees based on retailers’ net avoided costs from not having to provide credit themselves. In the model, this always raises consumer surplus compared to the unregulated outcome, sometimes to the point of maximizing consumer surplus.
- Published
- 2010
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