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In the past insolvency resolution process included operations of simultaneous Acts. This was changed and several insolvency laws were consolidated resulting in a single law for insolvency and bankruptcy unlike any other previous laws, These include the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985, the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, the Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, and the Companies Act, 2013. Due to this, some cases were there pending for years. This code is the unification of all these laws which help do a robust mechanism to revive a company if it had to see the fate of insolvency. This code provides genuine rehabilitation and restructuring of the company. The IBC process, like the Australian and UK administration procedures, is not a debtor in possession procedure. Instead, a third-party insolvency practitioner (the Resolution Professional) takes control of the corporate debtor and, within strict statutory time frames, formulates a restructuring plan that creditors need to approve. The IBC process gives substantial power to financial creditors, both domestic and foreign.

Singapore’s statutory provisions on scheme of arrangement are very similar to that found in most Commonwealth countries. Over the last two decades the scheme has become a popular tool to restructure the debts, both financial and trading, of insolvent companies. The courts have taken a leading role in this development and in the process have laid down principles and rules to augment the bare statutory provisions. The scheme has become a de facto debtor in possession regime in Singapore. This success story has an unexpected twist recently. As part of its strategy to develop Singapore into an international centre for debt restructuring, the Government has accepted the recommendations of a law review committee to bring in significant elements of the US Chapter 11. A draft Bill published for consultation included an automatic, wide-ranging moratorium, cross-class cram down, super priority lien and pre-packaged schemes. It will be argued that due to the significant differences between the insolvency laws of Singapore and US and the different conceptual framework of the scheme and Chapter 11, there will be a period of uncertainty or even instability while the courts work out ways to harmonise the two different bodies of law. This bold experiment has relevance beyond Singapore. The developments have close parallels in UK’s recent consultation on reforming her insolvency law framework and, to a lesser extent, the European draft directive on restructuring. The Singapore story of injecting US Chapter 11 into the Commonwealth scheme is thus deserving of close attention while it unfolds.

In October 2009, the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau of the Hong Kong Government published a consultation paper to review corporate rescue procedure with the aim of reforming key issues relating to corporate rescue. This paper compares the proposed reform in Hong Kong and the debtor-in-possession concept of the United States of America in Chapter 11 corporate rescue, and seeks to identify the reasoning behind the differences.

Two recent cases decided under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act highlight some potential snares in coordinating U.S. and Canadian insolvency proceedings. In both cases, the Canadian debtors had guaranteed the obligations of their U.S. affiliates, in one case under a secured loan and in the other under a debtor in possession loan. These cases illustrate how the Canadian courts are dealing with the issue of cross-border guarantees and the extent to which they are concerned that the interests of Canadian unsecured creditors be considered.

The US Bankruptcy Code’s chapter 11 procedure is both in practice and conceptually the most important insolvency procedure worldwide. Many countries, including the Netherlands, look at Chapter 11 for inspiration in revising their own insolvency laws. Chapter 11 is, however, itself up for revision. On December 4, 2014, the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) issued breaking news for the restructuring and insolvency community in the USA when it presented its Final Report and Recommendations on the Reform of Chapter 11. This article discusses the most principled recommendations that will also be of the most relevance for legislatures and policy makers drawing inspiration from Chapter 11. First of all, the recommendation is discussed for introducing the figure of a so called ‘estate neutral’ as a supplement to the debtor in possession model. Secondly, the introduction of significant restrictions on 363 sales; selling all or nearly of the assets. Restrictions deal both with timing and creditor involvement. As a third recommendation, we single out the introduction of a so-called ‘redemption option’. This option seeks to restore in part the balance between secured and unsecured creditors by giving ‘the immediate out of the money creditors’ a claim on encumbered assets equal to a redemption option. Finally, most novel and most interesting from a company law perspective, is the introduction of an Equity Retention Plan for Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SME’s). The plan seeks to strike a balance between protecting the statutory order of distributions which would normally prevent a distribution to shareholders on the one hand and providing an incentive to shareholders necessary for the successful reorganisation of the company to remain involved on the other. This recommendation thereby provides an exception to the Absolute Priority rule, which usually has as the effect of wiping shareholders out in case of insolvency.

The ability to obtain financing is a critical element in the attempt to successfully reorganise a firm which has declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing is one method which has become increasingly popular in recent years. This paper examines whether receiving DIP financing is related to successful reorganisations and a shortened duration under Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Evidence on these two research questions may then be extended to infer whether or not DIP financing is likely to reduce the costs of bankruptcy. The findings are of interest to managers of firms which are experiencing financial difficulty and their shareholders, as well as current and potential lenders and regulators.

German Abstract: Am 12.3.2014 publizierte die EU-Kommission eine Empfehlung fur einen neuen Ansatz im Umgang mit unternehmerischem Scheitern und Unternehmensinsolvenzen (C(2014) 1500 final). Der vorliegende Aufsatz setzt sich kritisch mit dieser Empfehlung auseinander. Eine Harmonisierung der mitgliedstaatlichen Insolvenzrechte ist zwar im Grundsatz zu begrusen. Die spezifischen Regeln, die in der Empfehlung vorgeschlagen werden, sind jedoch mangelhaft. In dem Aufsatz werden die Kernelemente eines neuen Eigenverwaltungsregimes entwickelt, das effiziente Unternehmensrestrukturierungen in Europa viel effektiver fordern wurde als die Vorschlage in der EU-Empfehlung. Vor diesem Hintergrund zeigt der Aufsatz, wie insbesondere der deutsche Gesetzgeber auf diese Vorschlage reagieren sollte. English Abstract: On 12 March 2014, the European Commission published a recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency (C(2014) 1500 final). This paper critically reviews the Commission’s recommendation. While harmonization efforts regarding insolvency systems in Europe are to be welcomed in principle, the specific rules suggested in the recommendation suffer from serious defects. The paper develops the core elements of a new debtor in possession restructuring regime that would be much more effective in promoting efficient business restructurings in Europe than the Commission’s proposals. Against this background, the paper suggests how the German lawmaker in particular should react to these proposals.

This paper is an introductory survey of bankruptcy and insolvency theory and practice relating to the introduction of Shari'ah principles into secular bankruptcy and insolvency regimes in both jurisdictions that incorporate the Shari'ah, to some extent, into the secular law of the jurisdiction and purely secular jurisdictions. The paper first summarizes some of the Shari'ah principles that are applicable in the bankruptcy and insolvency context. Thereafter, the paper notes the general nature of the secular bankruptcy and insolvency regimes currently in use and summarizes some current practices that are of relevance in the distressed debt, bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, restructuring and workout markets, particularly in jurisdictions that have adopted or may adopt a reorganization methodology (such as Chapter 11 or the UNCITRAL model insolvency law). Finally, the paper summarizes certain aspects of the bankruptcy proceeding involving the East Cameron oil and gas sukuk as an example of a secular bankruptcy proceeding involving a Shari'ah-compliant instrument and transaction.

Hong Kong lacks a statutory corporate rescue regime, despite repeated attempts at legislative reform beginning with the the Law Reform Commission’s 1996 recommendations. But each attempt to pass a version of so-called “provisional supervision” failed, mainly due to irreconcilable views of diverse stakeholders on the treatment of labour claims, and in particular on the feasibility of full satisfaction of labour claims as a precondition to entering provisional supervision. In October 2009 the government of Hong Kong tried once again to bridge the differences with proposals set forth in a consultative paper entitled, Review of Corporate Rescue Procedure Legislative Proposals, issued by the Financial Services and Treasury Bureau (FSTB). On 22 January 2010 at the University of Hong Kong, the authors convened a symposium of stakeholders to discuss and comment on the consultative paper. Underscoring the importance of corporate rescue legislation, stakeholders responded enthusiastically. and endeavored to overcome historical impasses with fresh ideas on the treatment of labour claims. The attendees also welcomed a proposal by the authors, that Hong Kong consider adopting a “hybrid” debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) approach to corporate reorganization that would allow management in certain cases and with creditor approval to continue administering the debtor during the statutory rescue process. Following the symposium, the FSTB invited the authors to draft a paper discussing the various proposals on the treatment of labour claims that emerged at the symposium, and to provide a more detailed discussion of the hybrid DIP approach. In this article, submitted to the Hong Kong Law Journal, the authors seek to relay to a broader audience the comments and proposals they initially expressed in their submission to the FSTB. This paper reviews the history of corporate rescue legislation reform attempts in Hong Kong, then discusses the merits and demerits of various proposals for dealing with labour claims, and finally presents and discusses the merits of a hybrid debtor-in-possession approach to corporate rescue. The authors argue that without a DIP option, many companies in distress will not avail themselves of provisional supervision, and that, in many if not most cases, a punitive approach to management is not merited and thwarts the intended goal of a corporate rescue regime.

Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing is one of the most important building blocks of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The recent economic downturn, however, has frozen the DIP financing market. Absent the financing necessary to reorganize, many companies will be forced to liquidate. Who will fill the void in DIP financing as banks exit the market? This note seeks to explore alternative options - local banks, the government, and private equity or hedge funds - that may fill the vacuum left by the banks, and the risks and rewards associated with DIP financing. As these alternate institutions go forward, the landscape of DIP financing may forever change, with not only increasing risk of loan default and inflationary concerns, but also the opportunity to profit.

In 2000, Japan enacted the Law of Recognition and Assistance for Foreign Insolvency Proceedings (LRAFIP) which adopted almost all the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, and abolished the notorious territorialism contained in Japanese insolvency laws for so many years. Since the LRAFIP became effective in 2002, only two cases have been filed (one by a foreign trustee and the other by a debtor in possession), calling for recognition and assistance under the LRAFIP.

In a study of the division of professional fees in 74 large, public company bankruptcy cases concluded from 1998 through 2003, we find that 79% of court-awarded fees are awarded for services rendered directly to the debtor in possession. Only 20% are awarded for services rendered to creditors committees, only one half of one percent are awarded for services rendered to equity committees, and less than one percent are awarded for services rendered by court appointed professionals. Fifty-three percent of the fees were awarded to attorneys, 42% to financial advisors, 5% to accountants, and a fraction of 1% to all other professions combined. Of the 53% that went to attorneys, more than two thirds went to bankruptcy attorneys and less than one third went to "special" or "ordinary course" counsel performing nonbankruptcy work. We estimated regression models for the fees of each of five types of professionals: (1) attorneys, (2) DIP bankruptcy attorneys, (3) DIP special attorneys, (4) financial advisors, and (5) DIP financial advisors. Debtor size, case duration, and the number of attorney firms working were the principal determinants of attorneys fees. But those factors were only weak determinants of financial advisors' fees. The strongest determinants of financial advisors' fees were court (the Delaware and New York courts awarded more to financial advisors) and the trend over time. Over the period of our study, the fees of financial advisors increased at the rate of 25% per year. Courts did not award higher fees to financial advisors in cases where the debtor sold its business or a controlling interest in its business. By comparing the results of our study with the results of LoPucki and Whitford's study of reorganizations in early 1980s, we find a sharp increase in the employment of financial advisors by creditors' committees and a sharp decline in the employment of professionals by equity committees. We found that several factors thought to cause DIP bankruptcy attorneys fees to be higher in fact did not. They include whether the DIP lead attorneys were a New York firm, whether the DIP lead attorneys were from a city distant from the courts, and the hourly rates charged by the attorneys.

This article presents the findings of an empirical study of professional fee and expense awards by United States Bankruptcy Courts in 48 large public company bankruptcy cases concluded from 1998 through the first half of 2002. Data was gathered from fee applications and orders in the courts files. Using that data together with case and company data from the Bankruptcy Research Database, the authors constructed regression models of the determinants of (1) the amounts of professional fees and expenses awarded by case and (2) the amounts of debtor-in-possession bankruptcy attorneys fees awarded by case. Two determinants dominate both models: the value of the reorganizing firm's assets and the length of time the case remains pending. Two additional factors contribute to determining the amount of professional fees and expenses, but not debtor in possession bankruptcy attorneys fees: the number of professional firms working in the bankruptcy case and whether the case was in the Delaware bankruptcy court. The ratio of fees and expenses to firm size was subject to a scale effect. As the size of the case increased, the ratio of fees to expenses declined. For the 48 cases studied, total fees and expenses were 1.4% of assets reported on the bankruptcy petition. The average ratio of fees and expenses to assets was 2.2%, but removal of a single outlier reduced it to 1.9%. Controlling for firm size, case duration, and the number of professional firms working, fees were 32% higher in Delaware cases. But controlling only for firm size, the significance of this finding disappeared. Fee cuts were generally small - exceeding 4% of the amounts applied for in only 11% of the cases. The mean fee cut varied significantly by court. Delaware cuts averaged 0.7%, New York 4.5%, and Other Courts 2.3%. The differences in fee cuts among courts was significant, but fees were not significantly lower in cases with larger fee cuts. Based on a comparison of the data gathered in this study with the data gathered by Weiss, inflation-adjusted professional fees and expenses awarded in large, public company reorganizations have fallen by about 57% since the 1980s. Controlling only for firm size, the difference is statistically significant. The decline in fees appears to be associated with the decline in case duration that occurred during the period.