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This article examines how Japan has adapted economic statecraft to serve changing strategic aims through case studies of trade arrangements, official development assistance, and dual-use technology. After World War II, Japan continuously adapted these economic tools to pursue shifting non-economic goals related to international reintegration, comprehensive security, human security, and traditional security. More recently, in response to escalating US–China strategic competition, Japan has employed economic statecraft to simultaneously reduce international instability and to counter China in targeted ways as part of a broader hedging approach. First, Japan has attempted to bolster multilateral trade arrangements amid a volatile policy environment, while also using them to both engage and counter China. Second, Japan has used official development assistance to stabilize and build defense capacity in Asian countries facing pressure from China. Third, Japan has increasingly militarized its dual-use technologies to enhance its ability to respond to Chinese activity in outer space.

The aim of this article is to give an overview of the state of artificial intelligence regarding malware attacks, its uses in the military and views regarding if it should be classified as a dual-use technology. As an emerging technology, with a wide variety of use and capabilities, more could be done to overview its uses, and some form of control over it. While the classical exports control might be counterproductive, a more closed approach towards critical information dissemination might be advisable until the full range of capabilities of artificial intelligence will be known.

This article examines the dynamics of an emerging multi-use paradigm for satellite remote sensing (RS). From the beginning of the space age, RS satellites have served as dual-use technologies. The advancements to RS technology since that time have largely been driven by the security and economic interests of States. While these interests are to some extent mutually supporting, they have also created a complex environment where non-governmental actors such as commercial satellite operators are increasingly involved in matters of national security and defence. Furthermore, the growing number of RS data providers globally, and more open and easily accessible data and analysis tools online, are creating a new use paradigm for RS in civil-military relations. These developments are extending the dual-use technology dilemma to one of multi-use, where non-governmental actors, including ordinary individuals, are becoming entangled in government affairs. This article traces the trajectory of these processes, and discusses potential implications for RS capable States.

Quantum technology is an emergent and potentially disruptive discipline, with the ability to affect many human activities. Quantum technologies are dual-use technologies, and as such are of interest to the defence and security industry and military and governmental actors. This report reviews and maps the possible quantum technology military applications, serving as an entry point for international peace and security assessment, ethics research, military and governmental policy, strategy and decision making. Quantum technologies for military applications introduce new capabilities, improving effectiveness and increasing precision, thus leading to `quantum warfare', wherein new military strategies, doctrines, policies and ethics should be established. This report provides a basic overview of quantum technologies under development, also estimating the expected time scale of delivery or the utilisation impact. Particular military applications of quantum technology are described for various warfare domains (e.g. land, air, space, electronic, cyber and underwater warfare and ISTAR -- intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance), and related issues and challenges are articulated., Comment: Revised version accepted for EPJ Quantum Technology

Modern universities play a significant role, and in some countries, a key role, in research and development on a large variety of topics, often belonging to the sphere of national security. University research in the US is an illustrative example in this regard, which is an important source of knowledge and technology for the military and its industrial counterparts. However, even with the large number of theoretical and empirical studies focusing on the different aspects of university research innovation activities, so far, the problems of the development of military or dual use technologies by universities has been poorly covered in the economic literature. In this article, the specific features of university participation in defense research and development is examined using the example of the Russian higher education institutions. It is shown that Russian universities are poorly involved in defense-related activities. On the basis of a sample survey of 80 universities and also analyzing certain public policies in research and innovations, the conclusion has been made that higher education institutions have considerable potential for performing research and development for the defense industry. The actual problems and obstacles hindering the development of research activities in the interest of the defense industry at universities are identified, including the traditional orientation of industrial companies on the their own research divisions and sectoral research institutes and design bureaus, weak information about the current opportunities and achievements of university research, inadequate activity of universities in promoting their own research competencies, and the creation of an image of advanced R&D centers. Possible ways of solving the existing problems are proposed.

Scientific and technical education can have dual uses, with both peaceful and WMD applications. Examples include Iraqi engineering students in the 1970’s learning skills that would later be useful in Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons programs, and A. Q. Khan, who went from European degrees in metallurgy to stealing URENCO centrifuge technology and leading Pakistan’s program. Engineering and scientific education in proliferation-related fields should be controlled as are tangible dual use materials and technologies, and denied to citizens of countries likely to be proliferation risks.

Space assets have provided the U.S. military a demonstrable edge against adversaries since the 1990–1991 Gulf War. Most space technology is dual-use, meaning it has both civil and military applications; this creates an ambiguity to know whether military applications are intended as offensive or defensive. This chapter examines four schools of thought on how to preserve U.S. space dominance, and what that realistically means, discussed within the context of issues related to dual-use technology, sustaining the space environment, and international law within which the schools have developed. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 celebrated its fifty-year anniversary in 2017, making those legal considerations especially appropriate. Whether further legal, even ‘soft law” approaches to optimizing the U.S. use of space, or whether preparing for what some consider “inevitable” space war should prevail in guiding future U.S. space security policy is the question planners and analysts must address.

In light of the quandaries presented by domestic law, has the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 (“BWC”) also been so outpaced by the technologies that it is no longer effective and meaningful in international law? Part II will examine the continuum of official actions that have attempted to keep pace with the growing biotechnologies that may present threats to global biosecurity through interpreting the BWC. Part III looks at how these definitions may not be sufficient. Finally, Part IV looks at other mechanisms that may provide a better way of controlling biological weapons than redefining the technologies through the current processes.

China has largely been cut off from direct transfers of military systems and technologies since the announcement of the EU arms embargo in 1989. Nevertheless, the EU and its member states remain a major source of high technologies for China, namely, by means of trade, investment, and scientific cooperation. This is mainly because the EU-China relationship continues to be dominated by the economic interests of individual member states, both in trade and increasingly in investments. Furthermore, due to a lack of direct security interests in the Asia-Pacific, Europeans do not generally see China as a security threat or a strategic competitor. Therefore, the EU has so far failed to develop a strategic approach toward the potential security implications of transfers of European militarily sensitive technologies that goes beyond the existing arms embargo and currently lacks effective mechanisms to control the flow of such technologies to China.

While Japanese business interests support the export of high-technology items and the transfer of technology from Japan to China, these economically motivated actions may have direct and indirect impacts on Japan's national security. First, the transfer of dual-use technology to China may directly help China's military buildup. Second, high-tech exports and technology transfers may have an indirect effect by eroding Japan's technological advantages vis-à-vis China. In this article I place these concerns into a historical context and analyze the current challenges to Japan's export control policies. I offer an overview of the Japan-China trade relationship, with a special focus on high-tech trade. I then discuss changes in Japan's export controls regarding China, based on heightened security concerns. Evidence indicates that the Japanese government is ill equipped to deal with “technology leakage,” which is accelerating the erosion of Japan's technological supremacy and is not covered by its current export control regime.

Technological Immersion (TI) is defined as an approach process to current industrial activity. It is focused on improving the competitive standards of the production activity by analyzing innovation processes, which were regulated by any standard that summarizes most of the international and relevant knowledge on Innovation Management Processes (for Spain, this is the regulation UNE166000). It allows using education on Project Management as a basic foundation to develop dual use technologies for security and defense purposes and for any other industry framework as well. The aim of this case study is to compile, under a TI scope, the experiences acquired by the students of the fourth course at the University Centre of Defense at the Spanish Air Force Academy, when studying the last generation of films that may have high strategic interest for defense as well as for many industrial applications. The TI was performed through a workshop about UNE166000 (Spanish Regulation), McLuhan Tetrad and other lessons on Innovation Management, the main purpose being to teach the students how to draft a professional report about the technological and knowledge transfer opportunities that these films may generate in order to develop new industrial advantages on dual use industry.

The literature concerning ethical issues associated with nanotechnologies has become prolific. However, it has been claimed that ethical problems are only at stake with rather sophisticated nanotechnologies such as active nanostructures, integrated nanosystems and heterogeneous molecular nanosystems, whereas more basic nanotechnologies such as passive nanostructures mainly pose technical difficulties. In this paper I argue that fundamental ethical issues are already at stake with this more basic kind of nanotechnologies and that ethics impacts every kind of nanotechnologies, already from the simplest kind of engineered nanoproducts. These ethical issues are mainly associated with the social desirability of nanotechnologies, with the difficulties to define nanotechnologies properly, with the important uncertainties surrounding nanotechnologies, with the threat of ‘nano-divide’, and with nanotechnology as ‘dual-use technology’.

The World Nuclear Association estimates that by 2030, 600 nuclear reactors will be in operation around the world; 60 countries are considering nuclear power, out of which 10 to 25 are expected to bring nuclear power plants on line by 2030. This could lead to the construction of additional uranium enrichment plants, which, with adjustments, can produce material for nuclear weapons. Any of these states can work to be within reach of weapons capability while, until the last minute, remaining within their international nonproliferation obligations. In recent years, efforts have again intensified to limit the spread of nuclear enrichment by proposing various multinational approaches to reduce proliferation concerns. While there has been progress in the establishment of low-enriched uranium banks, several obstacles remain to be removed. A special consideration is given to the fuel-leasing option, which reduces distribution of additional enrichment capabilities, provides economic incentives, and addresses safety...

In order to support well some promising dual-use core technology integration items with limited resources, scientific and effective value evaluation model should be constructed by governments. Based on the characteristics of such technology integration project, we build a value evaluation system for dual-use core technology integration, which includes social effects, economic results, technical value, and possibility for technology to be transformed into products etc. as major component. And then, such project evaluation model is established by using gray theory and hierarchy analysis method. By using a case analysis, it reveals and verifies further the operational process of this evaluation model. This model is scientific and feasible. Since it is not perfect, some research works on this model should be done further in future.

As the potential for the involvement of corporations in the manufacture of nuclear weapons has increased, particularly through dual-use technology, global regulation has failed to keep pace. Where regulation of private corporations does exist, in the form of treaties, UN resolutions, or more informal arrangements, the obligations fall only on states. This state of affairs is a result of international law's traditional deference to state sovereignty; yet, it has led to significant shortcomings in the global regulatory regime, where states are unwilling or unable to meet their obligations. While radical departures from the traditional model of international law might remove the regulatory gaps caused by noncompliant states, such changes are unrealistic in the current political climate. More realistic changes must be focused on, offering greater recognition of the role of private corporations in nuclear proliferation and increasing state compliance with existing regulation.

Over the last 10 years, India has taken on a significant challenge: become a great power in space-, missile-, and nanotechnology, and do it with the help of a new friend—the United States. But is U.S.-Indian technology-sharing still seen as harmless international engagement?

Like nuclear energy, most technologies could have dual use—for health and well being and disaster and terror. Some research publications have brought to the forefront the tragic consequences of the latter potential through their possible use. Monitoring life science research and development (R&D) to prevent possible misuse is a challenging task globally, more so in developing economies like India, which are emerging as major biotech hubs. As a signatory to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, India has put in motion a process of evolving a series of measures to manage dual-use technology. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) has taken a lead in drafting model codes of conduct, ethics and practice for use by other S&T agencies to tailor them as per their requirements. Taking cue from the discussions held by the editors of the various medical and science journals in the developed world, the Indian Journal of Medical Research, the official publication of the ICMR, is working on policy and uniform practice of publication of dual-use research results. The Government of India too has promulgated legal provisions to minimize the risks of misuse of technology, like the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. Clearly, no single agency would be able to manage the dual-use of technology effectively. Multiple agencies have to come together to work in tandem for effective implementation of various measure and also like Janus, ensure that they are neither too restrictive nor intrusive to discourage the development of science.

This paper explores the paradox of US policy on dual-use technology cooperation with China in the face of resistance from a strong section of the security establishment. The paper examines the factors contributing to the current level of dual-use technology business between the two countries. It finds that the US Cold War grand strategy of co-opting China by dividing the socialist bloc has resulted in embedded commercial interests that have been further bolstered by the strategic need for ties with China. To neutralise piqued interests, the United States is constantly engaged in the business of devising safety valves in the form of export controls.

Many technologies have both vital legitimate uses and potent military applications. An international regulatory regime has been devised for the purpose of monitoring the use of the most dangerous of these technologies, namely chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Multiple examples of the use of chemical and biological weapons against members of the public, and evidence of prohibited state weapons development programs, demonstrate the vital need for a more effective enforcement regime. The authors discuss the concept and threat of dual‐use technology, the existing regulatory regime and its shortcomings, and propose enhancing this regime with powerful international judicial authorities to enable the prosecution of any state, group or individual who attempts to misuse dual‐use technology.

By judiciously combining internal and external knowledge acquired since the early 1960s, India has been able to build one of the strongest national space programmes in the world. Space development policy and technology accumulation in India appear to have evolved in different phases. In the 1960s the space programme was mainly science-oriented; in the 1970s it progressed to technological experimentation and learning; in the 1980s the emphasis was on achieving ‘threshold’ capabilities in satellite and rocket technologies; and in the 1990s the focus shifted to commercialisation. This article traces India's space programme, which began as a ‘science’ programme in the 1960s, and by the 1990s had evolved into a ‘commercial’ programme.

Review of Chinese Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear Age to the Information Age. By Evan Feigenbaum. [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 339 pp. US$ 55.00. ISBN 0-8047-4601-X.]China's growing technological capability has become the topic of the day among Western officials concerned with the national security and economic competitiveness implications of China's growing prominence. The publication of a study which attempts to explain how security and competitiveness have been linked in the evolution of Chinese technology policies is therefore quite timely. The effort to locate this linkage in the development of an ideology of techno-nationalism resonates nicely with perceptions – held by many in Western capitals – of a China with a special passion for the acquisition of dual use technology and a determination to use political means to secure economic advantage. The appearance of Evan Feigenbaum's book, which rightly locates China's technological trajectory at the centre of many of the more important questions about the Chinese future, is thus to be welcomed.

The US Department of Defense (DOD) normally pursues a closed approach to technological development. It captures results from its own sponsored research and development (R&D), and the results are kept shielded by restrictions on related publications and exports. This R&D strategy is no longer viable. Now most military technology has commercial origins, the US no longer dominates all relevant technological fields, and sophisticated dual-use technology is accessible to adversaries in open global markets. DOD can address this dilemma by drawing on external R&D that tests a technology’s general capabilities against a variety of potential uses and by placing more of its internal emphasis on technology integration. Historically, this approach to military R&D also yields more commercial spin-offs.

Dual-use technology refers to tools or techniques, developed originally for military or related purposes, which are commercially viable enough to support adaptation and production for industrial or consumer uses. Consequently, expensive technologies that would otherwise only serve military purposes can also be used to benefit civilian commercial interests when not otherwise engaged. With defense budgets in decline, industrialized nations must address affordability, as well as performance, in the acquisition of new weapon systems. This paper explores how the utilization of dual-use technology in the United States and the Republic of China is leveraging advanced technologies and efficient production capabilities of commercial industry.

One tangible legacy of the Scott Report was to focus concern on the control of the transfer of sensitive technology by electronic means. In response to recommendations made in the Report the Government established a Scott Inquiry Follow Up Unit within the Department of Trade and Industry and published a Consultation Green Paper and White Paper. A particular concern has focused on the transfer of military and dual use technology which can be controlled (arguably) in a tangible form but not if transmitted by intangible means, i.e. fax, internet, e-mail, orally. Consideration has been given to the relationship between export controls for military and dual use goods and a parallel control regime for associated intangible technology. The Government proposal is to introduce a general power to control the transfer of technology by intangible means - limited 'for the time being' to weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and delivery systems). On the 10 November 1998 the Trade and In...

Time changes and so does the requirements; at times the scenarios transform the perception. The associated intricacies provoke the thoughts to deal and these thoughts are put in to action through education and practicalities achieved through structured training. One such event post-September 11 was the anthrax letters which changed the perspective of understanding the magnitude of biological agents. If we look back since then, each year has been better equipped to deal any eventuality rather more stress has been on safeguards. Meanwhile, the transformation in biotechnology and molecular biology with decoding of DNAs and evolution of genetically modified organisms, and finally danger associated with dual use technology remain persistent points of concern. Awareness and education have been pivotal in imparting knowledge and curtailing the occurrence of any substantial event. Thus immense efforts were launched towards biosafety training. Today all the institutes dealing with education related to microorganisms in any form ensure student awareness and training regarding biosafety. The basic training is mandatory before dealing with microorganisms, and training regarding transportation of infectious samples has to be repeated after specified period. Students and even professionals often face problems about finding available opportunities especially meant for excelling in this field; briefly these would be narrated

(1997). Proliferation in Northeast Asia: South Korea's dual‐use technology imports from Japan. The Nonproliferation Review: Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 72-82.

The project which led to this volume focused upon examining two issues: The primary legal challenges arising from the use of new technologies in warfare, most particularly with regard to foreseeable humanitarian impacts within the battlespace; and possible future directions of interpretation, application and progressive development in the law of armed conflict, in light of the challenges presented by the specific characteristics of each new form of technology. The prevailing view among scholars and practitioners at the summative Workshop held at the Australian National University in September 2012 was that the law of armed conflict, as it currently exists, remains flexible enough to meet the challenges posed by the introduction of new and anticipated technologies into warfare. Many chapters of the present volume have reinforced this view, whilst nevertheless identifying some of the seams where further, and more informed, debate is required in order to clarify the law in terms of its application or interpretation. This concluding chapter returns to the four thematic issues that emerged during the discussion at the September 2012 Workshop, and briefly reflects upon how the contributors to this volume have considered those themes and addressed the potential for the law of armed conflict to accommodate these varied—and highly variable—technological challenges.

This introductory chapter outlines the general relationship between technological development and the conduct of warfare in the historical context. It then introduces the objective of the book, which is to critically examine the potential legal challenges arising from the use of new technologies in warfare, and future directions of legal development. It proceeds on the premise that the fundamentally transformative impact of new technologies on the means and methods of warfare, and on the broader environment in which warfare is conducted, cannot be understood without specific characteristics of the technology and challenges each technology presents for both the law of armed conflict and the battlespace. Each chapter of this book is introduced in the broader context of the four thematic issues that emerged during the discussion among scholars and practitioners working in the field, held at the Workshop at the Australian National University in September 2012.

At first sight, and against certain counterparties, cyber warfare has appeared and proved to be a phenomenally low-cost and low-risk tool of adversarial foreign policy. But while questions increasingly arise about exposure to reciprocal risk to the most heavily digitized knowledge- and data-based economy and society, it has become clear that the genie will never again return into its bottle. Strategic, legal, and political questions will not be dodged much longer. The very advantages of cyber warfare may easily and all too quickly be turned against a first mover, especially one as vulnerable as a highly digitized industrial state. Its use for asymmetric warfare increases attractiveness to non-state actors. And one of its arguably greatest potential, the disruption of enemy economic functionality by disruption of payment systems has regularly been vetoed in the interest of the integrity of the global system. It may appear that the philosophy underlying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as treaties banning use of chemical and biological weapons may provide even stronger rationales in an understanding to ensure mutual non-aggression by digital electronic means between major and even mid-size powers.

Several toxins are “dual-use” in that they have legitimate therapeutic, pharmaceutical, or scientific applications as well as potential military utility as toxin warfare (TW) agents. The growing peaceful applications of such toxins may complicate efforts to ban their use for warfare or terrorist purposes. Worldwide consumption of toxins for medical therapy and scientific research has increased from a few grams to the current level of hundreds of grams per year, and the projected future growth of toxin therapies will require tens to hundreds of kilograms of material annually, blurring the distinction between medically useful and militarily significant quantities. As a result, a proliferator might seek to acquire an offensive TW capability under the guise of “peaceful” activities permitted by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). To examine this problem more closely, the case of ricin—a putative toxin warfare agent with expanding scientific and medical applications—is discussed in detail. Finally, an analysis of policy options for regulating dual-use toxins concludes that precise monitoring of toxin production would be impracticable in many cases, and that international efforts to achieve greater openness and transparency offer the most realistic basis for distinguishing between the legitimate and banned uses of toxins.

The U. S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) National Automotive Center (NAC) owns a fleet of ten Hydrogen Hybrid Internal Combustion Engine (H2ICE) vehicles that have been demonstrated in various climates over the past two years. This included demonstrations in Michigan, Georgia, and California. Between July of 2009 and January of 2011, the fleet of ten H2ICE vehicles was deployed to Oahu, Hawaii for long-term duration testing. The operation of the H2ICE vehicles in Hawaii utilized standard operation of a non-tactical vehicle at a real-world military installation. The vehicles were fitted with data acquisition equipment to record the operation and performance of the H2ICE vehicles; maintenance and repair data was also recorded for the fleet of vehicles. Over the year-long demonstration, the vehicles were driven by a wide range of military services including the Army, Air Force, Navy, Pacific Command (PACOM) and National Guard; each service had different drive cycles. Drivers were trained in the operation of the H2ICE vehicles and the safe use of hydrogen, and were surveyed to solicit their feedback on the H2ICE vehicles. The demonstration of this fleet of H2ICEs identified maintenance issues associated with long term operation of the vehicles, as well as user concerns that would need to be addressed if hydrogen vehicles are going to be transitioned from research and development fleets to general commercial use vehicles. Vehicle performance data collected showed the fuel efficiency of the fleet of vehicles and the vehicle's reliability.

The National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (Strategy) is a high-level document outlining the areas where the Obama Administration intends to focus its efforts to reduce the accidental or intentional spread of biological agents. The Strategy is meant to complement other frameworks already in place that address biological threats, emergency preparedness, and emergency response; it is not meant to implement any particular program or direct that any particular action be taken. Keywords: National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats; Bioterrorism; Biological threat; Biological Weapons Convention; Dual-use technology

This chapter analyzes the construction of secrecy under the current U.S. export control regime for dual-use technologies and discusses its application for two technologies: research on a class of semiconductors used in military and civilian applications and biotechnology research on select agents. We argue that the assignment of technologies and countries to categories controlled under the export regime is an exercise in creating secret knowledge, in which the broad category of “the other” is subdivided between those who are forbidden to know and those who are not (and thus implicitly are qualified to become a party to the secret). We draw attention to the social cost of errors made in applying these categories, and point to some remaining issues.

Advanced diagnostic and prognostic technology promises to reduce support costs and further improve safety of flight. The ability to detect fault precursors and predict remaining useful life can provide longer periods of uninterrupted operations as well as reduce support costs and improve crew response to degrading conditions. Two major barriers to realizing this potential include the cost of implementation in legacy and new aircraft and the lack of data to develop or mature algorithms. The cost of incorporating the additional sensing, data collection, processing and communications hardware into legacy aircraft is typically prohibitive, particularly if qualification/requalification of hardware and software are required. Boeing and Killdeer Mountain Manufacturing (KMM) developed a dual use technology to enable the low cost and footprint implementation of health management systems. The Chafing Protection System (CHAPS) uses optical fiber within wire bundles to detect and locate the wire chafing. An Optical Time Domain Reflectometry (OTDR) is used to locate the source of the chafing. Boeing has developed technology to also make use of the CHAPS fiber to communicate health management data onboard a vehicle. This technology includes a split ring connector which enables the implementation of a low cost, support critical, high bandwidth data network for health management.1 2

Many observers are skeptical of claims that private entrepreneurs can perform traditional governmental functions like supporting basic research, keeping WMD away from terrorists, or protecting public health. This article presents five recent counterexamples. These include initiatives designed to establish new health and safety standards in nanotechnology; build a central repository for worldwide mutations data; use on-line volunteers to find cures for tuberculosis; and require biotech companies to screen customer orders for products that can be used to make weapons. In principle, many more initiatives are both possible and desirable. Historically, however, government done little to promote private initiatives and sometimes destabilized them. The article suggests strategies for this overcoming this problem.

This project involves an Industry/University Cooperative Research Center consortium between The Ohio State University, the University of California, Davis, and North Carolina State University to assist in advancing food processing and packaging technology and will greatly benefit the US food industry and military personnel. This industry driven consortia center, CAPPS-Center for Advanced Processing and Packaging Studies, focuses on industrially relevant research directed toward coupling microbial life sciences with process and package engineering.

Dual-use core technology can be integrated along the entire life cycle of technology because of its value extensibility, while integration of this technology required a corresponding platform. Owing to problems of China status and policy, this platform is closed type. Platform based on innovation should be constructed in China. It is feasible. This platform should be divided into soft-type platform of a variety of management systems, mechanisms and modes of management etc., and hardware platform to ensure technology integration running such as money, talents, entrepreneurs, technologies, knowledge bank, etc. Countermeasures should be done by China government in order to build it, such as to reform military management system, better policies and regulations, improve personnel management, increase capital investment and strengthen risk management and so on.

This Technical Report establishes the initial Strategic Mobility 21 Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan. The plan is designed to support the deployment of the initial operating capability of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Support Platform (JDDSP). This initial plan is considered a living document that will be updated periodically during the program development effort. For long term experimentation planning, SM21 is following the general guidance provided by the Office of Force Transformation and US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Additionally, the guidance provided by the Focused Logistics - Joint Operations Concept (JOC); Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept (JIC); the Joint Sea Basing JIC; and the Sense and Respond Logistics JIC have been incorporated as appropriate.

An interagency team, sponsored by the Departments of Defense and Transportation and led by the National Security Space Office, has developed a National Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Architecture that will substantially affect future government- and commercially-provided PNT products and services. The Architecture envisions sustained U.S. global leadership in PNT through a strategy that makes greater PNT capabilities more generally available. The strategy is supported by vectors, or enterprise architecture elements, for using multiple PNT-related phenomenologies and interchangeable PNT solutions, PNT and Communications synergy, and cooperative organizational structures.

AFRL/RXM ManTech, the Manufacturing and Technology Division of the Air Force Research Laboratory's (AFRL) Materials and Manufacturing Directorate, is charged with understanding and facilitating successful new key technologies for the United States Air Force. In the past, this mission has primarily focused on understanding and facilitating the science behind these new technologies and the manufacturing process required for stable product availability. Success is being re-defined to include the science and technology maturation process which includes the manufacturing capability and business viability of the organizations providing these specialty products. A process named the Rapid Industrial Preparedness Assessment (RIPA) has been created to aid AFRL/RXM ManTech's technology evaluators in assessing this definition of success. The RIPA has been developed specifically for this application by the Center for Executive Education at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN.

The Intelligent Ground Vehicle Competition (IGVC) is one of three, unmanned systems, student competitions that were founded by the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) in the 1990s. The IGVC is a multidisciplinary exercise in product realization that challenges college engineering student teams to integrate advanced control theory, machine vision, vehicular electronics, and mobile platform fundamentals to design and build an unmanned system. Teams from around the world focus on developing a suite of dual-use technologies to equip ground vehicles of the future with intelligent driving capabilities. Over the past 15 years, the competition has challenged undergraduate, graduate and Ph.D. students with real world applications in intelligent transportation systems, the military and manufacturing automation. To date, teams from over 50 universities and colleges have participated. This paper describes some of the applications of the technologies required by this competition and discusses the educational benefits. The primary goal of the IGVC is to advance engineering education in intelligent vehicles and related technologies. The employment and professional networking opportunities created for students and industrial sponsors through a series of technical events over the four-day competition are highlighted. Finally, an assessment of the competition based on participation is presented.

This report describes the capabilities of the TRANSWAY suite of tools in the logistical domain. It addresses in particular their suitability for supporting an end-to-end military deployment exercise that is scheduled to occur within the Southern California public transportation corridor sometime in the first half of 2007. In support of this planned exercise the ontology-based intelligent agents of the TRANSWAY adaptive toolset will be able to assist operators in the planning and re-planning of delivery plans along alternative surface routes and air channels within a geo-spatial reference frame.

This analysis examined the rail network capacity and average transit times for commercial and surge military deployments through the proposed Victorville - Joint Power Projection Support Platform (JPPSP) and trans-loading to vessels at Southern California (SOCAL) ports, as part of the Strategic Mobility 21 (SM21) program. Dependable rail service is needed to eliminate port congestion. Baseline rail dispatch simulations were analyzed to determine current baseline and forecasted shipment impact on regional rail main line segments capacity and the further impact of military deployments. The military deployment scenarios studied were: (1) containerized Surge Sustainment and a Stryker Brigade deployed through the Port of Long Beach, and (2) a notional military force deployed through the Port of San Diego. The analysts concluded that if the 2010 and 2025 Scenario improvements analyzed in this report were implemented, the speed and reliability of both military surge deployments and commercial traffic would be significantly improved, in spite of continued strong growth in commercial traffic.

The U.S. Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS) is being designed and implemented to provide data and information needed to address seven societal goals related to (1) climate, (2) maritime operations, (3) natural hazards, (4) homeland security, (5) public health, (6) marine ecosystems, and (7) living marine resources. The operational objective is to achieve these goals by providing more timely and accurate assessments of the state of marine systems and predictions of changes in state. Operational capabilities from observations to models are more advanced for those goals that only require physical oceanographic and meteorological observations (goals 1-4) and less advanced for those that also require biological and chemical oceanographic observations (goals 5-7). Thus, building and improving an integrated system that routinely and continuously provides quality controlled data and information in support of decision making for all seven goals will require considerable investment in science and education and timely, effective synergy between advances in science and the development of operational capabilities. A major objective of the IOOS is to facilitate synergy between the development of operational capabilities and advances in scientific understanding of oceanic and coastal environments and their impacts on socio-economic systems. To facilitate synergy between research and improvements in operational capabilities, the IOOS includes a spectrum of activities from operational elements to research, pilot, and pre-operational projects. Research and pilot projects represent the research and development end of the IOOS. Transition from a pilot project to pre-operational status is a major step, and it is one that must be undertaken through collaboration between research and operational communities with the support of the organization that will integrate the new capability into to its operational systems. Describing a rational procedure for linking research and operational activities and developing a more integrated approach to how research and operational data streams are used is one thing. Implementing them is another. Needed now are government policies and procedures for doing so - from adopting standards and protocols required for interoperability to the formulation of budgets for operational activities in concert with budgets for research intended to improve operational capabilities

'Dual use' refers to those technologies that can, with some adaptation, have both military and civilian applications. It is a concept rooted in the dichotomies of the Cold War. Over the last 55 years it has served both to structure an export control regime aimed at limiting the diffusion of advanced technology to hostile states and to underpin a range of domestic defense acquisition policies aimed at increasing the utilization of civilian technologies by the military. With the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the boundaries between civil and military technologies, U.S. policy to control the spread of military-related technology is in disarray. A more workable policy would replace open-ended support for new military technology with a realistic assessment of the security risks and needs, and limit export controls to a few, highly dangerous technologies.

The Department of Defense (DoD) continues its strong support of research and development (R&D) in Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) technology for military system applications. Systems useful for homeland security applications could benefit from the MEMS investment for military systems. This document reviews past and current DoD MEMS developments for military systems and identifies potential applications of MEMS technology to homeland security devices and systems. For the areas cited where MEMS has potential application in military systems and homeland security systems, coordination between DoD and DHS throughout the development cycle is recommended.

BAE Systems is the leading producer of uncooled microbolometer based thermal imaging engines in the world. Initial investments to develop and produce uncooled infrared (IR) technology were primarily driven by military applications, but it was the commercial market with the potential for large product volumes which provided BAE Systems with the business model required for investment in uncooled IR technology. This paper reviews the heritage of BAE Systems technology and current products and is an example of the success of a Dual-Use technology area which DARPA invested in during the 1990s.