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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to verify the existence of financial constraints for investment in Brazil, an emerging market with growing international visibility. Design/methodology/approach – Using panel data methodology and generalized method of moments (GMM), the paper estimates dynamic investment models based on the Euler equation and Tobin's q for a panel data set of 199 Brazilian non-financial firms for the time period 1995-2006. Findings – Results show that Brazilian firms face financial constraints since their investments depend on internally generated funds. Results are robust to different investment models based on the Euler equation, also controlling for growth opportunities. Significant investment-cash flow sensitivity has been found for the whole sample of firms. Subsamples of firms considered as under financial constraints, according to dividend payout and equity issuance policies, have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. Investment-cash flow sensitivity of financially constrained firms in Brazil is higher than that in the UK and in Romania, a transition economy. Originality/value – The results extend empirical evidence of financial constraints in Brazil. The paper contributes to the literature by assessing the firms’ financial constraint status on an annual basis, and by using panel data methodology and GMM to estimate dynamic models of investment that take into account the proposals of the hierarchy of finance theory. In addition, the paper controls for growth opportunities. Capital market imperfections affect firm investment in Brazil and such effects are even stronger for financially constrained firms.

Our aim is to analyze the type of lender and the debt maturity of Chilean firms as a function of their ownership structure and their growth opportunities. We perform the empirical analysis using an unbalanced panel data of 169 firms from 1990 to 2001. Our results show that Chilean firms with growth opportunities, ownership concentration, and a need for external funds issue short‐term bank debt to finance their new investments. This financing source is an efficient mechanism in Chile to alleviate agency and asymmetric information problems. The Chilean institutional environment influences firms’ decisions on banking debt.

A board of directors is one of the most important corporate governance instruments available to banks. Another is the design of compensation packages for managers and directors to align their goals with those of other bank stakeholders: owners, creditors, depositors, taxpayers and regulators. Stakeholders can complement monitoring with incentive pay schemes by making the manager a residual claimant to the additional value obtained by his/her actions. However, compensation models for banks do not only have to align managerial and shareholder incentives, but must also avoid excessive risk-taking that may result in systemic risk (Bolton et al., 2010; Gordon, 2010).

The remarkable growth of literature about corporate governance during recent years is evidence of the importance that this issue has gained in the business world. The topic “corporate governance” is beginning to take the important place it deserves in the economics of organizations.