1. Theory choice, non-epistemic values, and machine learning
- Author
-
Ravit Dotan
- Subjects
business.industry ,05 social sciences ,No free lunch theorem ,General Social Sciences ,Theory choice ,06 humanities and the arts ,0603 philosophy, ethics and religion ,Machine learning ,computer.software_genre ,050105 experimental psychology ,Epistemology ,Philosophy of language ,Philosophy ,Argument ,060302 philosophy ,Economics ,No free lunch in search and optimization ,Condensed Matter::Strongly Correlated Electrons ,0501 psychology and cognitive sciences ,Epistemic virtue ,Problem of induction ,Artificial intelligence ,business ,computer ,Underdetermination - Abstract
I use a theorem from machine learning, called the “No Free Lunch” theorem (NFL) to support the claim that non-epistemic values are essential to theory choice. I argue that NFL entails that predictive accuracy is insufficient to favor a given theory over others, and that NFL challenges our ability to give a purely epistemic justification for using other traditional epistemic virtues in theory choice. In addition, I argue that the natural way to overcome NFL’s challenge is to use non-epistemic values. If my argument holds, non-epistemic values are entangled in theory choice regardless of human limitations and regardless of the subject matter. Thereby, my argument overcomes objections to the main lines of argument revealing the role of values in theory choice. At the end of the paper, I argue that, contrary to common conception, the epistemic challenge arising from NFL is distinct from Hume’s problem of induction and other forms of underdetermination.
- Published
- 2020
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