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Feedback from rule-making is an important facet of regulatory processes. By examining the operations of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), a transnational private certification program, we explore two types of feedback that operate within and outside R-I-T relationships and potentially influence agenda-setting and rule-reformulation. Within R-I-T relationships, intermediation feedback results from the knowledge that intermediaries acquire as they translate rules into practical forms applicable to specific regulatory targets. Intermediaries may communicate this knowledge to the regulator to strategically inform rule-reformulation. But the regulator may also have access to this information if transparency obligations come with the responsibility of performing intermediation functions. Outside R-I-T relationships, evaluation feedback involves external evaluative audiences -- actors outside the regulatory process that hold an interest in evaluating and influencing that process. Transparency about R-I-T relationships should strengthen this feedback, though lack of information will not prevent external evaluators from rendering judgments and seeking to influence rule-reformulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transnational private governance initiatives that address problems of social and environmental concern now pervade many sectors. In tackling distinct substantive problems, these programs have, however, prioritized different problem-oriented logics in their institutionalized rules and procedures. One is a 'logic of control' that focuses on ameliorating environmental and social externalities by establishing strict and enforceable rules; another is a 'logic of empowerment' that concentrates on remedying the exclusion of marginalized actors in the global economy. Examining certification programs in the areas of fair trade, organic agriculture, fisheries, and forest management, we assess the evolutionary effects of programs prioritizing one logic and then having to accommodate the other. The challenges programs face when balancing between the two logics, we argue, elucidate specific distributional consequences for wealth, power, and regulatory capabilities that private governance programs seek to overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many authors have argued that domestic regulatory gaps as well as a lack of international cooperation can at least partly explain the emergence of non-state regulation, this article will focus on an underexplored pathway of emergence linking international, domestic, and non-state regulation. I will argue that even in the presence of a widely supported international agreement, a non-ratifying country can provide the setting for the emergence of non-state certification programs. This will happen when significant domestic legislation on the topics covered by the agreement is absent, and non-state actors are able to act as institutional entrepreneurs with an interest in implementing key elements of this agreement. By tracing the development of certification programs for the electronic waste (e-waste) recycling industry, I will show why the US, more than other countries, provided an enabling environment for the emergence of non-state e-waste recycling certification. The US's failure to ratify the Basel Convention on transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and an overall lack of domestic legislation on e-waste exports created regulatory gaps that non-state actors were able to fill. The main global watchdog of the Convention-the US-based Basel Action Network-used certification as a forum-shifting strategy to implement key parts of the Convention in the US. Finally, the article will also show that conflicting interests and divergent perspectives on the legitimacy of the Convention and its rules have led to the development of a competing industry-supported certification program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Those supplying private regulation in the global economy face two fundamental challenges if they are to ameliorate the problems for which they create these systems: targets must conform to, while demanders must have proof of, regulatory compliance. This paper explores an important area absent from assessments as to whether, when, and how, private regulatory bodies are successful in improving behavior and rewarding compliant firms: the role of technological innovations. Employing an inductive, comparative case study analysis, we offer an analytical framework that distinguishes technological innovations that improve tracking mechanisms from innovations that directly improve on-the-ground performance. We illustrate the utility of the analytical framework through an assessment of technological innovations in shaping "non-state market driven" global certification programs governing forestry, fisheries, coffee, e-waste, and climate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We assess 98 private sustainability certification programs' changes to audit policies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. • We ask whether and how these changes exacerbate existing barriers to program participation by Global South operators. • Conditions on the use of remote audits and increased costs of such audits create barriers for Global South operators. • Limited flexibility of substantive certification standards and prioritizing existing over new entrants exacerbate barriers. • We reflect on implications for private governance of the broader global political-economic changes post-COVID-19. The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted global economic relations. Transnational private regulatory programs, such as sustainability certification and eco-labeling schemes that set standards for responsible production practices in global markets, have had to react. Private regulation's market credibility is partially built on audits, which include field visits used to assess whether participating operators conform with a program's standard. But COVID-19-related health and business restrictions have forced adjustments to field-audit policies. Literature on private governance has identified several barriers to participation of Global South operators, including the costs of certification, the availability of qualified auditors, and uncertain socio-economic benefits. Are audit policy changes made because of the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating these barriers? We examine this question through a dataset constructed between April and November 2020 that contains information on COVID-19-related audit policy responses of 98 transnational private sustainability regulators. We describe the mixed transparency of these adjustments to date and five ways in which the adjustments create explicit and implicit barriers to operators from Global South countries. The changes create barriers through (1) the conditions set on when and how adjustments to audits are permitted, (2) the limited flexibility of substantive standards, (3) the potential costs of shifting to remote audits, (4) the focus on accommodating existing participants over new applicants, and (5) the potential challenges of accessing auditors to conduct assessments. We conclude with implications for research on private regulation post-COVID-19. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transnational private governance schemes, like other global rule-making arenas, are confronted with the challenges of North-South imbalances. Through their standards and certification processes, private governance schemes aim to control access to the market for sustainably certified products and may consequently generate or perpetuate global inequalities. Are these imbalances inevitable and likely to persist? This article explores North-South imbalances in the operations of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), a leading standard-setting and certification scheme for capture fisheries. We examine whether the scheme's Northern-dominated origins reflect pre-existing structural imbalances, persist through path-dependent processes, or can be addressed by scheme adaptations. Our analysis uses data on the 312 fisheries that have engaged with the MSC from 1999 to 2015. We find evidence that imbalances in the MSC reflect corporate power and structures of power in the global fisheries sector, but that path dependence has also elevated the power of unexpected countries. Adaptations to date have been less successful as a means to lessen Northern dominance. • Structure affects rule making and auditing in MSC through corporate power • Dominant fisheries countries influence but do not predetermine imbalances • MSC sustainability rules and governance bodies are subject to path dependence • MSC adaptations have focused on changing assessment procedures for data-poor fisheries • Fisheries uptake likely more influenced by market demand than MSC adaptations [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]